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ABSTRACT
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) and the communication and the security therein have
been gaining further prominence in the tech-industry recently, with the emergence of the
so called Internet of Things (IoT). The steps from acquiring data and making a reactive
decision base on the acquired sensor measurements are complex and requires careful execu-
tion of several steps. In many of these steps there are still technological gaps to fill that are
due to the fact that several primitives that are desirable in a sensor network environment
are bolt on the networks as application layer functionalities, rather than built in them. For
several important functionalities that are at the core of IoT architectures we have developed
a solution that is analyzed and discussed in the following chapters.
The chain of steps from the acquisition of sensor samples until these samples reach a
control center or the cloud where the data analytics are performed, starts with the acquisi-
tion of the sensor measurements at the correct time and, importantly, synchronously among
all sensors deployed. This synchronization has to be network wide, including both the wired
core network as well as the wireless edge devices. This thesis studies a decentralized and
light weight solution to synchronize and schedule IoT devices over wireless and wired net-
works adaptively, with very simple local signaling. Furthermore, measurement results have
to be transported and aggregated over the same interface, requiring clever coordination
among all nodes, as network resources are shared, keeping scalability and fail-safe opera-
tion in mind. Furthermore ensuring the integrity of measurements is a complicated task.
On the one hand Cryptography can shield the network from outside attackers and therefore
is the first step to take, but due to the volume of sensors must rely on an automated key
distribution mechanism. On the other hand cryptography does not protect against exposed
keys or inside attackers. One however can exploit statistical properties to detect and iden-
tify nodes that send false information and exclude these attacker nodes from the network to
avoid data manipulation. Furthermore, if data is supplied by a third party, one can apply
automated trust metric for each individual data source to define which data to accept and
i
consider for mentioned statistical tests in the first place. Monitoring the cyber and physical
activities of an IoT infrastructure in concert is another topic that is investigated in this
thesis.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Recently the study of wireless sensor networks (WSN), and the communication and
the security therein, have been gaining further prominence in the tech-industry, with the
emergence of the so called Internet of Things (IoT). Wirelessly connected sensors are a
popular alternative for their cost advantage over wired sensors and are used for a variety of
applications in industrial applications and environmental sensing projects. The steps from
acquiring data and making a reactive decision on the sensor measurements are complex and
requires careful execution of several steps. There are several technological gaps that still
exist in the design of IoT have to do with several primitives that are desirable in a sensor
network environment are bolt on the networks as application layer functionalities rather
than built in them. For several important functionalities we have proposed and studied a
solution that is analyzed and discussed in the following chapters. The contributions of this
dissertation are visualized in Figure 1.1.
The first step a) we focused on, that is critical in many industrial control IoT, is the
acquisition of the sensor measurement at the correct time and, importantly, synchronously
among all sensors deployed. A synchronous measurement system system enables a number
of array processing and multi-sensor control algorithms to be applied on the data streaming
from the sensors, without having to ensure ubiquitous access to Global Positioning Systems
time-signals. The scheme we propose is fully integrated with the PHY and MAC layer
signaling of the nodes, eliminating the normal overhead of clock distribution protocols and
of scheduling.
The next crucial step b) is the transmission of the data over the wireless channel to a set
of aggregation points. While it is true that asynchronous solutions that are prevalent today
(e.g. the popular IEEE802.11 and IEEE802.15 solution series) are generally more robust
with respect to network failures, a significant number of applications in industrial control
are not delay tolerant and the sensors utilized are often constant bit rate sources, since they
1
Figure 1.1: Visualization of the contributions of this dissertation. Left: Steps from data
collection in wireless sensor network clusters, local processing with randomized gossiping,
aggregation in multiple levels, and security throughout the transmission, until the sensor
data arrives at a network operator. Right: All the work presented in this dissertation
typically continuously sample and are bound to report physical measurements at a regular
pace. Resolving network access conflicts among all nodes is not only critical to reduce
packet-loss and maximize transmission efficiency, but to address the critical issue of latency
and scalability of the network. Solving this network access conflicts optimally is NP hard,
and therefore difficult in large networks and we provide a scalable, decentralized solution
mentioned above. The steps protocol and architecture we proposed to support both steps
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a (synchronization) and b (scheduling) are in chapter 2 considering a wireless medium. We
then extended this work architecture in chapter 3 to work in the wired network backhaul
allowing for decentralized, minimum end-to-end latency, scheduling and synchronization.
Step c) is the analytics and aggregation of the sensor data to a central point, such as an
operations center or the cloud services where the data are published and the analytics are
performed. While all the aforementioned methods allow to alleviate bottlenecks or even fully
decentralize the joint processing of data, in several IoT network environments some of the
processing can occur in a fully distributed fashion greatly reducing the latency with which
events alerts can be given. Events that are detected locally can be an important indicator to
prioritize traffic. When transporting the data that report about abnormal conditions, such
as equipment failures and detected attacks should have priority over uneventful sensor data
or status messages. In chapter 4 we describe an architecture to stream data in an industrial
IoT for electric utilities, that manages traffic with priorities derived directly from nodal data
analytics. We have implemented this architecture in cooperation with Lawrence Berkley
National Laboratories, for the collection and analysis of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs)
measurements and SCADA traffic analysis data, inteded to issue alerts about anomalies and
potential cyber-physical attacks. While all the aforementioned methods allow to alleviate
bottlenecks or even fully decentralize the joint processing of data, in several IoT network
environments some of the processing can occur in a fully distributed fashion. Rather than
relying on cloud analytics, one can leverage distributed computational capabilities and
peer to peer connectivity and use message passing algorithms to perform the computations
directly using the meshed network as a parallel computation platform. In this context a
crucial step d) is protecting the integrity of the data processing. Gossip-Based algorithms
are well suited for distributed processing because of their self-healing capabilities in case of
to node failures and ability to adapt to network changes with nearly no network overhead.
One of the key problems is that Gossip based algorithms are sensitive to data injection
attacks. Cryptography can help protect a network against an outside attacker, but it does
not protect against an inside attacker that has access to cryptographic keys. Furthermore
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cryptographic operations, especially asymmetric ones, are computationally expensive and
might not be available in inexpensive WSN implementations. To solve this issue we have
developed an algorithm that can be executed in a distributed fashion, in order to detect,
locate and isolate manipulating adversaries. This is discussed in chapter 5.
1.2 Introduction
We are living on the cusp of a new era where human beings will be surrounded by net-
worked sensors in every situation of their everyday life. In many applications that will deal
with automation and industrial processes, the information from multiple synchronized and
networked sensors is required for the individual task to be successfully executed. Further-
more the sensor data has to be processed and aggregated towards a control center. These
applications will require high standards for security and availability of information about
critical events, which will need to take priority over uneventful data. This thesis combines
several threads of works that touch upon all of these aspects.
The first main thread of this dissertation focuses on supporting synchronous data acquisition
and TDM communications for IoT applications that have tight requirements in terms of la-
tency. The communication in wireless sensor networks frequently rely on wireless standards
such as WiFi and Zigbee, which are inherently asynchronous and resolve medium access con-
flicts decentralized Carrier Sensing Multiple Access (CSMA) methods. The need for network
synchronization, on the other hand, is typically addressed through dedicated out-of-band
control channels, like the Global Positioning System (GPS), or through an application layer
protocol such as the the Precision Time Protocol (PTP). While GPS and PTP can provide
time information for synchronous sensing, they do not solve the communication scheduling
problem which can be difficult, especially in large mesh networks of sensors. In fact, the
optimal scheduling problem is known to be NP-hard [Ramanathan(1997)] and thus, several
heuristic solutions have been proposed to allocate portions of the time frame to network
nodes, while meeting a given criterion of fairness [Huang and Bensaou(2001)] or maximizing
data throughput. However, in a large mesh network like a WSN, sharing and computing this
4
information may require significant overhead and complexity that increases rapidly with the
network size. Therefore several decentralized and distributed protocols have been proposed
to allow for a scalable scheduling solution. The following scheduling algorithms typically
rely on the availability of global synchronization and control information, such as the packet
destinations and data-rates, to determine the conflict free schedule. Protocols such as the
USAP [Young(1996)], DTSAP [Pond and Li(1989)] or FLUSH [Kim et al.(2007)] use a
message-passing approach, while DRAND [Rhee et al.(2006)] and the method in [Herman
and Tixeuil(2004)] formulate the time scheduling problem as an instance of the graph-
coloring problem. It is notable that our solution is not only a scheduling protocol but at
the same time also provides network wide synchronization. The protocol, called Pulse-
coupled Scheduling and Synchronization (PulseSS) protocol, is inspired by the so called
Pulse-Coupled Oscillator (PCO) model in mathematical biology. It turns out that we can
apply a similar algorithm in wired networks, by adapting the signaling to resolve conflicts
among routes rather than radio access. For this Software Defined Networks (SDN) are used
which adapted some ideas of (virtual) circuits, which typically finds application in load bal-
ancing [Vahdat and Koley(2017)], route optimization [Ohta and Sato(1992)] or for security
purposes [Chan et al.(1989)]. We apply SDN in a new way that allows for finding a network
schedule such that data can be forwarded instantly at switches with no queues needed, lead-
ing to minimal network latency. Furthermore we support network wide synchronization,
compatible with the wireless solution above. This extension is important is several Control
Area Networks (CAN) applications connecting large infrastructures. The ability to ensure a
minimum latency and synchronization could enable real time wide area control mechanisms
are based on the current state of the system which so far have been elusive because of the
communication latency and lack of reliability of traditional packet switched networks. The
management and optimization of traffic flow in VCs, or ATM networks is tackled in mul-
tiple works [Kung and Morris(1995), Newman(1994), Zhang(1990), Ross(1995), Fisk(1993)]
but the fundamental problem are the inflexibility to adapt to faster networking equipment,
fixed cell size and limited connections over the same link were fundamental problems ul-
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timately leading to the prevalence of packet-switched IP, with a flexible and completely
decentralized network. PulseSDN can also be applied to chip interconnects, where the
growing amount parallelism increases the demand for communication wires inside a (set
of) computer chip(s). These communication wires, in the current development, can no
longer be controlled from a central point, due to scaling issues [Taylor et al.(2003)]. There-
fore chip recent chip interconnect implementations aim to use routed networks [Dally and
Towles(2001)], potentially reducing the amount of communication wires needed and thus
reducing chip production cost. The savings originate in sharing the communication wire
among entities, and the access control to this shared wires requires intelligent scheduling
to meet all entities demand for communication with the corresponding bandwidth and la-
tency. While there are some constant bandwidth requirements that allow entities to be
pre-scheduled [Dally and Towles(2001)], there is a growing amount of dynamically changing
traffic due to recent advancements of specialized co-processors, such as graphics card and
FPGAs [Che et al.(2008)] [Chrysos(2014)], that have very dynamic communication needs,
depending on the task being executed. As stated communication demands are rising, due to
(die) space and wiring constrains and a peer-to-peer solution is required [Jablin et al.(2012)]
to distribute the network load. An inter chip SDN network, with decentralized control as
presented in this work, could be the solution.
The second major thread of this thesis focuses on the integration of data management
and processing in an architecture that ensures the availability and integrity of the informa-
tion flows in industrial IoT applications. In this context it is important to recognize how
the choices made on processing the data can influence the traffic management and moni-
toring tasks. In particular, recognizing that data acquisition and concentration points can
be leveraged to produce distributed analytics, the idea we proposed and demonstrated in
a testbed is to leverage the analytics to create priorities that can be exploited to schedule
traffic and make important data available in real time. Many other authors focusing on CPS
security have argued that the physics and knowledge of the control environment can, along
with sensor information and thorough monitoring of network traffic, provide significantly
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more insight in the analysis of controllers communications than solely sensing network traf-
fic [Ca´rdenas et al.(2011),Bass(2000),Varshney(1997),Berthier and Sanders(2013),Crdenas
et al.(2014),Koutsandria et al.(2014),McParland et al.(2014)] . While there have been sev-
eral experiments and demonstrations in literature, there is no reference model for how the
data aggregation and analysis should be structured. Our goal in part of this dissertation
is to fill this gap, by presenting an architecture that can support aggregation and analysis
of sensor data from both physical (analog) and cyber (digital) measurements. We propose
a modular design that allows easy addition and reconfiguration of software and hardware
components. The architecture is designed in a hierarchical fashion, and the sensor data
analytics are performed at various levels of this hierarchy, to ensure a fail-safe architecture
and to mitigate latency issues. To offer a concrete example, in the dissertation we discuss in
detail our testbed which is applied to support the security monitoring of an electric distribu-
tion grid, through the collection and analysis of Micro-Phasor Measurement Unit (µPMU)
data as well as Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) packets flowing in the
control area network.
The architecture we describe is meant to be the backbone to all security efforts and it
is designed to have a set of important features:
• Modularity and flexibility: This feature is achieved by enabling the integration of new
modules using a simple API. As the system is deployed or is updated, individuals can
work on a single module with limited knowledge about the remaining system.
• Scalability: Physical sensors nowadays produce high resolution data and as the system
grows in size, it quickly becomes impossible for a single server to handle all tasks. We
mitigate this problem by having different layers of aggregation and via multi-threading
techniques to distribute the workload on multiple interconnected computers, operating
jointly as a cluster.
• Analytics at multiple locations: To overcome latency in detecting and reporting
threats and to add resilience against data injection, the data analytics in our model
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are performed at various layers, starting from the lowers that is directly next to the
sensors to the central level at the top of the pyramid, as explained in section 4.3.2.
• Data stream prioritization: A unique feature of our architecture is that it takes ad-
vantage of the results of the data analysis at each layer to prioritize and reduce the
amount of data that are going to be sent upstream in real-time. More specifically, the
results of the analysis of data produces a priority index for the data segment that is
going to be forwarded by the sensor. Prioritization is in fact crucial to avoid over-
loading the individual components, holding back insignificant data to free the server
to receive those that appear to contain critical information.
Each node in the aggregation infrastructure should further take into account how trust-
worthy the source of the sensor data is, especially if the sensor deployed and managed by
at a third party. We present a set of metrics, and a discussion of those metrics to ana-
lyze the automated assignment of trust to users in energy delivery system environments.
These metrics can be applied both to external collaborators as well as to internal staff
with the goal of reducing the amount of manual trust assignments, while at the same time
using a situation-aware engine to minimize the amount of users that have access to an as-
set, thus minimizing potential attack vectors. The principles this automated classification
relies on basic principles introduced by previous researchers. Specifically, the notion of:
Quality of Service (QoS) trust introduced by [Cho et al.(2011)], where trust is evaluated
through the communication network by measuring the capability of a node to deliver mes-
sages to the destination node. Additionally, the notion of Social trust introduced by [Cho
et al.(2011)] [Mei and Stefa(2010)] is based on perceived honesty or integrity in social rela-
tionships, and friendship in social ties. Key parts of social trust for each node is honesty,
unselfishness of the node. The honesty of a node can be measured in various ways depending
on the application [Mei and Stefa(2010)]. Third Party trust is trust that blindly trusts a
third party. This principle is used for the trusted DNS rootzone [Abley et al.(2016)] as well
as for SSL/TLS certificates [Dierks and Rescorla(2008)]. Control Area trust is the trust
that is used in industrial control environments [Das and Teng(1998)]. Critical for Control
8
Area trust is that even one-time access to an asset can have fatal consequences if the user
has malicious intends.
An alternative to a hierarchical aggregation systems is offered by flat architectures such
as Gossip-Based algorithms, whose properties include the built-in fault tolerance to node
failures, as nodes can reorganize themselves automatically. These algorithms work perfectly
in combination with the decentralized synchronization and scheduling protocol introduced
earlier, preserving the described properties of fault tolerance in the decentralized structure.
Our focus in the case of fully decentralized architectures is to study methods to monitor
integrity of the message passing process. In fact, to prevent interference from unauthorized
external nodes, authentication and encryption methods can be used [Perrig et al.(2002),Zhu
et al.(2003)]. While we can protect the control area networks communications with ordinary
network security tools such as firewalls, these methods can be insufficient to protect the
system [Slay and Miller(2008)]. Unfortunately, in the case of an insider attack gossip-based
algorithms are highly vulnerable, even if only one node is compromised. In fact, the flat,
self-organizing architecture, which is the selling feature for gossiping algorithms, can become
a liability. Events such as the Stuxnet malware [Chen and Abu-Nimeh(2011)] or the attack
on the Ukraine Power Grid in 2015 [Lee et al.(2016)] and 2016 [Cherepanov(2017)] prove
that insider attacks can happen and, therefore, standard methods, such as firewalls should
not be the only line of defense.
In chapter 5, we study this problem focus on detecting an attacker in the insider attack
scenario, where authentication and encryption have failed. Noting that average consen-
sus gossiping is equivalent to the DeGroot model dynamics [DeGroot(1974)], the attack
scenarios are identical to models that have emerged for the study of stubborn agents or
zealots in social networks (see e.g. [Yildiz and Scaglione(2010),Waagen et al.(2015),Ramos
et al.(2015),Mobilia(2003),Yildiz et al.(2011),Wai et al.(2016)]). We propose decentralized
strategies, which aim at detecting and localizing insider attackers by analyzing the statis-
tics of the nodes’ states, as the nodes in the network perform the algorithm several times
starting from different initial conditions. While in general data injection from attackers
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(or stubborn agents) will not lead to a consensus [Yildiz and Scaglione(2010), Acemoglu
et al.(2013)], in this work we model the attackers in the randomized consensus algorithm
as a group of coordinated agents that are trying to steer the consensus state to a value of
their choosing, while hiding their nature by judiciously preserving the expected exponential
convergence rate [Dimakis et al.(2010)] and leading the network to consensus towards a
desired final state (see Section 5.1.1). This is the worst case scenario, since the network will
still converge to consensus, but to the wrong state. We refer to the two proposed strategies
as the time difference and spatial difference methods respectively and refer to nodes that are
not attackers as normal nodes. Our methods are fully decentralized and hence each normal
node can detect and localize neighboring attackers independently. Moreover, the spatial
strategy can even detect an attack which is not a direct neighbor of the sensing node. Once
a normal node detects and localizes an attacker, it can report the anomaly to a central
authority or, alternatively, cut future communication with the attacker. Eventually, the
proposed algorithms isolate all the attackers from the network, thereby preventing future
harm to the whole system. It is worth mentioning that each node only needs to collect
its local statistical information by evaluating messages transmitted by nodes in the neigh-
borhood as the protocol is executed. Therefore, no additional communication overhead is
required in the two proposed strategies, which is perfect for our decentralized networking
deployment.
1.3 Organization of This Dissertation
In chapter 2 we show a completely decentralized, clustered synchronization and schedul-
ing protocol. We will show it’s performance both in simulation as well as in a micro controller
implementation
In chapter 3 we extend the work of chapter 2 and apply a similar decentralized, syn-
chronization and scheduling protocol to wired Software Defined Networks for the seamless
integration between wireless access and wired core network in wide area IoT communica-
tions. Wired networks are fundamentally different from a wireless broadcast medium and
require key changes to the protocol signaling.
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In chapter 4 we discuss a hierarchical data collection architecture for monitoring wide
area cyber-physical IoT infrastructures. The novel notion introduced with respect to other
standard data collection networks is that each layer incorporates data analytics whose out-
come is used to decide what is the right priority to send the data upstream, in order to
reduce the latency in communicating event alerts compared to data that do not reveal any
anomaly. We also present a metric for classifying a users trustworthiness, especially useful
when data is shared among multiple entities that do not trust each other blindly. We im-
plemented this architecture in collaboration with Laurence Berkeley National Laboratories
and its aim is the collection of electric power sensors and SCADA traffic data that are fused
to detect if there are physical events and if them can be traced back to a malicious attack
to the SCADA network.
In chapter 5 we show how nodes executing a inherently vulnerable randomized-gossiping
algorithm, can be protected from an inside attacker. For this purpose we locally evaluate the
data send from neighboring nodes and exploit statistical properties and expected behavior.
We conclude this work with a summary in chapter 6.
1.4 Prior Works
In this section we describe some prior works for the projects showcased in this disserta-
tion.
1.4.1 Prior Work on Synchronization and Scheduling (Ch. 1&2)
As we mentioned in the introduction, there is a significant body of work on both net-
work synchronization and scheduling. Our work fits into a specific class of protocols that
borrow design principles from mathematical models of emergent behavior in biological net-
works. For decades, engineers have tried to draw inspiration from the field of mathematical
biology, to emulate the simple rules that lead to organized behavior in natural swarms
and invent lightweight and easy to deploy protocols that meet the desired coordination
goals. Our focus is a mechanism that builds on the pulse coupled oscillator (PCO) mod-
els from mathematical biology [Peskin(1975)], and supplies two important primitives for
11
Table 1.1: Comparison between WirelessHART and PulseSS
Protocol WirelessHART PulseSS
Medium Access Control Central, by the Network Manager
Decentralized, each cluster operates independently
from other clusters
Knowledge of global network required Yes No
Source of Timing Built in, but only basic mechanics defined Build in
Timing Provided to Sensors Yes Yes
Timing Accuracy few µs per hop have been shown [Kim et al.(2008)]
Simulations show errors of <5ns per hop depending
on Bandwidth and Transmission power
Network Layer Defined Yes No
clustered ad-hoc networks: decentralized synchronization and medium access control. Re-
lated work on PCO-based scheduling algorithms include the Desync protocol in [Degesys
et al.(2007)], our previous work on proportional fair scheduling [Pagliari et al.(2010)], and
follow-up works in [Motskin et al.(2009), Kang and Wong(2009)] that relax the all-to-all
connectivity assumption required by the former two. PCO synchronization for network-
ing applications was investigated by many, see e.g. [Hong and Scaglione(2003), Pagliari
and Scaglione(2011), Lucarelli and Wang(2004), Mallada and Tang(2010)]. Further work
has shown that PCO synchronization does not work well if it is merged with CSMA/CSCA
protocols [Werner-Allen et al.(2005)]. Efficient implementations of the PCO protocol should
disable CSMA [Pagliari and Scaglione(2011)] or use a separate dedicated radio band [Wang
and Apsel(2007)].
There are other relevant scheduling schemes in the wireless communication world that
find scheduling solutions on a conflict graph. One of this schemes is WirelessHART protocol
[Foundation(2007)]. WirelessHART is one of the current industry standards, however it has
various drawbacks. First WirelessHART [Lennvall et al.(2008)] is centrally managed by a
single network manager requiring network visibility and limits scaling beyond 600 nodes,
limiting the size of the application and introducing a single point of failure. In contrast,
in our proposed protocol each cluster is managed locally, thus our solution is naturally
scalable. Moreover, network synchronization is provided by flooding the network with a
synchronization signal from this central point similar to [Maroti et al.(2004)]. This is done
without any correction for signaling delay thus in the wireless domain several µs delay
per hop can be expected. A comparison of WirelessHART with our proposed PulseSS
protocol can be found in Table 1.1. The protocol ISA100.11a [An(2009)], is very similar
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to WirelessHART and has its key differences in the network layer and above. Therefore
ISA100.11a suffers from the same problems as WirelessHART: central management and
need for global knowledge of the network topology.
The proposed protocol is referred to as the Pulse-coupled Synchronization and Schedul-
ing (PulseSS) protocol, building on the principles of pulse-coupled-oscillators mentioned
earlier. PulseSS works in an ad-hoc mesh network scenario, where nodes are grouped into
clusters (with nodes communicating with a designated cluster head (CH)) and contend for
the same spectrum resources adaptively. The architecture is similar to the IEEE 802.11
standard: 1) transmissions are only allowed from and to the CH and 2) CH’s acknowledge
the reception of signals from nodes in their range to expose hidden terminals.
The key difference of this work is that PulseSS interlaces the PCO signaling with the
scheduling signals, allowing to naturally separate the control traffic from the data traffic
transmitted on the same physical channel. Compared to [Degesys et al.(2007)] and [Pagliari
et al.(2010)], the scheduling protocol we propose resolves conflicts among neighboring cells,
i.e. it does not require an all-to-all connectivity. In fact, the PulseSS protocol can be viewed
as the integration and realization of the theory of PCO synchronization and desynchroniza-
tion previously studied in e.g. [Hong and Scaglione(2003),Pagliari and Scaglione(2011),Lu-
carelli and Wang(2004),Mallada and Tang(2010),Pagliari et al.(2010),Degesys et al.(2007),
Motskin et al.(2009), Kang and Wong(2009)]. The benefits that we will showcase are: 1)
collision avoidance; 2) integrated signaling; 3) improved synchronization accuracy. Some of
our preliminary results on the PulseSS TinyOS experiment in the numerical section can be
found in [Gentz et al.(2015a)] and the related in depth convergence analysis is in [Ferrari
et al.(2017)].
The notions and analysis of PulseSS can be extended to deal with packet switching in
saturated wired networks and provide a solution that ties together the wireless access and
wired backhaul network seamlessly. Scheduling with a Earliest Deadline First principle is
a distributed principle and gives the same results as PulseSDN when the packets can be
served immediately at the core of the network. However in as soon as the network gets
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crowded and congested then PulseSDN can dynamically regulated the traffic flow at each
source node and can keep minimal end-to-end latency. Earliest Deadline First scheduling, in
a congested case, will queue up data at switches with resulting in delays and thus increased
and uncontrolled latency. In a traditional WAN system this problem is solved by over-
provisioning each link and not utilizing the full capacity of each link [Duan et al.(2003)].
The conflict graph solved in this chapter is similar to the conflict graph of wireless
PulseSS in chapter 2. However, in chapter 3 we are using a wired peer-to-peer approach
that requires a completely new signaling as connections can go over multiple hops and links
that each have different conflicts that have to be respected.
In this context, There are several related works on virtual circuit systems (VCS), as they
were in use since the beginning of networking. ATM networks [Stallings(1998)] provide an
organization for VCS. Internally ATM schedules in TDMA fashion data sent into a fixed
size cell on each link. Each VCS has to use an integer multiple of this fixed cell size which
is complex to allocate on demand. Routing in form of VP requires deep knowledge of the
network architecture in order to function. These complexities and requirements became too
hard to manage with higher networks speeds, especially as the cell size did not grow with ad-
vancements in communication technology. For this reason ATM became obsolete and packed
switched IP became dominant because of its simple and robust way to schedule traffic based
on the “best effort” principle [Stallings(1998)] using local decisions that are unaffected by
a change of route. The need of providing deterministic time delivery for data, particularly
in control area networks, never disappeared and the solution called Deterministic Ether-
net [Plankensteiner(2010)] later emerged as a solution that provides minimal end-to-end
transmission latency and provides global synchronization. [Plankensteiner(2010)] provides
synchronization from a set of central master devices in a fashion similar to the Precision
Time Protocol (PTP). Once synchronization is archived a precomputed schedule is used,
that does not require queues or delays as switches, similar to our protocol. The problem of
this implementation is that this schedule is precomputed and thus cannot react dynamically
on changed environments or communication demands.
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1.4.2 Data Management for Cyber-Physical Security Applications(Ch.4)
Related works for an infrastructure include [Li et al.(2015)] and [Rajagopalan and Varsh-
ney(2006)] and references herein, and the commercially available solutions [AmazonKine-
sis(2017)] [IBMstreams(2017), Apa(2017)]. Most presented related works are modular and
scalable, but do not support analytics at multiple location and thus cannot prioritize the
data accordingly when propagating it through the network, nor can operate locally for fail
safe reasons. Other researchers implemented aggregation algorithms that can perform ag-
gregations with untrusted aggregation nodes [Chan et al.(2006)] these systems however miss
out as they ignore the information value in the transported data for prioritization purposes.
Others [Kalpakis et al.(2003)] ignore the need for security and are vulnerable to simple man
in the middle attacks or access and tampering by untrusted third party nodes.
There are several existing methods that seek to find a way to compute trust for a user
in an automated fashion. We split the trust applications for communication purposes in the
following categories: quality of service, social trust, third party trust, and control area trust.
Our primary requirements are related to control area trust, but it is essential to examine
similarities and differences with trust metrics applied in other context as well. The Quality
of Service (QoS) trust [Cho et al.(2011)] is measured through the communication network
as the capability of a node to deliver messages to the destination node. This includes several
subcategories such as node to node throughput, latency, packet-loss, etc and for wireless
communication applications also battery consumption. These models are used in many
communication protocols e.g., in delay [Ayday and Fekri(2012)], and also peer-to-peer net-
works [Shah et al.(2007)] in order to increase the overall network speed. Social trust [Cho
et al.(2011)], [Mei and Stefa(2010)] in IoT context, is based on perceived honesty and un-
selfishness of a node or entity with respect to its expected behavior. The honesty of a node
can be found in various ways depending on the application [Mei and Stefa(2010), Gentz
et al.(2016b)]. The experted behavior also ties into QoS trust (consider the “prisoner’s
dilemma” [Rapoport and Chammah(1965)]). Trust chains, or friends-of-friends trust are
key components in trusting a user, e.g. an individual employee of a cooperating company.
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This principle is used in the web of trust principle, and is very successful if every user is ap-
plying similar metrics on what trust means with prominent members such as the well known
PGP (“Pretty Good Privacy”) [Zimmermann(1995)] or KarmaNET [Spear et al.(2009)], a
peer-to-peer trust protocol that encourages good behavior. The KarmaNET learning com-
ponent requires both positive and negative learning events. However, in the context of
control systems [Das and Teng(1998)], there is one-time administrative access on assets,
meaning that the administrator has root permissions and also has the means to keep the
permissions forever, e.g., by installing a back doors or causing permanent damage [Chen
and Abu-Nimeh(2011)] and might even happen unintentionally [Meyer and Schwenk(2013)].
Bayesian trust models, have similar learning drawbacks of also requiring negative experi-
ences [Chen et al.(2014)].
1.4.3 Data Injection Attacks in Randomized Gossiping (Ch. 5)
To the best of our knowledge, algorithms to detect and mitigate insider attacks in gossip-
based networks have received limited attention so far. Exceptions are [Yan et al.(2012),
Kailkhura et al.(2015)] and very recently [Sundaram and Gharesifard(2016)]. In [Kailkhura
et al.(2015)] the authors propose to detect injection attacks using a likelihood ratio test that
is appropriate for synchronous average consensus, but not for its more popular asynchronous
implementation, while [Sundaram and Gharesifard(2016)] proposes to discard neighbors
state values that are extreme (maxima or minima), given that malicious agents do not
average their state with that of normal nodes. Reference [Yan et al.(2012)], instead, proposes
two protection schemes for randomized consensus algorithms. The first one is motivated by
the fact that the convergence speed is usually slower in the presence of an attacker. Thus,
a data injection attack can be spotted by detecting possible anomalies in the convergence
speed, which has an exponential trend. Note that, the “normal” convergence speed can be
estimated only if we have prior knowledge of the underlying physical model; e.g., see [Aysal
et al.(2009),Dimakis et al.(2010),Boyd et al.(2006)]. The second scheme in [Yan et al.(2012)]
is based on using cryptographic signatures. However, for the detection of the attacker a node
needs to be surrounded by a majority of normal neighbors. Furthermore, the cryptographic
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solution does not detect unintentional bias at a node, which can result in similar catastrophic
results. In this work, we consider a data injection attack model in which the attackers are
insiders, they are possibly coordinated and also deceive their neighbors by following an
expected convergence rate. Therefore, the first detection scheme in [Yan et al.(2012)] is not
even applicable to our target problem. We propose two detection schemes that are based on
computing two metrics at each node whose high values are indicators of a possible attack.
The metrics are computed at each node locally, overhearing the messages exchanged in the
neighborhood over several instances of average consensus.
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2 PulseSS: A Pulse-Coupled Synchronization and Scheduling Protocol for Clustered Wire-
less Sensor Networks
Abstract: The Pulse-coupled Synchronization and Scheduling (PulseSS) protocol is pro-
posed in this work for simultaneous synchronization and scheduling of communication activ-
ities in clustered wireless sensor networks (WSNs). PulseSS emulates the emergent behavior
of pulse-coupled oscillator (PCO) networks in mathematical biology. Different from exist-
ing works that address synchronization and scheduling (i.e., desynchronization) separately,
PulseSS provides a coordination mechanism that achieves decentralized network synchro-
nization and time division multiple access scheduling simultaneously for clustered WSNs.
Here, we assume that the nodes are connected only locally via their respective cluster heads.
Moreover, PulseSS addresses the issue of propagation delays, that may plague the accuracy
of PCO synchronization in practice, by providing ways to estimate and precompensate for
these values locally at the sensors (i.e., PCOs). At the same time the protocol retains the
adaptivity and light-weight nature of PCO protocols both in terms of signaling and com-
putations. Simulations of both the physical and the medium access control layers show a
synchronization accuracy of fractions of microseconds above 15dB of SINR for a 5 cluster
network. A hardware implementation of PulseSS using TinyOS is also provided to corrob-
orate the real world applicability of our protocol.
In this chapter we describe the distributed synchronization and scheduling algorithm
for wireless networks we developed and call PulseSS. PulseSS relies on the principle of
pulse coupled oscillators, a principle also found in pacemaker cells in the human hearth.
We are considering clustered networks in which all nodes in a cluster establish a two-way
half-duplex communication with one Cluster Head (CH) in a TDMA schedule that needs
to resolve conflicts with neighboring clusters. At the same time the same nodes that are in
multiple cluster carry synchronization information from one cluster to another and allow for
global network synchronization. This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 we give
an overview of the protocol signaling and updates and the system model. In Sections 2.2 and
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2.3, we describe the proposed PCO synchronization and scheduling protocols, respectively.
In Section 2.5 we show the results of the protocol numerical simulations and in Section 2.5.2
we report the performance of the protocol in wireless network experiments that corroborate
our hypotheses and findings. Some of our preliminary results on the PulseSS TinyOS
experiment in the numerical section can be found in [Gentz et al.(2015a)] and the related
in depth convergence analysis is in [Ferrari et al.(2017)].
2.1 Overview of the PulseSS Protocol
The reference architecture of PulseSS is shown in Fig. 2.1. Note that not represented
in the physical (PHY) layer of Fig. 2.1 are all the standard modules of a transceiver
which are not part of, and are not relevant, to the inner-workings of our invention. Each
individual box represents a module of the system and all of them are explained throughout
this chapter. In this work we show the complete architecture, placing the various modules
in the appropriate OSI layers, and include provisions to control the update parameters
that lead to the specific rate assigned to each node, referred to as Demand Control. The
preliminary work in [Gentz et al.(2015a)] exclusively focused on the case of networks with
infinite backlog, while the full PulseSS solution we show here adjust the update to reflect
the actual need of the nodes, so that when the bandwidth is in excess of what is needed, the
nodes stop the process of expanding the portion of frame they occupy. As we have multiple
solutions that solve Demand Control we put each solution on the right side in Fig. 2.1. We
include a delay estimation procedure and compensation, which increases significantly the
precision of PulseSS synchronization. We also indicate how to operate the PulseSS node in
“Power Savings” mode, which leverages the periodicity of the protocol to turn the system
into sleeping mode for power savings. Furthermore, we show how this reference architecture
can be applied to a flat network infrastructure with no clusters, and how to increase the
efficiency of PulseSS by reordering the nodes transmissions. Finally we provide a reference
architecture that does not require custom physical layer processing modules in the Section
2.6.
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Figure 2.2: A network with two clusters, with one node in range of both cluster heads and
a pictorial representation of the coarse and fine clocks maintained by the nodes.
Let the WSN be described by the graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of stationary
sensor nodes and E (i.e., the set of edges) captures the pairs of nodes that are in range of
each other. The network consists of a set of cluster heads (CHs) denoted by the set C ⊂ V
and a set of regular nodes N , V−C that communicates only with the CHs. For each c ∈ C,
we define Nc ⊂ N as the set of regular (non-CH) nodes that lie within the transmission
range of CH c; and, for each v ∈ N , we define Cv , {c ∈ C : v ∈ Nc} as the set of CHs that
are within the transmission range of v.
In this dissertation we assume that CHs are preassigned, such that each node has at least
one CH in communication range. Nodes that have multiple CHs in communication range
are referred to as shared (or gateway) nodes. The management of these nodes is crucial to
ensure that all neighboring clusters can self-organize and attain conflict free schedules.
In PulseSS, each node maintains two local clocks, namely a fine clock with period T
and a coarse clock with period LT , as illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Each cycle of the coarse clock
is advanced by the expiration of L cycles of the fine clock and each cycle of the fine clock
represents a transmission time slot of duration T . The PulseSS signaling is used to locally
update the phases of both clocks, as will be explained mathematically next. These updates
synchronize the phases of the fine clocks at all nodes at the slot level (see Section 2.2) and set
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the phases of the coarse clocks apart so as to schedule for each node a portion of the L time
slots available in the frame, enabling proportional fairness and spatial reuse (see Section 2.3).
These goals are achieved by having each node transmit two control signals, a preamble which
we call the start beacon and a post-amble, called end beacon, meant to reach neighboring
CHs. As in the 802.15.4 MAC these two signals delimit the period allotted for the two way
data transmission between a node and is CH. However the beacons emissions are controlled
by the regular nodes and not the CHs and there is no contention in this interval. The times
of emission of these beacons governed by the local coarse clock expirations (every frame);
the reception of such beacons by other nodes triggers adjustments of their own coarse clocks
(and, thus, their schedules) as the CHs’ corresponding acknowledgment is received. The
notion of being coupled through an acknowledgment is new in PCO based protocols, and it
is the key ingredient to attain collision avoidance.
Mathematically, let the state of the local fine clock at node v ∈ V be described by the
phase variable
Φv(t) =
t
T
+ φv (mod 1), (2.1)
where t is the absolute time and φv ∈ [0, 1) is the offset of the clock relative to the absolute
time origin. The phase variable increases from 0 to 1 linearly in each period and marks
the portion of time that has elapsed within each time slot. Moreover, to determine its
transmission schedule, node v maintains not one but two ascending timers for the coarse
clock, i.e., a start timer and an end timer, as depicted in Fig. 2.2. The state of the start
and the end timers can be described by the phase variables
Ψ(s)v (t) ,
t
T
+ φv + ψ
(s)
v (mod L)
= sv(t) + Φv(t) (2.2)
Ψ(e)v (t) ,
t
T
+ φv + ψ
(e)
v (mod L)
= ev(t) + Φv(t), (2.3)
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where ψ
(s)
v and ψ
(e)
v are integer offsets of the timers and sv(t) , bΨ(s)v (t)c and ev(t) ,
bΨ(e)v (t)c are the indices of the start and end time slots. The timers expire when their
respective phase variables reach the value L and are reset to 0 afterwards. As mentioned
before, the expiration of the start and end timers marks the first and last time slots that
node v is scheduled to transmit (for a duration of [Ψ
(s)
v (t)−Ψ(e)v (t) (mod L)] = [sv(t)−ev(t)
(mod L)]) and the transmission begins with the start beacon and ends with the end beacon.
The two control signals inform the CH that a node v in range is transmitting for that time.
The corresponding acknowledgments by the CHs, called start and end acknowledgments,
warn other nodes in range that the channel towards the CH is busy. By having each node
u, that hears the acknowledgements, update the discrete portions of its own start and end
timers to avoid overlap (i.e., su(t) and eu(t)), nodes avoid conflicts (c.f. Section 2.3). At
the same time, synchronization is achieved by using the estimated emission times of these
beacons modulo T to update the fine-clock phase Φv(t) (c.f. Section 2.2).
Note that, even though each node update is based only on the acknowledgment of its
CHs’ in range, the synchronization information will eventually propagate through the whole
network via the updates and firings of shared nodes. It is important to remark that a node
v updates its start and end timers based on the acknowledgements that occur right before
and right after its start and end beacons, respectively. These acknowledgements may belong
to different CHs. In fact, as time elapses, these acknowledgements will most likely come
from CHs of the densest clusters. This will be made clearer in later sections.
PulseSS exhibits the following three main features:
• Synchronization – The network is synchronized at the slot level, i.e., Φu(t) = Φv(t),
for all u, v ∈ V.
• Collision Avoidance: The transmission schedules of all nodes within the neighbor-
hood of the same CH are disjoint, i.e., for any c ∈ C and u, v ∈ Nc,
Ψ(s)v (t)−Ψ(e)v (t) ≤ Ψ(s)v (t)−Ψ(s)u (t),
24
where the above operations are modulo L.
• Proportional Fair Scheduling: Transmission schedules of nodes that are in the
same cluster, with no other conflicts and that are transmitting in succession of each
other, are proportional to their demands.
Moreover, in each time slot, we divide the duration T into uplink and downlink trans-
mission periods with durations Tu = λT and Td = (1− λ)T , respectively, where λ ∈ (0, 1).
This approach not only enables two-way communication between each node and its CH, but
also avoids conflict between the uplink and downlink transmissions of two exposed nodes,
i.e., two nodes that are in range of each other but are transmitting and receiving simul-
taneously with different CH partners. Note that in the setup we assume that there is no
direct CH to CH communications. However, they could occur if CHs were to operate also
as normal nodes for a neighboring cluster.
2.2 PulseSS Synchronization Updates
Next we describe the clock update procedures required to achieve synchronization among
all fine clocks in the network. It is interesting to point out that the synchronization relies
only on the beacons and acknowledgments utilized for scheduling and, thus, comes at no
additional signaling overhead.
2.2.1 Effect of Delay on Conventional PCO synchronization
The basic idea of PCO synchronization is to have each node emit a pulse (or beacon)
whenever its local phase variable, say Φv(t), reaches 1 and have each node update its local
phase variable whenever it receives a beacon from another node. In the early studies of
PCO synchronization, the proof of synchrony among the local phase variables of all nodes
often relied on three ideal assumptions: (i) all-to-all connectivity, i.e., all nodes are in range
of each other; (ii) periodic pulsing, i.e., a pulse (or beacon) is emitted each time the phase
of the local fine clock reaches 1; and (iii) instantaneous communication, i.e., a pulse (or
beacon) transmitted by one node arrives at all other nodes instantaneously.
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Let t+ , lim→0 t +  indicate the time immediately following time t. Specifically,
suppose that a beacon was emitted by node u at time t, and that every other node v 6= u
who has overheard the beacon and is not firing at the same time, updates its local phase
variable so that the value at time t+ becomes
Φv(t
+) = min{(1 + α)Φv(t), 1}, (2.4)
where α ∈ (0, 1). By doing so, the local phase variable is advanced by an amount pro-
portional to its current value. Under the ideal assumptions mentioned above, it has been
shown in [Mirollo and Strogatz(1990)] that the PCOs will eventually converge to synchrony
with probability 1. That is, for almost all initial conditions, there exists t0 such that
Φv(t) = Φu(t), for all nodes u, v and for all t > t0. For locally connected networks, PCO
convergence has only been proven by considering asymptotically small coupling (i.e. small
α) (see e.g. [Lucarelli and Wang(2004), Mallada and Tang(2010)]). An extension of the
presented protocol could include a different choice for the dynamics of PCO update in (2.4)
to speed up the protocol convergence, as done e.g. in [Wang and Doyle(2012)].
Note also that to allow for propagation delays, several works (e.g ) introduced the use of
the refractory period, i.e. a short period of time, following the emission of the beacon at each
node, during which its phase variable cannot be updated1. The refractory period prevents
a node from being affected by other nodes whose pulses were emitted simultaneously (i.e.,
synchronized) but arrive later due to propagation delay. For typical PCO-type protocols,
the duration ∆ref of the refractory period must be chosen to be larger than twice the
propagation delay (to accommodate for the echoing effect that may occur when a node’s
own firing triggers the firing of another node) plus the likely range of the arrival time
estimation error. In mathematical terms, let r be the time of reception of a pulsing event
1This reduction in sensing time in the PCO protocol is also applied in other works with the idea of energy
savings [Wang et al.(2012),Wang et al.(2013)]. Our protocol naturally reduces the sensing time because the
node can sense only once a frame and adjacent (in time) beacons described in Section 2.3. Because the
periodicity of the beacons of interest is much slower than the PCO period T the receiver is already mostly
off.
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that occurred at time t. Then, the modified update rule is given by
Φv(r
+) =
 Φv(r), if Φv(r) ≤ ∆refmin{(1 + α)Φv(r), 1}, otherwise. (2.5)
The size of the refractory period, that is necessary for the protocol convergence, must be
chosen such that ∆ref > 2(r − t) for all neighborhoods in the network.
2.2.2 PulseSS Synchronization with Delay Compensation
In PulseSS, synchronization is achieved by utilizing the time of reception of the start
and end beacons also used for scheduling, thus re-using the same signaling. The updates
of local fine clocks are always between regular nodes (shared or not) and CHs that are in
their range.
In [Tyrrell et al.(2008)] it was shown that in PCO synchronization the error accumu-
lates over multiple hops and, thus, can be bigger than the refractory period ∆ref required to
observe convergence. PulseSS mitigates this effect by having the nodes estimate and com-
pensate for the propagation delays of acknowledgments in their updates. This is possible
because, in PulseSS, a pulse is emitted by each node only once every cycle of the coarse
clock (which has duration LT ), instead of once every fine cycle (which occurs with period
T ), as done in conventional PCO synchronization. This means the firing event of each
node is isolated from other events in the same cluster and the propagation delay between
the firing node and the CH can be estimated and the update can compensate for that.
Therefore only propagation delay estimation errors (see next subsection) accumulate, but
not the transmission delay itself. Moreover it was shown in [Ferrari et al.(2017)] that the
PCO synchronization algorithm converges for any tree network to fixed points such that the
maximum synchronization error can be bounded by the sum of the timing errors along the
hops of the longest path starting from the (this result was predicted and shown numerically
in [Ferrari et al.(2014)]). Even though there is no proof of convergence valid for an arbitrary
clustered network, numerical evidence shows that the network always converges as long as
α is sufficiently small.
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Specifically, let τˆv,c be the estimated propagation delay between node v and CH c.
Suppose that node v emits a start beacon at time t
(s)
v and is received at CH c at time
r
(s)
v . Upon receiving the start beacon from node v, CH c first computes an estimate of the
emission time of the beacon as tˆ
(s)
c,v , r(s)v − τˆc,v and then updates its local phase variable so
that the phase at time tˆ
(s)+
c,v (i.e., the time right after tˆ
(s)
c,v) is
Φc(tˆ
(s)+
c,v ) =
 Φc(tˆ
(s)
c,v), Φc(tˆ
(s)
c,v) ≤ ∆ref ,
min{(1+α)Φc(tˆ(s)c,v), 1}, else.
(2.6)
Afterwards, CH c sends an acknowledgment in the downlink (DL) transmission period of
the next time slot, i.e., at time tˆ
(s)
c + λT , where t
(s)
c , min{t > r(s)+v : Φc(t) = 1} is the
beginning of the next time slot according to CH c’s local clock. This acknowledgment is
received by all nodes in its range. Suppose that the acknowledgment is received at node
u ∈ Nc at time r(s)c . Node u computes an estimate of t(s)c as tˆ(s)c,u = r(s)c − λT − τˆu,c and
updates its local phase variable so that the phase at time tˆ
(s)+
c,u is given by
Φu(tˆ
(s)+
c,u ) =
 Φu(tˆ
(s)
c,u), Φu(tˆ
(s)
c,u) ≤ ∆ref ,
min{(1+α)Φu(tˆ(s)c,u), 1}, else.
(2.7)
By observing the reception time of the acknowledgments, node u can also obtain an estimate
of the emission time of node v’s start beacon as tˆ
(s)
v,u = tˆ
(s)
c,u − T , which is used to determine
the scheduling as described in Section 2.3.
2.2.3 Estimation of Propagation Delays
In the previous subsection we showed how the phase compensation in the synchronization
updates (such as (2.7)) (which occur when nodes send their start beacons and the CH
acknowledge them) can be performed with estimates of the propagation delays. In this
subsection we describe how the estimation of the propagation delay τˆv,c can be performed
based on a specific hand-shaking protocol for the emission and acknowledgments of the end
beacons. In particular we adopt a back-and-forth signaling between node v and CH c similar
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of the signaling in the end time slot according to node v’s time-scale
used for delay estimation and scheduling.
to that in PTP [ptp(2008)]. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.4. The impact on the network
synchronization accuracy attainable with this technique is discussed further in Section 2.5.1.
Let t
(e)
v be the time that the end timer of node v expires and that an end beacon is
emitted. Then the arrival time of the end beacon at CH c can be written as
r(e)v , t(e)v + τv,c + z(e)v , (2.8)
where τv,c is the propagation delay between node v and CH c and z
(e)
v is the estimation error
of the arrival time. The estimate is carried out in the presence of noise and interference.
In our simulations we model the estimation error z
(e)
v as a Gaussian zero mean random
variable with variance matching the so called Ziv-Zakai lower bound for the time of arrival
error variance [Dardari and Win(2009)].
Upon receiving the end beacon, CH c waits for time λT and then emits, at time t
(e)
DL ,
r
(e)
v + λT , an acknowledgment on the downlink that arrives at node v at time r
(e)
DL , t
(e)
DL +
τv,c + z
(e)
DL, where z
(e)
DL is the estimation error of the arrival time of the first acknowledgment
at node v. Similarly, after time (1 − λ)T (i.e., at time t(e)UL , r(e)DL + (1 − λ)T ), node v
emits a second acknowledgment on the uplink (UL) that arrives at CH c at time r
(e)
UL ,
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t
(e)
UL + τv,c + z
(e)
UL, where z
(e)
UL is the arrival time estimation error made when processing the
second acknowledgment at CH c2. Since t
(e)
v and r
(e)
DL are known at node v, the propagation
delay can be estimated at node v as
τˆ (v)v,c =
1
2
(r
(e)
DL − t(e)v − λT ) = τv,c +
1
2
(z(e)v + z
(e)
DL). (2.9)
Similarly, since t
(e)
DL and r
(e)
UL are known at CH c, the propagation delay can be estimated
at CH c as
τˆ (c)v,c =
1
2
[r
(e)
UL − t(e)DL − (1− λ)T ] = τv,c +
1
2
(z
(e)
DL + z
(e)
UL). (2.10)
For a static network, the delay estimation can be further refined by averaging over the
estimates obtained in the recent M coarse cycles.
Note that, to ensure that the uplink and downlink transmissions are in their respec-
tive time periods, the durations of the end beacon, the DL acknowledgment, and the UL
acknowledgment should be less than λT − τv,c, and (1−λ)T −2τv,c, λT −3τv,c, respectively.
2.3 PulseSS Scheduling Primitive
Different from the synchronization updates, the scheduling of PulseSS for collision avoid-
ance and proportional fair scheduling is achieved through the update of the discrete portions
of the nodes’ start and end timers (i.e., sv(t) and ev(t)) in each cycle of the coarse clock.
The updates and messaging mechanisms can be viewed as an extension of the theory of
PCO desynchronization studied in [Pagliari et al.(2010)] and are described as follows.
We use this section to describe the general structure of the scheduling update, repre-
sented by the block named update function and dithering in Fig. 2.1. Within this section
we assume that a node has infinite amounts of data to transmit and its queue never runs
empty. Activating the update is an option in the actual reference architecture, because the
amount of data to transmit is finite and the resources available may be in excess of some
2Note that, in the case of a beacon sent by a shared node there are multiple CH that can respond. Our
assumption is that the arrival time can be resolved as it is typical in multi-path channels, by estimating
the strongest path arrival time which should correspond to the closest CH (if that is not the correct CH, a
residual error will remain).
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or all nodes individual needs. This means that in the actual implementation of the solution
the system has to decide if the update is necessary and how to pick the parameter that
defines the desired demand. We propose different solutions to perform this decision, based
on the transmission buffer backlog, as shown in Fig. 2.1. These solutions are explained in
Section 2.3.2.
Specifically, suppose that the initial state of the start and end timers already satisfy the
collision avoidance criterion, that is, for any c ∈ C and u, v ∈ Nc,
Ψ(s)v (t)−Ψ(e)v (t) ≤ Ψ(s)v (t)−Ψ(s)u (t) (mod L). (2.11)
This can be achieved by letting the initial difference of the start and end timers at each
node be sufficiently small. If this holds true, we can denote by pick(t) the kth index at time
t of the permutation of the nodes’ indices that sorts the phase variables of the nodes in Nc
in descending order at time t i.e., in the order such that
Φpic1(t)(t) > Φpic2(t)(t) > · · · > Φpic|Nc|(t)(t).
In the following, we shall omit the time index t in Φpik(t)(t) whenever its dependence on t
is clear. For this algorithm, as it will be clear later, the firing order does not change over
time. To simplify the notation, let us consider two functions pre, suc : N ×C → N , defined
by:
pre(i, c) = pick−1 ∈ Nc (2.12)
suc(i, c) = pick+1 ∈ Nc (2.13)
for all c ∈ C and for all i ∈ Nc such that i = pick, where pic0 = pic|Nc| and pic|Nc|+1 = pic1 (the
above quantities are not defined if i /∈ Nc). Here, pre(i, c) and suc(i, c) represent the nodes
in Nc that produce a firing event (the expiration of one of the two timers) immediately
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before and after the firing of the start and the end timers of node i. Introducing:
Γpick(t) = spi
c
k
(t)− epick(t) (mod L) (2.14)
Θpick(t) = epre(pick,c)(t)− spick(t) (mod L) (2.15)
for k = 1, . . . , |Nc|, it is possible to describe mathematically the evolution of the schedule
for every cluster c by describing the dynamics of the vector:
Υc(t) , [Θpic1(t),Γpic1(t), . . . ,Θpic|Vc|(t),Γpic|Vc|(t)]
T . (2.16)
Notice that the entries of this vector are the portions of the frame allocated to each node at
time t and the corresponding intermediate guard-spaces. Our solution tries to implement,
in a decentralized fashion, a linear update of the vector Υc(t) whose dynamics converge to
a schedule that has favorable properties as fairness and efficiency.
Definition 1: We define a PulseSS Scheduling primitive any linear update of the vector in
(2.16) which can be written as
Υ(t+) = JUΥ(t) (2.17)
where Υ = [ΥT1 ,Υ
T
2 , . . . ,Υ
T
|C|]
T , J is a permutation matrix and U is any matrix that has
the following block structure
U =
 A 0
B I
 (2.18)
with A being a stochastic matrix and I the identity matrix.
Such update could be triggered by any CH acknowledgment, broadcasted to all nodes in
the communication range. The PulseSS Primitive which is described in the next subsection
has been named PulseSS Pairwise Update but similar analysis could be extended to different
sequences of primitives that respect Definition 1.
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2.3.1 PulseSS Pairwise Update
Since node i may be in the range of more than one CH, it is necessary to define
Pre(i, t) = pre
(
i, arg min
c′∈Ci
{Ψpre(i,c′)(t)− Φi(t)}
)
(2.19)
Suc(i, t) = suc
(
i, arg min
c′∈Ci
{Ψi(t)− Φsuc(i,c′)(t)}
)
(2.20)
as the two nodes (not necessarily in the same cluster) which transmit immediately before
and after node i among all the ones in clusters node i belongs to. Notice that we need node
i to have no conflicts with all the nodes in the clusters that it belongs to, which can be
more than one. The identification of these two nodes is fundamental for the bio-inspired
procedure we are going to introduce in the next subsection. To discriminate the firing times
of Pre(pick) from the others, node pi
c
k can prepare an update for any firing it hears and discard
the update if a more recent firing event is registered. Suc(pick) is easy to identify since is the
first to fire after the expiration of node pick’s own end clock. The value of ΨPre(pick)(t), which
is the reference for node pick to make its update, can be calculated simply measuring the
time it elapsed between the firing of Pre(pick) and the local clock. Hence all the information
needed to advance the protocol is implicitly available and firing beacons do not need to
carry data, but rather can be special preambles that are easy to detect at the PHY layer.
The expiration of the start and end timers marks the start and end of a node’s transmis-
sion period in each cycle. Once the start (or the end) timer of a node, say node v, expires,
a start (or an end) beacon is emitted by it in the UL period of the time slot. The beacon
emitted by node v will then be acknowledged by all CHs in range, to inform all other nodes
in the neighborhood of the CHs of the beacon emission. In case the collision avoidance
criterion is violated, admission control at CHs would not acknowledge, i.e., may deny a
second start beacon, before an end beacon is received, so that only one node at a time has
channel access. We assume that all CHs in range acknowledge at unison with an identical
beacon signal, such that acknowledgments are processed at the receiving node as a single
signal affected by multi-path (we view this as a cooperative-channel acknowledgement). Let
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pre(v) ∈ ∪c∈CvNc and suc(v) ∈ ∪c∈CvNc be the nodes that transmit immediately before and
after node v, i.e., the predecessor and successor of node v. Node v adjusts its local timers
in each cycle based on the expiration times of the end and start timers of nodes pre(v) and
suc(v) respectively. Therefore the fixed points of the algorithm represent the final schedule,
assuming the demands remain unchanged for a sufficiently long period. It is of interest to
understand if the schedule will correspond to an efficient use of the bandwidth and this is
the aim of the analysis in the next sections.
Let t
(s)
v ∈{t : Ψ(s)v (t)=L} be the expiration time instant of the start timer of node v in a
given cycle of the coarse clock and let t
(e)
v =min{t>t(s)v :Ψ(e)v (t)=L} be that of the end timer
of node v that follows immediately after. Moreover, let t
(e)
pre(v) =max{t<t
(s)
v :Ψ
(e)
pre(v)(t)=L}
be the most recent expiration time instant of the predecessor’s end timer and let t
(s)
suc(v) =
min{t> t(e)v : Ψ(s)suc(v)(t) =L} be that of the successor’s start timer. The corresponding time
estimates3 at node v are denoted by tˆ
(e)
pre(v),v and tˆ
(s)
suc(v),v. Immediately after receiving the
acknowledgment to the start timer of suc(v), node v, at time t
(s)+
suc(v), updates its local timers
in an attempt to move the discrete portion of the clocks phases (i.e., the time slot index)
towards the target values
sv,target =
Dv+δ
Dv+2δ
epre(v)
(
t
(s)+
suc(v)
)
+
δ
Dv+2δ
Ψ
(s)
suc(v)
(
t
(s)+
suc(v)
)
ev,target =
δ
Dv+2δ
epre(v)
(
t
(s)+
suc(v)
)
+
Dv+δ
Dv+2δ
ssuc(v)
(
t
(s)+
suc(v)
)
where Dv is a parameter capturing the demand of node v, δ is the portion of time slots
reserved as guard period in between transmissions. If the target values are achieved, a
portion of Dv/(Dv + 2δ) of the time between the transmissions of its predecessor and
successor is left for node v’s transmission of its payload data and δ/(Dv + 2δ) portion of
the time is left before and after its own transmission as guard intervals.
When t
(s)
suc(v) and t
(e)
pre(v) are perfectly known and that no updates have been made to
3Note that the time instants t
(e)
pre(v) and t
(s)
suc(v) can be estimated by node v through the reception time of
CH’s acknowledgments to these beacon signals, but the accuracy may be affected by synchronization errors
and propagation delays, as described in the previous section.
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predecessor’s phase before time t
(s)
suc(v),v, node v can infer that ssuc(v)(t
(s)+
suc(v)) = 0, since the
timer must have reset to 0 after it has expired and that epre(v)(t
(s)+
suc(v)) = (t
(s)+
suc(v)− t
(e)
pre(v))/T ,
which is the time that has elapsed after the expiration of the end timer of node pre(v).
However, in reality, these target values cannot be obtained precisely since only the estimates
tˆ
(s)
suc(v),v and tˆ
(e)
pre(v),v are known at node v and also since the phase of the predecessor may in
fact have been updated before time tˆ
(s)
suc(v),v due to the beacon emission of node v. In this
case, node v can only obtain the estimated target values
sˆv,target =
Dv+δ
Dv+2δ
tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v − tˆ
(e)
pre(v),v
T
(2.21)
eˆv,target =
δ
Dv+2δ
tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v − tˆ
(e)
pre(v),v
T
. (2.22)
Since the target values are not precise4, it is necessary to further limit the adjustment of
the timers at node v so that the relative order of its timers and the timers of its predecessor
and successor are not altered, causing overlap in the schedules. This is achieved by further
modifying their target values as
s˜v,target =min
sˆv,target,
sv(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v)+
tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v
−tˆ(e)
pre(v),v
T
2

e˜v,target =max
ev,target, ev(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v)
2
 .
Finally, the local timers at node v are updated as
sv(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v)=Q
[
(1−β)sv(tˆ(s)v,suc(v))+βs˜v,target
]
(2.23)
ev(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v)=Q
[
(1−β)ev(tˆ(s)suc(v),v)+βe˜v,target
]
(2.24)
where β ∈ (0, 1) and Q(·) is a dithered quantization function [Wannamaker et al.(2000)]
4The time values used are based on possibly outdated information about the predecessor node’s state at
the time it last fired.
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Figure 2.4: Network topology of illustration in Fig. 2.5. The same topology is used for the
simulation in Fig. 2.11, for which distances and drywall placements are marked.
that maps the phase to the integer set {0, 1, . . . , L} defined as Q(x) = round(x+ v), where
v ∼ U(−1/2, 1/2). As shown in [Aysal et al.(2008)], the dithering operation ensures the
convergence of the quantized consensus policy and has similar effects on PulseSS. In fact,
as time elapses and synchronization is achieved, the dithered quantized desynchronization
protocol mentioned above has been shown to converge for all-to-all networks in [Ashkiani
and Scaglione(2012)]. Its properties in a locally connected networks are discussed in the
next subsection. To illustrate the idea an example on scheduling evolution is shown in
Fig. 2.5. The scheduling primitive just described only relies on the signaling of a node’s
respective pre- and successor while all other nodes are ignored for scheduling purposes. As
per Definition 1 multiple nodes could update at the same time with knowledge, obtained
via physical signalling, of the other state variables and this could potentially give a faster
convergence.
36
Figure 2.5: Scheduling evolution illustration for a two cluster network with 4 local
nodes{1,2,3,5} (2 in each cluster) and one shared node{4} as illustrated in Fig. 2.4. For this
illustration, we overlay the scheduling of all nodes, assuming the nodes are synchronized
and have equal demands. The shared node{4} is in both clusters, in green color, while the
4 local nodes{1,2,3,5}, 2 in each cluster, are each in their own color. Fig. A) shows the
initial state of the system. We can see that each node only has the minimal size, in fact
a slot for start and end beacon each. When time progresses and a start or end counter
expires the node will send the corresponding beacon. Specifically, the start timer on the red
node{1} is expired is Fig. B) and it sends out a beacon, that is acknowledged by the CH1.
The green node{4}, notices this acknowledgment as the first start beacon following its own
end beacon; Therefore finding that the red node{1} is its successor. Furthermore the green
node{4} knows from previous firings that the blue node{2} is its predecessor. Then using
(2.21)-(2.24) the green node{4} will calculate the target values for start and end timers and
moves its start and end timers towards the target value, with a factor of β, claiming these
transmission slots exclusively. Other nodes will not update their scheduling at this time as
the red node{1} is not their respective successor. Then, as time continues, nodes will fire
and update their timings based on the status of their respective successor and predecessor.
In Fig. C) the nodes have reached a steady state, all have their proportional fair share,
and most importantly the transmission of the shared node is respected in both clusters, so
there is no channel access conflict.
37
2.3.2 Demand Control & Queue Length
In practice, we may have situations where the scheduling updates of Sec. 2.3 will return
a larger portion of the frame for communications that what the node needs, which clearly
makes no sense. To ensure that the protocol provides no more than necessary in the schedule
we have several options that are displayed on the right in in Fig. 2.1. We use qv(t) to denote
the transmission time required for the data queue length at time t to be fully emptied.
Solution 1: We can tie the demand Dv to the amount of data to be transmitted,
e.g. the data that is ready in the nodes queue once every frame. This method would
dynamically react to different needs of communication bandwidth and also set an upper
limit to the demand (max queue length). That is choose Dv in (2.21), as a function of qv,
which itself is an application layer.
Solution 2: We can stop updating once the node has a sufficient amount of scheduled
time during the frame and does not need to extend it further (i.e. Dv(t) ≤ Dv(t − LT )).
This comes with the condition that neighboring nodes also have achieved a fraction of the
frame that is long enough to empty their queue (their demand did not increase) and do not
need to move (e.g. by also not updating). This idea comes from the fact, that initially, each
node starts with the minimum amount of time scheduled that will slowly grow to the fair
share. If the node needs less that its fair share it can stop updating earlier, leaving more
room for other nodes to join. Mathematically we have to check the following values when
the successor is received at time r := t
Ψ
(s)
suc(v)=0
No update if:
Ψ
(e)
pre(v)(r − LT )−Ψ(s)v (r − LT ) ≤ Ψ
(e)
pre(v)(r)−Ψ(s)v (r)
Ψ(e)v (r − LT ) ≤ Ψ(e)v (r)
Dv(r − LT ) ≤ Dv(r)
Otherwise: regular update as in Sec. 2.3
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It is important to remark that the computation required in this particular solution of de-
mand control, has variable runtime5 as opposed to constant run-time to both other methods
in this subsection. This can be important for implementation reasons as correct signal tim-
ing is one of the key ingredients of PulseSS, especially for synchronization updates in Sec.
2.2.
Solution 3: We can run an additional function on the update mechanism that compares
the result of the scheduling update in (2.23),(2.24) and the amount of data available in the
queue and chooses the minimum value. This ensures that a node takes only as much from
the frame as it needs, but not more than its fair share, and to achieve this one can simply
modify the update function in (2.23),(2.24) to have
ev(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v)=Q
[
(1−β)ev
(
tˆ
(s)
suc(v),v
)
+βe˜v,target
]
(2.25)
sv(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v)=min
{
Q
[
(1−β)sv
(
tˆ
(s)
v,suc(v)
)
+βs˜v,target
]
, ev(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v),v) +
qv(t)
T
}
(2.26)
2.3.3 Convergence Properties of the PulseSS Pairwise Update
While the protocol always achieves a TDM schedule, the final solution may vary de-
pending on the initial conditions. In some cases, certain portions of a frame corresponding
to a particular cluster may be left empty in order to avoid conflict with neighboring clus-
ters (an example in shown in Section 2.5.2). We refer to these spaces left empty as white
spaces. White spaces can be avoided under special conditions on the network topology
and on the order of the initial clock phases, which are discussed in this subsection. This
discussion leverages the theoretical results presented in [Ferrari et al.(2017)]. This theory
not only gives important insights on the attainable performances of the scheduling protocol
proposed, it also provides an indication on how the CH could reactively reorder the nodes
transmissions in the frame to obtain a more efficient resource utilization that reduces the
left-over white spaces. The reactive reordering procedure is clarified in Section 2.3.4.
5In the best case no update has to be made and the function returns early. In the worst case updates
being required and the update function needs to be executed. However because of the if-block, this method
requires a few extra CPU-cyles in the worst case compared to the vanilla implementation. In the best case
however we return early and can put the CPU to sleep early, saving energy.
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Let us first introduce the following definitions
Definition 2 (Partial proportional fairness criterion): We say a schedule meets a partial
proportional fairness criterion if, once convergence is reached (i.e. ∀t > t∗ for some t∗),
∀(u, v) u 6= v if Cu = Cv = {c} and u = pre(v) the following condition is met :
(su(t)− eu(t)) mod L
Du
=
(sv(t)− ev(t)) mod L
Dv
Definition 3 (Global proportional fairness criterion): We say a schedule meets a global pro-
portional fairness criterion if the two following properties are satisfied once convergence is
reached (i.e. ∀t > t∗ for some t∗):
1. ∀(u, v) u 6= v if Cu = Cv = {c}, then:
(su(t)− eu(t)) mod L
Du
=
(sv(t)− ev(t)) mod L
Dv
2. ∀v [(sv(t)− ev(t)) mod L] ≥ min
c:v∈Nc
Dv∑
w∈Nc (Dw+δ)
L
The second property indicates that the solution guarantees that every node gets the
minimum possible duration among all the clusters in its range.
Assumption 1: For each CH c, all the local nodes (i.e. the set of nodes in Nc and not in the
range of other CHs), occupy consecutive portions of the frame.
In [Ferrari et al.(2017)] we have proved the following:
Theorem 1: For a network with two CHs, the update rule in (2.23) and (2.24) will converge
to a unique fixed point that respects the partial proprtional fairness criterion in Definition 2,
irrespective of the initial phases of the timers. If Assumption 1 holds, the resulting schedule
will also respect the global proportional fairness criterion in Definition 3.
Proposition 1: For topologies with more than two cliques we have, in general, fixed points for
(2.23)-(2.24) form sets with measure greater than zero. All these points respect the partial
proportional fairness criterion in Definition 2.
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In a nutshell, for general topologies we do not have enough constraints on the attainable
schedule to guarantee a unique fixed point as in the two-clique case. Nevertheless, additional
definitions and assumptions allow to characterize very peculiar cases in which a unique fixed
point is attainable with more than two cliques. To explain the conditions for the existence
of a unique efficient fixed point we define for each node v a unique cluster c (we will break
ties if they exist by choosing an arbitrary one) with maximum demand as:
C(v) = arg max
c′∈Cv
∑
u∈Nc′
(Du + δ). (2.27)
Then, we define for each cluster c the sets of nodes:
Ac = {v |C(v) = c} (2.28)
Sc = Nc/Ac ∀ c ∈ C. (2.29)
Since, by definition, for each node i its C(i) is unique, the sets Ac form a partition of all
the nodes in the network. As detailed in [Ferrari et al.(2017)], if the following assumption
holds:
Assumption 2: All the nodes in a clique are at most in two partitions Ac as defined in (2.28).
Mathematically, ∀c ∈ C, there is only a single c′ ∈ C such that
Nc ⊂ Ac ∪ Ac′ (2.30)
or equivalently for any c and i, j ∈ Sc, it holds that C(i) = C(j).
then there exists an ordering that allows to have an efficient (i.e. white spaces free)
schedule which respects the global fairness property in Definition 3 and Algorithm 1 cal-
culates such efficient schedule, i.e. the result in Theorem 1 extends to network with an
arbitrary number of CHs. Note in fact that the condition in Assumption 2 implies that it
41
is possible to order the clusters in a tree structure where the root is the unique cluster c for
which Sc = ∅ (see Fig.2.6)
CH CH
CH
CH
CH
CH
CH
CH CHCH
✓ ✗ 
Figure 2.6: Two examples of network topologies and demands for which a unique fixed
schedule can be computed via Algorithm 2 (left) and for which it is not possible (right).
CHs are triangles and regular nodes are circles, different colors are used to identify different
CH transmission ranges and larger nodes’s sizes are used for nodes with higher demand
D. The topology on the left and the demand assignment satisfies Assumption 2, whereas
the topology on the right cannot satisfy the assumption having nodes in the central cluster
belonging to two other different clusters.
It is then naturally to infere
Corollary 1: For any tree network, if parents have always higher demand than the chil-
dren, there is a unique fixed point for the scheduling update consistent with the procedure in
Algorithm 2.
This is due to the fact that the condition in this corollary can be seen as an alternative
way to state Assumption 2 for this topology, where we recall that the assignment to every
partition Ac is based considering the overall demand of nodes (see (2.28)). This is also a
pleasing result, because if the tree is used for data aggregation, it would be natural to have
higher demand at the higher level of the tree.
Let us now explain Algorithm 1. We assume that Assumption 1 and 2 are satisfied and
denote by T c ≤ LT the portion of the frame available for the nodes in Ac. For the unique
cluster c, for which Sc = ∅ we have T c = LT and the portion of the frame available for all
nodes v ∈ Ac is:
sv(t)− ev(t) = Dv|Ac|δ +
∑
u∈Ac Du
T c. (2.31)
Furthermore each node in this unique cluster c has a guard space before and after its
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Algorithm 1: Computation of the unique efficient fixed-point
% For a network with unique fixed point derives the % unique schedule
find c such that Sc = ∅
assign this schedule to all nodes v in Ac:
T c = LT , Ψ(s)v (t)−Ψ(e)v (t) in (2.31), δc in (2.32)
C˜ = c;
% C˜ = {c : nodes in Ac have an assigned schedule}
while C˜ 6= C do
• pick a random c ∈ C \ C˜
• [i1, . . . , i|Sc|] = Sc
• c′ = A−1(i1)
if c′ ∈ C˜ then
assign this schedule to all nodes v in Ac:
T c in (2.33), Ψ(s)v (t)−Ψ(e)v (t) in (2.34), δc in (2.35)
C˜ = C˜ + c;
transmission time equal to
δc =
δ
|Ac|δ +
∑
u∈Ac Du
T c. (2.32)
For all other clusters c′, for which Sc′ 6= ∅, we will have:
T c′ =
LT − (|Sc′ | − 1)δc′ − ∑
v∈Sc′
(sv(t)− ev(t))
 (2.33)
and every node v ∈ Ac′ will have
Ψ(s)v (t)−Ψ(e)v (t) =
Dv
(1 + |Ac′ |)δ +
∑
u∈Ac′ Du
T c′ . (2.34)
with a guard space before and after the transmission time:
δc′ =
δ
(1 + |Ac′ |)δ +
∑
u∈Ac′ Du
T c′ . (2.35)
Algorithm 2 is a method to exhaustively calculate the schedule for all nodes by ensuring
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that δc′ and
∑
v∈Sc′ (sv(t)−ev(t)) in (2.33) can be determined sequentially starting with the
cluster with Sc = ∅.
An example for Di = const. is shown in Fig. 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Example of schedule in a two-cluster network using the topology with 2 shared
nodes in purple and 7 and 5 local nodes respectively and all nodes with equal demand.
We can see that cluster 1, has the highest total demand, since it contains more nodes,
determines the size of the shared nodes. The other node’s size are determined by each
cluster individually. We can further find T1/δ1 = T2/δ2 = D/δ The guard band between
local and shared nodes (in green) is determined only by the local nodes.
Remark 1: In the limit for δ → 0, if the schedule meets Property 2 in Definition 3, then it
is also one of the possible solutions of the minimum coloring graph problem for that conflict
graph.
To meet Assumption 1 the topology of the conflict graph has to allow an assignment
which leaves a portion available in any frame for nodes that belong only to one clique.
However, this assumption may be violated in dense networks and a more formal version
of Assumption 2 that explains what conflict graphs can possibly meet Assumption 2 is
elusive. Nonetheless, the presentation in this work should give the reader the necessary
tools to analyze the possible attainable schedules on a case by case basis, given that a
general treatment remains elusive. Notice that changes in demand are naturally leading to
adaptively change the schedule. A similar effect is attained when nodes leave the network,
because the total demand decreases and node can then occupy the empty space. Even if
it is difficult to realize and enforce these assumptions in general, it has been observed via
simulations that the conflict-free schedule provided by PulseSS generally supports higher
network throughput compared to random access (see Sec. 2.6). Other inefficient fixed points
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can be calculated on a case by case basis. Interestingly there can be regions of convergence
for the algorithm (i.e. non isolated fixed points): an example is offered in Section 2.5.2.
2.3.4 Reactive Reordering of Nodes in a Frame
From a design perspective, Proposition 1 and our definition of partial fairness tell us
that, if the nodes in the clusters transmit in an order such that nodes with the same
conflicts are consecutive, then they are guaranteed to obtain a share of the time frame
proportional to their demands. This ordering, when possible, is desirable because it reduces
the presence of white-spaces. At the cost of additional complexity, one can include in the
protocol a reactive method, orchestrated by the respective CHs in each cluster, that could
enforce a better ordering of the nodes. The CH in this case will need to receive control
information regarding which are the other CH in range of each node in its cluster (this
could be useful information for routing as well). Upon receiving this information the CH
can direct/move the nodes that can hear the same set of clusters (local or shared nodes)
to occupy consecutive portion of the frame. In reaching such a configuration, different CH
act cooperatively since placing nodes with the same conflict graph closer to each other is
a common shared goal. Once the above-mentioned condition is attained and the protocol
has converged to a certain configuration, there is an additional flexibility the CH’s can take
advantage of to trade fairness for efficiency and reduce the whitespace in each frame. Each
CH, in fact, is aware of the whitespace in his own frame and the relative position of the local
nodes with respect to the shared nodes. The method we propose is to move the local nodes,
i.e. nodes that are in range of only a CH in different portions of the frame, whenever the
CH evaluates that with this move the share of all its local nodes would increase, reducing
the whitespace in its frame and increasing the efficiency of the schedule, willingly giving
up partial proportional fairness as per Definition 2. This procedure is summarized in the
diagram in Fig.2.8.
All that remains to clarify is how new nodes join the network, which is the subject of
the next subsection.
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CH cooperate to have 
nodes with the same 
conflict graph occupying 
consecutive portions of the 
frame
Nodes update their 
timers according to the 
update rule in (23),(24)
Nodes have converged 
to a fixed point
Each CH:
Can I move a local node 
and increase efficiency?
All No
At Least One Yes
Network Inititialization
Transient Phase
CH local nodes 
reordering
Figure 2.8: CH procedure to increase efficiency of the schedule attainable by the PulseSS
Pairwise Update
2.3.5 Power Saving Mode
The algorithm relies only the two beacon signals for scheduling. Overhearing other bea-
cons is useful to improve the synchronization convergence speed (by updating more often),
however it is not required for steady state operations of synchronization and scheduling.
For this reason a node can go into a deep sleep mode with the radio off, when none of the
two critical beacon are expected. Now it is hard to know exactly when pre and succes-
sor of node v, {Ψ(e)pre(v); Ψ
(s)
suc(v)} will send a beacon, because that depends on the Demand
Control output and on the other nodes respective pre and successors, which are unknown
to node v, and make up this distributes scheduling solution. Furthermore nodes could
have joined the network in between node v and {Ψ(e)pre(v); Ψ
(s)
suc(v)}, respectively that would
make those the new pre and successor. For these two reasons one could turn the radio on
in between where two beacons where a previous interation of the protocol; extended by
a safety margin M1;M2 > 0 that allows the respective node to move in the scheduling:
{ˆΨ(e)pre(v) −M1; Ψˆ
(s)
suc(v)} + M2 If with the chosen safety margin not both {Ψ
(e)
pre(v); Ψ
(s)
suc(v)}
have been received, because they were chosen too small, then the node should a) not use
any power saving mode for the next iteration of time LT , to ensure that {Ψ(e)pre(v)&Ψ
(s)
suc(v)}
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are found and b) Not update the clocks this iteration as the parameters for the update
equation e.g (2.21) are unknown.
A CH can never turn off the receiving radio as it needs to acknowledge the beacons
from other nodes and thus must be able to receive them. As other nodes can potentially
transmit at any time the receiving radio can never be turned off. Note that this fact implies
that when the network has no preassigned clusters and any node can communicate with
any other node, this sleeping mechanism could be only applied once a node is engaged in a
pairwise communications, but would prevent other nodes from reaching the initiating node
or receiving end of the pair at other times that might be available.
The just presented power saving idea of this subsection cannot be used in the flat
architecture presented in subsection 2.4.1 as then each node can be target of a transmission
and needs to be able to receive it.
2.3.6 Node Joining and Admission Control
Suppose that node v wants to to join the network as a regular node. Before joining,
node v first listens for at least one cycle LT to determine which CHs and nodes are within
its neighborhood. We assume that node v is paired with specific CHs and if none of them is
in range, node v will not join the network. If the intended CH is in range then node v checks
after which node is the longest unoccupied space, that is large enough to fit a start and
end beacon. in the next cycle node v listens for the end beacon (or, more specifically, the
acknowledgment of the end beacon) of that node and emits its own start beacon T+(1−λ)T
later (i.e., after the acknowledgments of the end beacon have died out according to Fig. 3.4).
The end beacon is then send 2T later, resulting in no payload bytes in the first cycle. If the
end beacon is acknowledged by the CH, then node v has successfully joined the network.
On the other hand, node v will refrain from transmitting its end beacon if the start beacon
is not acknowledged. Similarly, if more than one node is trying to join the network at the
same time, the CH will not acknowledge the beacon emission due to a collision among the
nodes that try to join, node v can try again at a another randomly chosen empty spaces.
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2.4 The PulseSS Protocol for Flat Networks
So far, we have assumed that a subset of the nodes in the network are pre-assigned as
CHs and that all communications are between normal nodes and CHs. It appears this limits
the application of PulseSS Protocol for master-slave type of communications in single-hop
networks, but this is not the case as the next three subsections will illustrate. In Subsection
2.4.1 we show it is not necessary to have pre-assigned CHs, and that PulseSS can be used to
handle any single-hop D2D communication, where any node can talk to any node in range:
we refer to this as a flat architecture. In 2.4.2 we discuss the application of PulseSS for
multi-hop heterogeneous networks: this subsection serves as introduction and connection to
the wired software defined network implementation of PulseSS, which is the object of the
secondary patent.
2.4.1 Flat Architecture without Clusterheads
Let us consider an arbitrary transmitter-receiver pair (v, u) and discuss how PulseSS
can enable the communication between them. While the communication is half duplex,
we note that one of the nodes, say node v, initiates the communication. If no other node
but v needs to communicate to node u then we can view node u as fitting the role of CH
and view the scenario as that of a cluster with a single node in the cluster. Because no
assumption was made in the size of the cluster the conflict resolution protocol continues to
work. Indeed the analysis in [Ferrari et al.(2017)] does not leverage the presence of CHs.
What however we have not provisioned before is a mechanism to ensure that a specific node
knows u is called upon to communicate as the intended destination of a communication
link with node v. Because the role is not preassigned in this case, it is clear that the
start beacon sent by node v is insufficient and it has to be followed by information that
addresses node u directly or indirectly, prompting its reaction and acknowledgement in
response to the detected beacon and an identifier. The acknowledgement will lag in this
case, allowing for the reception of the identifier, and will be timed in half duplex and include
a back and forth of beacon identical to the normal PulseSS update. The two nodes can
therefore estimate and compensate their link propagation delay as described in Sec.2.2.
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Note, however that this is not possible for other incoming start and end beacon signals and
their respective acknowledgments that pertain other communications in range. Therefore
the nodes can either update their fine clock disregarding the error any time a start beacon
signal is heard, or they can update exclusively when the firing signal of the node they are
in communication with replies, but that can slow down the convergence and possibly crate
islands in the synchronization mechanism. As shown in [Tyrrell et al.(2008)] each hop adds
errors and therefore the propagation delays that cannot be compensated due to an active
communication pair along that route will add up.
2.4.2 Multi-hop Heterogeneous Networks
To discuss the application of PulseSS to multi-hop heterogeneous networks, let us first
look at the simple network depicted in Fig.2.9 where the two nodes (s1, s2) are trying to
communicate with nodes (d1, d2) going through nodes/switches {a, b}. We note that if the
link (a, b) has twice the norm speed of links (si, a) and (b, di) for i = 1, 2, then the link (a, b)
can be split into two virtual channels and from the scheduling perspective there would be
no conflict. However for the delay estimation that our protocol uses for synchronization,
we need to ensure that all links experience the same amount of delay, which we can treat
as additional component of τ , measured in Sec. 2.2. If they did not have the same delay
the previously mentioned measuring of τ would not work, as in this work all nodes would
measure the same delay over the same link which would not be true. To guarantee this we
need to add an additional artificial delay to all but the last transmission to ensure that all
links have the same amount of delay, and to minimize this artificial delay an interleaved
solution is favorable as illustrated in Fig.2.10. As far as synchronization is concerned, the
handling of different rates is the only additional complexity in the multi-hop case, since the
protocol was already providing synchronization for locally connected networks.
Concerning the scheduling, whenever the path between two source-destination commu-
nications intersect and it is not possible to create two equivalent virtual channels as in the
previous example, there is a potential conflict we need to resolve. The way we handle the
scheduling is by having the final destination nodes sending the acknowledgments for the
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s2
Figure 2.9: Dumbbell topology used to introduce the PulseSS for multi-hop heterogeneous
networks
received packets (i.e. acting like CH in the discussion in 2.4.1) and all the intermediate
nodes/switches broadcasting the ACK over all the paths of potential conflict. In order
to be aware of the paths of potential conflict every intermediate node will need a routing
table, as in a traditional packet-switched network. We will continue to refer to the simple
dumbbell topology in Fig.2.9, with the link a,b having the same speed as every other link:
a repeats the acknowledgments to s1 and s2, coming from node b which in turn might have
come from either d1 or d2. The nodes s1 and s2 hear the acknowledgment and the node
that was not transmitting uses this information to update its timers (as described above
for standard node-CH interaction PulseSS), whereas the other one is notified of a successful
transmission: if nodes s1 and s2 interfere at node a then they do not receive any ACK and
therefore move to a different random position their timers, as in standard PulseSS.
The signaling for arbitrary graphs however has to be altered such that all nodes in
conflict are aware of each other. This is described in detail in the next chapter.
2.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of PulseSS in terms of both scheduling
efficiency, convergence and synchronization accuracy.
2.5.1 Results on PulseSS Synchronization
In this section we evaluate by simulations the achievable synchronization accuracy of
PulseSS. Here, we consider a network with 5 nodes and 2 CHs as illustrated in Fig. 2.4. The
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Figure 2.10: A double capacity link that is fed from 2 norm speed links and output to 2
norm speed links. As one transmission is after the other one is transmission is delayed versus
the other. To ensure that both connections experience an equal delay that can be measured
with means in Sec. 2.2 we artificially delay the first option. Furthermore we see see that the
artificial delay needed in a sequential transmission is larger than in an interleaved fashion.
Note that this picture for simplicity does not include signal and processing delays.
parameters used for this simulations are the given in Table 2.1. We assume the receivers
time of arrival estimation algorithm is reaching the accuracy predicted by the Ziv-Zakai
Bound [Dardari and Win(2009)], which we evaluate as a function of the signal to interference
and noise ratio (SINR). In fact, in spite of our conflict resolution technique, the reception will
always be subject to some interference, which in short range communications will dominate
over thermal noise. Thus, it is necessary to pay close attention to the interference and path
loss attenuation. We calculate the interference power received from any active node to a
certain receiver by scaling the transmit power of the active nodes as predicted by the indoor
path-loss model for the ISM 2.4 GHz system proposed in [Anderson and Rappaport(2004)];
the power level is also multiplied by a random exponential random variable with unit mean
to model short-term fading. Using the signal to noise plus interference value of a certain
link that is receiving a beacon signal, we simulate the time of arrival estimates at each
receiver as the free space delay of the link plus zero mean Gaussian noise with variance
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Table 2.1: Simulation parameters
Parameters Value
Frequency 2.4GHz
Bandwidth 2Mhz
Tx & Rx Antenna height 1m
Temperature 300K
Rx Noise Factor 1
PCO-Period T 1/60s
Beacon length 6.4ms
Slots L 120
(α,D, δ, β, λ,M) (0.04, 15, 7, 0.4, 0.5, 1)
Random Initialization true
SINR of link 4
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Figure 2.11: Simulated fine clock accuracy, for node 4 (Fig. 2.4) being the leading (head
node), or another node being the leading node. Note that link 4’s SINR is equal to link 4’s
SNR as by protocol design it will exclusively transmit in it’s timeslot.
equal to the Ziv-Zakai Bound evaluated at the link SINR level. The conflict graph is the
topology shown in Fig.2.4. The shared node is placed between two drywalls, to illustrate
that the clusters are typically at two separate locations providing an additional path loss
attenuation of 5.7dB [Anderson and Rappaport(2004)].
In Fig. 2.11 we plot the average absolute value of the phase mismatch (PM) of all nodes
versus an arbitrary chosen reference as a function of the SINR of the link between node 4
and CH16, which is the minimum average SINR for the whole network. When the network
converges all nodes in range are firing within the refractory period and there exist a certain
6Both links from node 4 to the CH’s are symetric and therefore identical.
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order of firing. The PM shown in Fig. 2.11 is averaged among all nodes, over 1000 iterations,
illustrates 3 cases: a) in the first case node 4 is the first in the final PCO firing order; b) in
the second case one non-shared node is leading the others in the final firing order; c) in the
third case the initial condition is chosen at random and either situation is possible, although
not necessarily with the same frequency. In fact, it is clear that starting at random the
final PCO firing order of case b) is quite frequent and the average performance tend to be
closer to the worst ones. Another interesting observation (see also [Ferrari et al.(2014)]) is
that in PulseSS there is an accumulation of timing errors, adding up over the path length
between the node firing first (the head-node) and the last, which explains the degradation
compared to the Ziv-Zakai limit. What is most pronounced is the difference in accuracy we
observe between the two cases mentioned earlier. In the first case both CH are absorbed
by node 4, and can take advantage of the fact that PCO updates occur interference free by
design. We can see that the accuracy in this case is close to the sum of the Ziv-Zakai limits
of the links forming a 4 hop length path.
In the second case, the difference is that node 4 may update its clock in the presence
of interference from one of the clusters. The results shown are averaged over all 4 possible
choices for head-nodes other than node 47, which are identical due to symmetry. If two
nodes from the two clusters that have node 4 in common transmit data while another is
transmitting a beacon, assumed to have the same transmission power, then node 4 will
experience interference from the concurrent transmission of data, resulting in the loss in
accuracy in the time of arrival estimation that we observe in the simulations. Note, however,
that a simple modification of the protocol would allow to attain the same accuracy as in
case a all the time. In fact, instead of updating the PCO phase at every acknowledgement,
nodes could selectively discard updates if the SINR are below a threshold (although coarse
clock updates that require simply a correct detection would still have to be done). A more
extreme option is that all nodes update exclusively when their specific acknowledgement
7CH’s never initialize a transmission and can never be head nodes.
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Figure 2.12: Simulated TDMA Scheduling Result. The topology simulated and the location
of nodes of special interest can be seen in the bottom right.
are sent, once every frame. Of course, PCO updates would be far more infrequent and the
convergence speed would be lower.
2.5.2 Results on PulseSS Scheduling
In this section we focus on the effectiveness of the PulseSS scheduling. The network
topology we consider is in Fig. 2.12, bottom right with an average node to CH distance of
6.2m. To illustrate that nodes are in different rooms we place drywalls as in the previous
section. The simulations parameters, Rayleigh fading and path-loss model are the same as
in the previous section. Assume that the detection of a signal is perfect, but the time of
arrival is affected by the same type of error as in the previous section. We are especially
interested in the influence of noise and inaccuracies of the synchronization on the scheduling
results, and also in the effectiveness and proportional fairness of PulseSS. In the simulations,
all nodes are assumed to have equal demand.
In Fig. 2.12, we plot the state of the start and end timers of different nodes in a cluster
with respect to the number of firing rounds. The values are shifted relative to the firing
time of the start beacon of an arbitrarily chosen node in the cluster. The state of the start
and end timers of the same node are plotted, in all clusters where the node is present, using
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the same color. The line style is solid, if the node updates with that cluster and dash-dotted
if the nodes is not updating the respective timer with that cluster but is in range of the
CH. The theoretical convergence points in Algorithm 2 are shown as the dashed lines for
comparison. Note that the plot is shown modulo L, thus the slot L − 1 and 0 are next to
each other.
We can see, in Fig. 2.12, that the nodes have a small gap initially at their disposal,
since they are initialized with the minimum possible distance between start and end clock
and, as the time advances they acquire a fair amount of the frame. Notice that the sudden
jump in phases of node A in cluster 1, node J in cluster 3, node H in cluster 4, and node K
in cluster 5 are due to the artifact of the modulo L definition of the phases, i.e., due to the
fact that slots L-1 and 0 are next to each other. We can clearly see that cluster 1 contains
the most nodes and is therefore the densest cluster (root). As consequence, all nodes in
range update with that cluster. Cluster 2, which is the second densest cluster, has only one
node (node C) that is not shared with cluster 1. It can be seen that the schedule of cluster
2 is constrained by cluster 1 and the only node that is not in common, node C, reuses the
same slot of node B from cluster 1. Note that there the presence of white space (marked by
the letter E) in cluster 2, as we mentioned in Section 2.3.3. Equation (2.33) in Algorithm 2
is then modified to consider the effective T 2 that node C has, i.e. an additional δ1 and the
schedule of node A are removed from T 2. The unused space could have been filled if nodes
A and B were next to each other in time, putting all shared nodes in consecutive spots
(mod L) and requiring no adjustment of Algorithm 2. We can see that all nodes start and
end timers approach their theoretical convergent points predicted by Algorithm 2 with the
modification just described for cluster 2. The average channel utilization at the end over
all clusters is 62%.
In cluster 5, we see one shared node C with cluster 2, that is, always updating with
cluster 2 and therefore limited by cluster 2, visualized as a dash-dotted line. However, node
K in cluster 5 has only one CH in range and, thus, can take advantage of the available space
in that cluster and expand. We can further see that node K (seen in the outer part of the
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figure, due to the modulo L property), leaves a larger separation, potentially allowing node
C to claim that space, since it is unaware of the limitations in another cluster.
In clusters 3 and 4, we can see the combination of all the previously mentioned effects.
In cluster 3, node B is updating with cluster 1 and therefore not claiming any space. Node
F’s start beacon is confined by node H in cluster 4, but its end beacon is confined by node
B in cluster 3. This is the best case scenario for the region of possible spaces between B and
F that give a fixed point as discussed in [Ferrari et al.(2017)], since corollary 1 is violated
for cluster c = 3 and the mapping C(i) in (2.27) that gives C(B) = 1 and C(F ) = 4. The
confinement due to node H is because in cluster 4 the nodes can share the available space
equally. As a consequence the guard space between nodes in cluster 4 is smaller than those
in cluster 3 where node B is confined by cluster 1. On the other end, node F’s end beacon is
confined by node B because that node is already fixed and cannot move. As a consequence
all nodes from cluster 4 reduce their shares such that the limitations inflicted from node
B, in cluster 3 are respected, and proportional fair scheduling is achieved. Node J behaves
similarly to node K in cluster 5: it claims the available space but does not influence nodes
B or F as they are confined by other clusters.
It is interesting to note that the convergence lines plotted in Fig. 7 help us visualize
where the phases of the nodes start and end beacons will eventually converge as time goes
to infinity. These phases need not stay above or below their respective convergence lines
during the transience period. What is common to the evolution of all phases is that (i)
the difference between the phases of the start and end beacons of each node will gradually
expand towards occupying its proportional share of the frame, and (ii) once the expansion
reaches a certain point, the phases of the beacons will start to shift in the same direction
towards their convergence lines due to the pressure imposed by nodes that are firing just
before or after them. This can be observed for all nodes. For example, for node K, the phases
of its start and end beacons initiate at values in between their convergence lines (modulo
L), but the difference between these phases rapidly expands (since node C is occupying
only a small portion of the frame), causing the phase of its end beacon to go below its
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convergence line around the 4th firing round. These phases then both shift in the same
direction towards their convergence lines due to the pressure imposed by node C, which is
governed by the evolution of nodes in cluster 2. Similarly, for node J, the phases of its start
and end beacons both initiate at values below their respective convergence lines (modulo
L), and then shift in the same direction towards these lines.
2.6 MAC Layer PulseSS Architecture and Testbed Evaluation
In this section we introduce a second reference architecture for PulseSS, which is com-
patible with a variety of wireless physical layers and, in particular, with PHY layers that are
Internet of Things (IoT) standards. The reference architecture for this MAC-layer PulseSS
in Fig. 2.13. This architecture relies on signaling that is typically available between that
data/access link (MAC) and physical (PHY) layer, which is the generation of an interrupt
to the micro-controller handling the interface between PHY and MAC, when a packet is
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Figure 2.13: Overview of the components in the microcontoller implementation. Green
blocks are not included in previous works. Notice the difference to the proposed solution in
Fig. 2.1.
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detected at the PHY layer. In a nutshell, beacon packets replace beacon signals and their
arrival interrupt signal replaces the detection of the beacon signal at the PHY layer in the
full PulseSS stack in Fig. 2.1. We demonstrated our architecture in testbed implementation
that relied on Zygbee radios. As mentioned before we can only access events reported by
the radio to the micro-controller and this limits our precision in time to the time interval
between clock ticks.
In the specific implementation we have used to demonstrate the PulseSS performance,
the micro-controller is running with 7.3728MHz, which is not enough in an indoor envi-
ronment to account for signal traveling delays, as the minimum step size is one clock cycle
(=41m free space travel). This has prompted us to ignore the delay compensation feature
for this implementation, which also eliminates the need for the third beacon acknowledg-
ment. Furthermore, because we cannot modify and add physical layer signals and detection
schemes, as we mentioned before beacons are, in fact, special control packets that need to
be differentiated through a message in the payload that is decoded. In turn, this means
that it is easy to add the identifier of a particular node and, therefore, the implementation
of the MAC-layer PulseSS architecture for a network that does not have a preassigned set
of CHs is a trivial modification of what we implemented in our demonstration, where CH
were preassigned.
The delay compensation is still possible if the nodes are endowed with accurate GPS
receivers. This could be still beneficial to better align the slotting of the frame among
different nodes.
In a real time system one has to account for CPU limitations and ensure that all calcu-
lations can be completed before the node or CH has to send the next command. The time
that are needed to send beacons and acknowledgements, as shown in Fig. 2.14, including
the computation times, need to fit in the PCO slot duration. To gain some extra computa-
tion time before the deadline arrives we can take advantage of the following: Because the
CPU is notified when the radio chip receives a preamble, we can preemptively compute the
updates, assuming the acknowelgement is valid. Once the complete packet is received (we
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Figure 2.14: Channel and computation utilization from Node and CH. The task of comput-
ing updates for the clocks after a successful beacon receivement has to be complete after
time tchcompute , t
node
compute, respectively.
ignore the stopbyte), either the type of beacon sent or the reception of data is confirmed,
and the updates can be applied or discarded.
Like in TDMA each node can transmit once every LT . While the minimum size L
depends on the maximum number of nodes in each cluster, we find the minimum period T
is bounded below by the transmission delays and the devices computation speed. From the
specification of our micro-controller we determined that the delay for a single transmission
for our system is tsingle ≈ 1099.176µs, limiting the minimum round trip time. Therefore,
based on the time required to transmit, receive and process the back and forth of beacons
and acknowledgement (see Fig. 2.14) we find
T > max(2tsingle, t
ch
compute − tstop, 0.5(tnodecompute − tstop) (2.36)
where tcompute and t
ch
compute are the nodes and CH’s respective required computation times
and tstop is the transmission time of the stop-bit. We note that we have to include tsingle in
our calculation and treat it as a known transmission delay the same way as we do for τˆ
(s)
v,c in
(2.6) since we are interested in the time the beacon transmission was initiated rather than
when it was completed.
In Section 2.3 we stated that PulseSS requires acknowledgments from multiple CH to
be sent at unison so that the receiver will view them as a multi-path channel transmission.
In our implementation we only have access to the MAC and not the physical layer. As a
consequence, the accuracy achieved is not sufficient for multiple CH’s acknowledgments to
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Table 2.2: Microcontroller implementation parameters
Parameters Value
Frequency 2.4GHz
Bandwidth 2Mhz
Datarate 250kbit/s
Microcontroler clock 7.3728MHz
PCO-Period T 10ms
Coarse Clock Period LT 1.2s
(α,D, δ, β, λ) (0.125, 15, 7, 0.7, 0.5)
be received in times that are close enough to be considered as multi-path (in case of OFDM
modulation, for instance, multi-path means that acknowledgments are within the cyclic
prefix). Therefore we extended the PCO period T so that each CH uses a deterministic lag
with respect to their own clock that prevents the collisions with neighboring CH.
In the first experiment we have 2 clusters with one shared node and 3 and 2 local nodes
respectively, as seen in the top right of Fig. 2.15. To control the topology we use tin-foil to
create Faraday-Cages that would result in the desired connectivity.
In Fig. 2.15, we plot the PM between each node in the network and CH 1, chosen as
the reference. We can see that, apart for the shared node PM (red line) the PM of the
nodes in cluster C1 and C2 are very close, which means that the nodes tend to lock their
PCO clocks in their respective clusters, while the shared node, in red, is initially oscillating
between the two clusters, causing oscillations. After 16 cycles of the coarse clock (LT )
the system converges to a common timing, confirming that, via shared nodes, the clusters
are lead to coalesce to the same network timing. With the given parameters in Table 2.2,
we computed the average error after convergence in the experiment to be 80µs, which is
significantly larger than the simulation results. Recall that we do not have access to the
physical layer and therefore cannot estimate beacon arrival times precisely.
We also noticed that this system is converging a lot faster than in the simulations,
which is reasonable since our α (Table 2.2) is larger by an order of magnitude, speeding up
convergence. Another reason to chose α larger is the limited precision of 16-Bit fix point
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Figure 2.15: Synchronization result and topology.
numbers compared to 64-Bit floating point numbers used in the simulation8. Similarly, we
chose the parameter β for the scheduling updates larger than in the simulations, to speed
up scheduling convergence. From the simulation we found that β to be between 0.2 and 0.7
yields good results.
The system’s TDMA scheduling result can be seen in Fig. 2.16, showing the theoretical
solution in dashed lines and the measurement result in solid lines. We can see that the
system is converging to the theoretical solution and oscillates around it due to the dithering.
We can see each node obtaining its proportional fair schedule in this experiment. Specifically
the shared node in red, is correctly associated with the denser cluster 1, as we would expect
from our association rule.
In our second experiment we tested the same exact implementation of PulseSS, but on
a much larger set of 39 nodes and 6 CHs. We also have the same set of parameters than in
the previous experiment, except for T set to 50 ms. The network deployment shown in Fig.
2.17 was inside a hallway. The conflict graph was determined by the nodes position and
interference. As before CH’s were preassigned to nodes. We can see that scheduling aligns
and shared nodes are distributed among the available space as seen exemplary for 2 of the
6 clusters in Fig. 2.18 and 2.19. We notice that group A in the top cluster is at the edge of
reception and loses connection after some time. Our interpretation is that as transmission
begins and the battery powered node begins to consume more power, the battery voltage
8The change of phase with a small α would always be rounded to 0.
61
Time [LT]
5 10 15 20 25
Sc
he
du
lin
g
0
20
40
60
80
100
Cluster 1
Time [LT]
5 10 15 20 25
Sc
he
du
lin
g
0
20
40
60
80
100
Cluster 2
Figure 2.16: TDMA Scheduling result of topology in Fig 2.15. Note that the shared node,
in red, is similar but not identical in both clusters. This is due to independent recording of
the beacon arrival times in the 2 CH, with respect to their own clock.
drops, resulting in reduced transmission range. The network simply adjusts to occupy the
slots that are available after these nodes fail. We notice 5 shared nodes (group B) that are
present in both clusters. We record the schedule attained locally on each CH with respect
to the CH’s own PCO clock, thus shared nodes are only similar and not identical for both
clusters and the schedules appear as drifting, because of frequency drift and rounding errors
of the CH’s clocks. We can further see that the conflicts of the nodes in cluster 1, which is
the densest cluster, ultimately determine the schedule.
Through this second experiment we were able to confirm that the protocol works in
this large scale networks in the way we predicted in theory. As far as the synchronization
performance are concerned, in this second experiment we obtained an average synchroniza-
tion accuracy of 410µs in Fig. 2.20. As expected, the accuracy degrades compared to our
previous experiment, as a consequence of errors adding up over more hops in this larger
network scenario.
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Figure 2.17: Deployment Map of 39 Nodes and 6 CHs.
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Figure 2.19: TDMA Scheduling result of cluster 2.
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Figure 2.20: Synchronization result of both shown clusters. Mean and standard deviation
are calculated from the point of convergence.
We also compare the throughput of our protocol versus the default protocol in TinyOS
Carrier Sensing Collision Avoidance (CSCA) and pure ALOHA random access. For this
comparison we let each node transmit sequential data to its CH and check the rate of
success. In PulseSS a node transmits data, if and only if it has transmitted its start beacon,
but not yet its end beacon. Using the parameters from Table 2.2 we can find the channel
usage to be 69%. To emulate a similar channel usage using random access each node
waits a random time between transmissions, using the build-in uniform pseudo random
number generator, such that it matches the channel usage of PulseSS. For our experiment
we transmit 250 packets per node once converged. We notice, in Table 2.3, that the failure
rate increases with the number of nodes communicating, as there is a higher chance of two
nodes overlapping, i.e. are colliding. In the 6 CH case random access approaches 39.5%
packet loss, CSCA 23.5% and PulseSS is only 8.0%, as the protocol ensures that only one
node transmits at a time per cluster. We can further see that even if there is only one
node in the cluster, and no interference/outage should occur, there is an outage rate of
≈ 1.6% for all MACs. We suspect that this is caused interference, likely due to nearby
2.4GHz devices transmitting at the same frequency when we carry out the experiments,
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One CH +
Nodes ALOHA-Fail CSMA-Fail PulseSS-Fail
1 1.6% 1.6% 1.6%
2 5.4% 2.2% 1.6%
3 11.1% 2.3% 1.4%
4 12.8% 2.9% 2.0%
Six CH +
Nodes
39 39.5% 23.5% 8.0%
Table 2.3: Comparison of transmission failure rates
while for large networks the network self-interference, caused by our devices, is dominant.
The achieved results show that PulseSS is especially suited for maximizing throughput per
area unit, as self-interference in the network is minimized.
2.7 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we proposed PulseSS, a protocol that provides network synchroniza-
tion and proportionally fair scheduling in wireless mesh-networks with a clustered structure.
The protocol was loosely inspired by the PCO model from mathematical biology. PulseSS’
main appeal is that of providing scheduling and synchronization functionalities by exploiting
simple physical layer signaling and local network updates. The complexity of the updates
remains unchanged as the size of the network scales up, offering a competitive alternative
for wireless sensor networks to main-stream protocols, like WirelessHart, especially in ap-
plications that are delay sensitive and need a resilient clock distribution mechanism, e.g.
Intelligent Infrastructures, Internet of Things, Control Area Networks and Cyber-Physical
Systems.
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3 PulseSDN: Pulse-Coupled Software Defined Networks for Virtual Circuit Switched Net-
works
Abstract: Control Area Networks (CAN) have strict requirements for network latency
and, especially in monitoring applications, have many sensor sources producing data at
a constant bit rate. Therefore, instead of the prevalent packet switching solution, circuit
switching would be a far more appropriate way to connect field devices and controllers at
the network layer. Nonetheless, in the past, the resilience and scalability of packet switched
networks has led to their widespread proliferation in CAN environments. The advent of
Software Defined Networks offers a new opportunity for finding new protocols that are not
constrained by the typical taxonomy of packet switching networks and offer new flexibilities.
The idea we propose is to merge through SDN the network and medium access sub-layers
solving a multiple access problem over an entire network path, by leveraging advances in
distributed scheduling for shared media. In fact, the insight we use is that the issue of
enabling the exclusive use of a path during a portion of a time frame is equivalent to resolving
contention in a shared medium, with packets colliding at switching points that are shared
among routing paths. To attain a conflict free schedule we introduce the PulseSDN protocol
– a decentralized protocol that attains Time Division Duplex schedule over an arbitrary
conflict graph, that is loosely inspired by the principle of Pulse Coupled Oscillators. The
proposed protocol is a lightweight, event-driven protocol that operates in a fully distributed
manner, and can achieve minimal network latency without requiring queues at switching
nodes, while also providing network wide synchronization. At the same time the protocol
is resilient to node failures & distributed denial of service attacks, is self-healing and can
coexist with legacy traffic by giving the legacy traffic a lower priority.
3.1 Introduction
Software Defined Networks (SDN) introduce new capabilities to networking equipment
that offer new design opportunities to adapt better to network traffic management and load
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balancing [Vahdat and Koley(2017)] to different application environments. One such envi-
ronment, for instance, are Control Area Networks (CAN). We are interested in this chapter
in wired networks, that typically connect large infrastructures as well as critical sites that
require a certain degree of protection from jamming and eavesdropping. Unlike more stan-
dard computer networking applications, in CAN environments the traffic tied to monitoring
functionalities is typically at a constant rate, rather than being bursty, suggesting that the
application space may be served better by supporting circuit switching. The ability to en-
sure a minimum latency and synchronization is very important feature in control networks,
as control algorithms have a maximum tolerable delay, especially for feedback loops.
An SDN has two main components: the SDN enabled switches and their respective SDN-
controllers. In fact the SDN controller is controlling the SDN switches using application
specific rules. Also, SDNs can control MAC-Layer and above, compared to regular IP
communication where one has only access to the IP-Layer and higher. Therefore it is
the controllers responsibility to manage and optimize the flow of data in the network for
whatever objective is suited to the application.
Virtual Circuits (VC) are virtual constructs designed to run on top of other networking
infrastructure that itself can have many shapes and forms. In general VC can be imple-
mented on top of packet switched networks or other circuit switched networks. The goal
of this chapter is to create a lightweight, decentralized VC switching (VCS) network policy
that leverages the SDN flexibility to cater to applications in which minimum, reliable and
accurate information delivery time is of the essence. We named the protocol PulseSDN.
PulseSDN is a protocol that is inspired from the field of mathematical biology, to emu-
late the simple rules that lead to organized behavior in natural swarms of pulse-coupled
oscillators. The goal of PulseSDN goes beyond that of traditional VCS: specifically, our
protocol establishes a common schedule among all VC routes such that the SDN switches
do not buffer the incoming VC data but relay them immediately to the next switch or the
destination. The protocol is a fully distributed (and thus scalable) adaptive solution to
adaptively compute a fair schedule among the VCs that share common links and maintain
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Figure 3.1: Reference Implementation of PulseSDN
frame synchronization. A notable property of the common schedule is that it is designed to
eliminate buffering at the switches since each switch immediately sends the incoming VC
data towards the appropriate destination; in other words, the transmission of the data of a
certain VC over the link starts at a time of the frame equal to the reception time plus the
processing delay. This provision minimizes the latency for all participants, making it ideal
for CAN applications, although in general full efficiency cannot be guaranteed. In addition
PulseSDN is naturally enables security features that are very desirable in such applications
as, for instance, the ability to dwarf Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Like
in other VCS solutions, PulseSDN is backward compatible with supporting de-prioritized
legacy traffic over the same network infrastructure. In Fig. 3.1 we show the reference
architecture of the proposed protocol to be explained throughout this chapter.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Sec. 3.2 we discuss the system model and
conflict graph. In Sec. 3.2.2 we describe the signaling and the algorithm that we use to
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solve said conflict graph. In Sec. 3.3 we show how we can reuse the same signaling from
the scheduling section to provide network wide synchronization. In the next section we talk
about optional optimizations to the scheduling solution followed by a security extension
that protects against distributed denial of service attacks. We conclude this chapter with
simulation results.
3.2 System Model
The goal of PulseSDN is to provide an end-to-end TDMA schedule & synchronization
for each VC in the network in a distributed fashion. Let us denote the graph associated
with the network in which VCs are present as G = (V, ES), where V is the set of nodes
and ES is the set of edges with a set of link speeds S. G is in general a sub-graph of the
entire network that we assume to be connected. PulseSDN requires all the edges to have
a uniform network speed so we transform G to an transformed graph G′ converting high
speed links into multiple edges of uniform speed G′ = (V, f(ES , B)) with the uniform speed
B = GCD(ES), with GCD being the greatest common divider.
We define the source of any VC as source node Vn ⊂ V; each node that is forwarding
data for others as SDN switch Vs ⊂ V; each sink of a VC as destination node Vd ⊂ V. Note
that there are many VCs and therefore a node can be in multiple of the groups. The route
forming the path utilized to connect a pair of nodes in (u, v) ∈ Vn×Vd are VCs and will be
denoted by puv and the set of VCs as P1. Paths that intersect from different connections,
i.e. pu′v′ ∩ puv 6= ∅ form the conflict graph G′′(P, E). Paths connected with an edge in
G′′ are called connections in conflict. The source nodes of these connections in conflict are
called nodes in conflict.
A traditional SDN would find the TDMA scheduling solution for a given G′′ in a cen-
tralized SDN controller taking into account the communication demand of individual con-
nections to the controller, historian or to the cloud. PulseSDN is computing parts of the
solution G′′ with distributed SDN agents that act on locally available information, making
1At first, for simplicity, we will focus on supporting peer to peer communications and consider neither
multicast nor network-coding type of solutions that are, however, compatible with the PulseSDN.
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Figure 3.2: a) Traditional SDN with a dedicated SDN controller. b) PulseSDN: The
timescale in our framework of the SDN central controller is a slow scale compared to that
of the SDN Agents. In our work we assume that the central SDN controller manges routing
decision and decides communication parameters such as the frame duration.
the system scalable and the partition of network resources dynamic. The dynamic network
resource allocation in PulseSDN is performed based on the demand, resulting a proportional
fair share of the network resources for every VC. At the same time PulseSDN provides this
service with minimal end-to-end latency and without the need for buffers at SDN switches.
The key component for PulseSDN enabling the mentioned properties, lies in the signaling
that is forwarded by SDN switches to only the nodes in conflict. This signaling is then used
locally on each node in conflict, i.e. distributed, to find said non-conflicting schedule in an
iterative fashion. For this we rely on the principle of pulse coupled oscillator (PCO) models
from mathematical biology [Peskin(1975)] and supplies primitives for distributed access
control and synchronization. For now let us assume that routing information from the
SDN controller is available at each node. In the following we describe the clocks, signaling
and the mathematical update function used by PulseSDN.
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3.2.1 Local Clocks
Each SDN agent has a clock for synchronization with other nodes, with period T , which
we shall call fine clock Φv and is defined in (2.1). However only source nodes are required
to have this fine clock. Other nodes can have a fine clock optionally to also benefit from
network wide synchronization. In addition SDN agents that are source nodes have , two
coarse clocks with period LT , for each open connection2. Each cycle of the coarse clock
is advanced by the expiration of L cycles of the fine clock and each cycle of the fine clock
represents a transmission time slot of duration LT .
Let us for now assume that all fine clocks from all nodes are synchronized, which will be
relaxed in Sec. 3.3. To determine its transmission schedule, source nodes v ∈ Vn maintains
two ascending timers for the coarse clocks, i.e., a start clock and an end clock for each
connection to a node u ∈ Vd. The portion of the frame alloted to the pair (u, v) is between
the expiration of the start clock and that of the end clock described by the following phase
variables, which similar to (2.2)(2.3)
Ψ(s)v,u(t) ,
t
T
+ φv + ψ
(s)
v,u (mod L)
= sv,u(t) + Φv(t) (3.1)
Ψ(e)v,u(t) ,
t
T
+ φv + ψ
(e)
v,u (mod L)
= ev,u(t) + Φv(t), (3.2)
where ψ
(s)
v,u and ψ
(e)
v,u are integer offsets of the clocks and sv,u(t) , bΨ(s)v,u(t)c and ev,u(t) ,
bΨ(e)v,u(t)c are the indices of the start and end time slots. As in the previous chapter the
timers expire when their respective phase variables reach the value L and are reset to 0
afterwards. Similarly, the expiration of the start and end timers marks the first and last
time slots that the connection v, u is scheduled to transmit (which lasts [Ψ
(s)
v,u(t) − Ψ(e)v,u(t)
(mod L)] = [sv,u(t)− ev,u(t) (mod L)]).
2In contrast to the previous chapter where we only had one connection to the Cluster Head.
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3.2.2 PulseSDN Signaling
3.2.2.1 Clock Expiration
At the time of expiration of start or end clock, node v will send out a signal towards
the destination u. The signal contains the following set of information:
{PulseSDN − policy, Signal − Type, Source−Address,Destination−Address} (3.3)
Where PulseSDN-policy is a marker to identify this protocol to other nodes.; Signal-Type
indicates weather the start or end timer expired. We assume that addresses are routeable
and unique. This information is then sent, via forwarding SDN switches (if needed), to the
destination node u. Node u answers populating the following fields in its acknowledgment
message:
{PulseSDN − policy, Signal − Type−ACK,Original − Source−Address,
Original −Destination−Address}
(3.4)
It is important that SDN switches forward the information immediately and that the
destination immediately acknowledges such that acknowledgment has to reach the source
node within time T (see Fig. 3.3) If it does, then the connection has now the exclusive right
to transmit data on the path towards the destination. The messages are constantly sent
in the session preamble, and are also used to warn other nodes that the path is busy. If
the source node does not receive the acknowledgment, because the signal was not received
successfully, then the connection is not clear to transmit data at that time. In fact the
lack of acknowledgment means that at least one of the links towards the destination is
busy at this time and the coarse clocks su,v and eu,v should be reset and reinitialized
with a random starting point. We can see this working like the collision avoidance (CA)
mechanism in wireless networks, where the communication session starts only if a ”clear
to send” message is issued by the destination. Here, however, the signaling is intended to
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Figure 3.3: Signaling in PulseSDN when start and end clocks expire.
resolve the contention in using any of the links along the route between node v and node u
at a certain time.
Before and after a connections transmission time a node is sensing to a third type of
control signal that we call forwarded ACK (see Fig.3.3). The forwarded ACK are sent to all
nodes in paths that are in conflict and are is used to share information about the time when
there are busy links in the connections in conflict. These forwarded ACKs generated by
nodes on the path as will be explained in Sec. 3.2.3. Once such forwarded ACK is received
the following update function is triggered.
3.2.2.2 Scheduling Update Function
Now we describe the timing update to the start and end clocks if a source node received
such a forwarded ACK. This is in many ways analogous to the PulseSS update, but we
repeat it to make the chapter self-contained. Let us assume for now that all connections
are saturated, i.e have unlimited amount of data to send (In case this is not true we can
apply the same optimizations as in Sec. 2.3.2.). For this clock update operation we rely
on two specific signals. The last forwarded end acknowledgment before a nodes own start
73
clock expires which we call predecessor and the first forwarded start acknowledgment after
a nodes own end clock expired which we call successor. Both pre- and sucessor are called
critical signaling. The following algorithm will take the Time of Arrival (TOA) of the
critical signaling and move local clocks such that all connections on the graph G′′ form a
conflict free scheduling. Furthermore the algorithm allocates a proportional fair share to
each connection over the same (congested) link depending on each connections demand Dv,u
compared to the overall demand over the link.
We denote the estimated time when the successor to connection u, v was send as
tˆ
(s)
suc(v,u),v,u. We can compute this time with the time a node receives this signal minus
propagation delay τv,u (computed in section 3.3) and the known signal length ηT , i.e.
tˆ
(s)
suc(v,u),v,u = r
(s)
suc(v,u),v,u − τv,u − ηT . Similarly we can estimate the time tˆ
(e)
pre(v,u),v,u when
the predecessor was sent. We can write the update function as the following series of
equations (a variation of (2.21)(2.22) (2.23)(2.24)):
sˆv,u,target =
Dv,u+δ
Dv,u+2δ
tˆ
(s)
suc(v,u),v,u − tˆ
(e)
pre(v,u),v,u
T
(3.5)
eˆv,target =
δ
Dv,u+2δ
tˆ
(s)+
suc(v,u),v,u − tˆ
(e)
pre(v,u),v,u
T
. (3.6)
s˜v,u,target =min
{ˆ
sv,u,target,
sv,u(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v,u),v,u)
2
+
tˆ
(s)
suc(v,u),v,u − tˆ
(e)
pre(v,u),v,u
2T
}
(3.7)
e˜v,u,target =max
ev,u,target, ev,u(tˆ
(s)
suc(v,u),v,u)
2
 . (3.8)
sv,u(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v,u),v,u)=Q
[
(1−β)sv,u(tˆ(s)v,u,suc(v,u))+βs˜v,u,target
]
(3.9)
ev,u(tˆ
(s)+
suc(v,u),v,u)=Q
[
(1−β)ev,u(tˆ(s)suc(v,u),v,u)+βe˜v,u,target
]
(3.10)
where β ∈ (0, 1), δ proportional to the intended gap in between connections and Q(·) is
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a dithered quantization function [Wannamaker et al.(2000)] that maps the phase to the
integer set {0, 1, . . . , L} defined as Q(x) = round(x + z), where z ∼ U(−1/2, 1/2). Even
though there is no proof of convergence valid for an arbitrary conflict graph, numerical
evidence shows that the network always converges as long as α is sufficiently small. The
theory can be found in Section 2.3.3.
3.2.3 Forwarded ACKs/SDN Switches
The SDN Agent in SDN switches have multiple tasks to complete. The first task is to
forward any acknowledgment signal towards its destination via the local routing table if and
only if the link towards the destination is free/empty. Otherwise the signal is not forwarded
and dropped. With this method we ensure that the path from source to destination is
available from source to end, by checking if the ACK arrives at the source node.
The second and more complicated task is to inform all nodes in conflict about any
acknowledgments in any conflicting connection such that individual pre and successors can
be found and the update function of the previous subsection can be performed. This
contains of two subtasks: Identifying which connections are in conflict and if the path of
the conflicting connections branch at this SDN switch.
In order to complete both of these subtasks each SDN Switch learns and stores each
active connection in a table that contain the following information3.
{Source−Address,Destination−Address,
Incoming − Link,Outgoing − Link}
(3.11)
Using this information the SDN Agent in each SDN switch (see Fig. 3.2) executes the
code in Algorithm 2, which we explain next and provide an example. We denote the local
link towards the source as incoming link and the link towards the destination as outgoing
link. Let us remind the reader at this point that for scheduling purposed a conflicting node
3If a connection is no longer active and has not send information for the time LT then it will be removed
from the storage.
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only needs to receive its critical signals. Other signals are not as important and only used
for synchronization purposes in Sec. 3.3 and can be missed.
In the first step on receiving an acknowledgment the SDN switch finds all conflicting
connection that branch locally by finding all connection that have one link at this switch
in common and the other link different. For all conflicting connections the SDN switch will
forward the acknowledgment to the nodes in conflict. In the case that the link towards a
node in conflict is busy, then this means that another conflicting connection was transmit-
ting already before at this time; therefore this other connection will be a nodes successor.
This indicates that this new forwarded acknowledgment is not a critical signal and can be
dropped.In the case of multiple connections in conflict that branch at the same node one can
use a list of multiple destinations to multi-cast the forwarded acknowledgment to multiple
destinations at the same time.
Let us make an example using the red connection in Fig. 3.5. We see that the red
connection shares the line on the link (2,5) with green and on link (5,6) with the blue
connection. In this example node 2 has to forward all ACKs from the green connection to
node 3, the source node of the red connection, because this is the first node4 where the red
and green connection join and travel over a joint link. Node 5 will forward all blue ACKs
to node 3, the source of the red connection, because its the first time the red and blue lines
join in one link. If at the same time when node 5 should forward an ACK to node 3, the
link towards node 3 is busy (e.g. because the green link is using it at the time) then the
forwarded ACK will not be sent. This operation has computational complexity O(m) and
memory complexity of O(n), where m is the amount of connections in conflict and n is the
amount of active connections through the SDN switch in question.
3.3 PulseSDN Synchronization
Given that the graph G is connected we can guarantee that the individual fine clocks
of each node in the network are synchronized, even where there is uncertainty and delay in
the signaling. We are reusing the same starting and end beacon signaling already used for
4starting from red’s source node
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Algorithm 2: Computation of which nodes are in conflict and if the SDN switch
should forward any signaling.
on new incoming (not forwarded) acknowledgment to a signal from node i do:
//unacknowledged signals are also forwarded, but only used for synchronization in
Sec. 3.3.
for each element in storage j do
//find if connection in conflict and branches at this switch
if (i.Outgoing-Link = j.Outgoing-Link &
i.Incoming-Link 6= j.Incoming-Link) ‖
(i.Outgoing-Link = j.Incoming-Link &
i.Incoming-Link 6= j.Outgoing-Link) then
//this connection is in conflict and branching =¿ this SDN switch has to take
action.
if j.Incoming-Link 6= busy then
//If link is busy then it is not a required signal for the node in conflict
(see next subsection).
Send towards link j.Incoming-Link:
{i.Beacon-(Ack)-Type-Forwarded; j.Source-Address;
j.Destination-Address}
scheduling in Sec. 3.2.2, reducing the overhead. It has been shown in [Tyrrell et al.(2008)]
that in conventional PCO synchronization, propagation delay, timing errors accumulate
over each hops and can be bigger than the refractory period ∆ref required to observe con-
vergence. PulseSDN mitigates this effect by having the nodes estimate and compensate
for the propagation delays of acknowledgments in their updates. This is possible because,
in PulseSDN, a signal is emitted by each node only when a coarse clock expires (which
has duration LT ), instead of once every fine cycle (which occurs with period T ), as done
in conventional PCO synchronization. This means that the firing event of each node is
isolated from other events in the same conflict graph, and the propagation delay between
the source node and each beacon recipient can be estimated and compensated. Therefore
only propagation delay estimation errors (see next subsection) accumulate, but not the
propagation delay itself. In contrast to the previous chapter we are using the end signal for
both delay estimation and synchronization. As described in we can Sec.3.2.3 only guarantee
to receive the critical signals as opposed to all all conflicting signals the previous chapter,
therefore we can choose if we want to update with the predecessor (by using the end signal)
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or the successor (by using the start signal). We choose to update with the predecessor using
the end signal because it means that nodes can propagate the synchronization information
further (with their own signaling) to their predecessors without waiting for almost another
cycle LT to elapse.
In Sec. 3.2.3 we have described how SDN switches forward signals and that we only
guarantee to receive the critical signals. In general we find that the system will converge to
a common fine clock (=synchronize) by using only these critical signals; however by using
signals from any node we can accelerate synchronization convergence.
Specifically, let τˆv,w be the estimated propagation delay between node v and a node in
conflict w. Let t
(e)
v,d be the time that the end timer of node v expires and that an end signal
is sent towards the destination d. This signal is received at the SDN switches on the path
pu,d and and forwarded to nodes in conflict with Algorithm 2. The node(s) in conflict w
can then compute the estimated time tˆ
(e)
v,d based on the local receiving time of the signal
r
(e)
v,d,w and the known signal length ηT to
tˆ
(e)
v,d = r
(e)
w,v − τˆv,w − ηT
With this information node w then updates its local fine clock so that the clock at time
tˆ
(e)+
v,d (i.e., the time right after tˆ
(e)
v,d) is (variation of (2.6))
Φw(tˆ
(e)+
v,d ) =
 Φw(tˆ
(e)
v,d, Φw(tˆ
(e)
v,d) ≤ ∆ref ,
min{(1+α)Φw(tˆ(e)v,d), 1}, else.
(3.12)
with the convergence factor α ∈ (0, 1) and the refractory period ∆ref chosen chosen as small
as possible, while ensuring that the following equation is true with high probability:
|t(s)c,v − r(s)v − τˆc,v| < ∆ref (3.13)
It was shown in [Ferrari et al.(2017)] that the PCO synchronization algorithm shown in
this section, converges for any tree conflict network to fixed points such that the maximum
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of the signaling in the end time slot for synchronization purposes.
synchronization error can be bounded by the sum of the timing errors along the hops of the
longest path starting from the (this result was predicted and shown numerically in [Ferrari
et al.(2014)]).
3.3.1 Estimation of Propagation Delays
In the previous subsection we showed how the phase compensation in the synchronization
updates can be performed with estimates of the propagation delays. In this subsection we
describe how the estimation of the propagation delay τˆv,c can be performed based on a
specific hand-shaking protocol for the emission and acknowledgments of the end beacons.
In particular we adopt a back-and-forth signaling between node v and the destination c
on the same path similar to that in PTP [ptp(2008)]. SDN switches between source and
destinations have intermediate timestamps that are forwarded (along the signaling from the
previous section) to nodes in conflict. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.4. We assume that all
link and processing delays delays are a stationary RV.
Let t
(e)
v,u be the time that the end timer of source node v expires and that an end signal
is emitted and send towards a destination d and bounced back and forth as seen in Fig.
3.4. Nodes on the path record the time of arrival of these signals and any node on the path
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u ∈ pv,d we can estimate it’s respective τˆu,v as
τˆu,v =
1
2
(r(UL−ack)u,v − rDL−acku,v − ηT ) (3.14)
The error made in determining τˆu,v, is a random variable (RV) with zero mean. The
variance depends on the precision in which the nodes can a) determine the time or arrival
and the variance in processing the packets on all the nodes on the path pv,u. In our
simulations we model the estimation error τˆu,v − τu,v as a Gaussian zero mean random
variable with variance matching the so called Ziv-Zakai lower bound for the time of arrival
error variance [Dardari and Win(2009)].
Nodes w that are not on the path but are in conflict w 6∈ pv,d&(pv,d ∩pw,d′ 6= ∅) cannot
compute τv,w directly but require the timing information (3.14)(3.15) form the SDN switch
that is informing the node in conflict, according to Algorithm 2.
τˆu,d =
1
2
(r(DL−ack)v − rULv − ηT ) (3.15)
Nodes in conflict w compute:
τˆv,w = τˆu,v +
1
2
(rULv − rDL−ackv − τˆu,d − ηT ) (3.16)
For a static network like a wired SDN installation, the delay estimation can be further
refined by averaging over the estimates obtained in the recent M coarse cycles.
3.4 Increasing the Efficiency of PulseSDN
Like PulseSS, PulseSDN can guarantee proportional fairness among all connections [Fer-
rari et al.(2017)].Unlike PulseSS, PulseSDN can, through a judicious choice of routes, mit-
igate the inefficiencies due to what we referred to as ”white spaces” in Section 2.3.3, i.e.
portions of the frame that cannot be used because of conflicts.
A way of reducing the amount of whitespace by reordering connections. Reordering of
connections can help because each connection, is sandwiched between its pre and sucessor
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and cannot expand even though there is empty transmission time in other parts of the
frame, because the algorithm in Sec. 3.2.2 preservers the order of connections. This means
that if the pre- and sucessors have constrains (due to conflicts with their respective con-
flicting nodes) that we may end with a suboptimal ordering of nodes and thus suboptimal
scheduling. In the following we provide a two step method that minimizes such whitespace
due to connection orders.
Step one: SDN switch agents, which observe the existence of white space, (e.g. the
network has converged and there are open gaps) can issue instructions to a connection to
a reconnect at a specific time such that all the connections that go over the same link are
next to each other in time and form a group of connections (e.g. by not passing an ACK
to the source node and forcing a reconnect, see Sec. 3.5).
Step two: If step one is complete and there is still whitespace available, then multiple
groups of connections should be reordered. However if this reordering violates the rules
for step one (for any node in the path) then there is no scheduling solution without any
whitespace. A remedy is that the whitespace only appears on some links on the path and
we can try to “move” whitespace from a highly congested link to weakly congested link.
One option to realize this would be a greedy algorithm that compares the total demand
over each link. Notice that step two requires communication of all forwarding nodes while
step one can be executed locally.
3.5 Initialization of Connections
When initializing a connection we have to distinguish if it is the first connection a
source node is establishing or not. As we allow each node to communicate with multiple
destinations, we give each source node multiple sets of coarse clocks, one for each connection
but only one fine clock as described in Sec. 3.2.2. Suppose that source node v ∈ Vn wants to
initialize its first connection, to destination node d ∈ Vd. Then node v picks a random start
and end beacon time with minimal distance among each other, i.e. e(v, d) = s(v, d) + 1, to
maximize the chance of successfully getting both start and end signals to the destination
and acknowledged, before another connection interferes.. The fine clock φ(v) is chosen at
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random. If the connection is successful, that is an acknowledgment from the destination u
is received then the connection is successfully established. If no acknowledgment is received
node v has to retry at a different random time-slot.
When initializing additional connections after the first one the node should choose ini-
tial timings for start and end immediately following its previous connection and therefore
respecting the local solution for whitespace minimization is respected (see Sec. 3.4)
3.6 Security Extension for Denial of Service Protection
In CAN networks security is very important and cyberattacks are particularly impactful
to CAN because they can lead to physical damage to the infrastructure. (Virtual) circuits
passively secure a network by creating logical data streams that are isolated from each other
(but unencrypted and therefore not as secure as a Virtual Private Network (VPN). Even
though an attacker cannot easily inject data into a VC, an attacker can generate fake traffic
that will congest and jam the network. Especially in traditional packet switched networks
every data packet that penetrate the system is always delivered to its destination and treated
in the same way. This jamming of the network is known as (Distributed) Denial of Service
attack (DDoS). The current state of the art countermeasure to DDoS is to provide proxies
with huge bandwidth that are able to filter the fake requests. Unfortunately, only few can
afford such a solution [Wong and Tan(2014)] and, therefore, companies such as Cloudflare
are paid to provide the additional bandwidth to sail through the occasional DDoS event in
their customers networks. The benefits of SDN for DDos Protection can be found in [Casado
et al.(2006)], where the authors propose a single-sign-on system to authenticate network
streams against, interdependent of their physical location. This however required that the
single-sign-on system itself is protected against attacks, as it is now an integral part of the
network [Kreutz et al.(2013)]. PulseSDN be easily extended with a similar, but distributed
and therefore unaffected by attacks against a single-sign-on system, security extension that
protects against denial of service attacks as follows: The idea here is to prioritize established
and authenticated connections over new unauthenticated connection attempts. To allow for
authentication each signal is now extended to contain authentication information. In fact
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the source node will send its signal with authentication information to the destination node
that will then verify it. Only if the verification is successful (and the signal is received in the
first place, see previous subsections) then the destination will send an publicly trusted ACK
back (Keep in mind that an acknowledgment is required for scheduling and synchronization
updates). This publicly trusted ACK could be an ACK that is signed with a publicly
trusted SSL/TLS certificates [Dierks and Rescorla(2008)]. SDN switches can use and verify
the acknowledgment to know which connections are established successfully and which ones
are new (not-yet authenticated or malicious) connections. This means that the destination
nodes must have a certificate that all SDN switches trust, while the source node only needs
to authenticate against the destination. Here we have assumed that an attacker does not
have the power to create a such a trusted certificate itself, e.g by using a private certificate
authority or private co-signing authority [Vaeth and Walton(2000)]. This principle is similar
to implementations of certificates for Internet sites, where only one side of a connection has
a publicly trusted certificate, while the other (the user) needs to log in with username and
password, but does not need any certificate.
Using the above mechanism we can ensure that an attacker cannot disturb existing VCs
using a (Distributed) Denial of Service attack. In fact, only if all link to the destination are
unused, then new connections such as the attacker’s messages are sent to the destination,
but even in that case no harm to existing connections is done since the link was unused
anyway. The destination node will parse the authentication and drop the request if the
authentication is invalid. Since no acknowledgment is sent no other node will react to to
any beacons received and the attackers messages are ignored and do not do any harm any
existing VCs.
3.7 Numerical Results
We have implemented PulseSDN in Matlab for a network indicated in Fig 3.5, the
conflict graph G′′ is shown in Fig 3.6. The clock dials on each link represent the frame and
the colored shaded area represent the portion of the frame that is allocated for the path
of equal color. As can be noticed none of the paths will transmit simultaneously over the
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Figure 3.5: An example network graph, with a feasible TDM scheduling solution for each
link.
Figure 3.6: The network conflict graph of Fig. 3.5
same link. Furthermore the time allocation is exactly the same in every link (propagation
delay is ignored in this drawing) which means that there is no need to buffer information
along the path.
For this simulation we implemented a 100Mbit/s 100BASE-TX, Cat5e copper based
network with a assumed cable length for each connection of 100m. Using these inputs we
can find the average SNR to be 27.7dB [Hatamian et al.(1998)] which we use throughout
this simulation. We assume that the the processing delay at each node is deterministic and
known to all nodes; Signal delay however is unknown to nodes and has to be estimated
using the results of Sec. 3.3.1. Connections between nodes use shortest path routing. In
order to speed up convergence of the initial (rough) synchronization we use α = 0.03 for
t < 10LT . Further simulation parameters are fund in table 3.1. The results in Fig 3.8
show that starting from a period of initialization, where nodes have only start and end
signal timeslots and no time in between for payload transmission. After nodes are rapidly
expanding to gain their fair share of the available scheduling slot. In Fig. 3.7, we show the
absolute value of the phase mismatch, i.e the synchronization error, with the green node
as an arbitrarily chosen reference. Using the values in table 3.1 we can find the average
synchronization error to be 119ns. This value could be improved further if we had used an
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Table 3.1: Simulation parameters
Parameters Value
Bandwidth 125Mhz
Temperature 300K
Rx Noise Factor 1
PCO-Period T 1/60s
Slots L 120
Refractory Period 2e-4
Synchronization Symbols 1
(α,D, δ, β, λ,M) (3e-4, 5, 7, 0.4, 0.7, 1)
Random Initialization true
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Figure 3.7: Synchronization against the green link as arbitrary chosen reference (see Fig
3.5)
entire synchronization sequence instead of a single synchronization symbol as we had done
in the previous chapter.
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Figure 3.8: Scheduling result for the links in conflict
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4 An End-to-End Infrastructure for Cyber-Physical Security Applications
Abstract: In this chapter, we showcase a complete end-to-end architecture for Cyber-
Physical Security (CPS) applications that allows the collection, transport, storage, process-
ing, and display of raw data and analytics. We propose a modular design that allows easy
addition and reconfiguration of software and hardware components. The architecture is de-
signed in a hierarchical fashion, and the sensor data analytics are performed at various
levels of this hierarchy, to ensure a fail-safe architecture and to mitigate latency issues. To
offer a concrete example, we present how this CPS architecture can be applied to support
the security monitoring of an electric distribution grid, through the collection and analysis
of Micro-Phasor Measurement Unit (µPMU) data as well as Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) packets flowing in the control area network.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a hierarchical data aggregation and analytics platform. This
platform can become necessary due to large quantities of sensor and data one is collecting,
e.g. in the emerging IoT field. Especially, most of these sensors only establish their full
sensing potential if their data is compared and analyzed together with other (sensor) data.
At the same time we do not want to transport all data from every sensor to a central point
for analysis, causing congestion on in the central node and the data networks towards that
point. We therefore propose an aggregation method that uses multiple stages of analytics,
classifying and prioritizing and the importance of each piece of sensor-data ultimately re-
ducing the network latency and therefore reaction time on important events; Both critical
features in control environments.
4.2 Overview
As mentioned before our architecture can serve various CPS environments, different
physics, controllers and protocols for communications, and can host a variety of related
analytics. But for concreteness we will refer to the application of this architecture to manage
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the Individual Components in Cyber-Physical Security Architec-
ture.
the security of power distribution grids and its cryptographic key distribution system for
security, since our work was driven by the need of designing a working deployment of the
architecture for this specific problem. Note that distribution grid automation and operations
are time and function-critical, and issues, such as latency requirements are strict. Therefore,
this applications offers an excellent test-case in terms of challenging our implementation.
In Fig. 4.1, we show the components for this infrastructure deployment, which we are
going to describe next. A sample power distribution grid is shown at the top of this figure
proving the actually sensor data. We have build the system with heterogeneous sensor
types in mind like the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network, and
recently-developed Micro-Phasor Measurement Unit (µPMU) sensors that can provide three
phase phasor measurements with a high sample rate and low jitter. The placement of the
sensors in the distribution grid [von Meier et al.(2014)] is critical to gain visibility in the
grid state and is found in [Li et al.(2014)].
The sensor data is then sent to the first layer of our framework, for witch we are using
cheap mini computers (specifically a BeagleBoneBlack (BBB) [BeagleBoneBlack(2017)]).
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Figure 4.2: A µPMU data sensor (left) with BBB attached (right).
In fact we place a BBB right next to each sensor (a µPMU with BBB can be seen in Fig.
4.2), having multiple benefits:
• First, the BBB can act as a middle-ware between sensor and the network. Physical
sensors have a variety of vendors, and often do not lend themselves to be repro-
grammed easily. A lot of important functionalities that are necessary to ensure the
successful transport of data are also frequently missing. The BBB can take the sensor
data, and convert the data from potentially proprietary formats to a standard format
that is fully encrypted.
• The conversion in the open-source framework of the open-source Linux environment
improves security, as it allows the use of advanced modern cryptography that the
legacy protocols of the sensor might not support by itself.
• It allows us to shield the sensor from direct external communication. A lot of sensor
vendors only sparsely update their firmware to mitigate the latest security risks. With
a standard connection point that is supported by a large community, the BBB as entry
point to the sensor is always up to date.
• The BBB allows initial analytics to be performed on the data directly acquired from
the sensor, without suffering from any network delay or packet loss and without being
exposed to other communications. These analytics, in addition to being instrumental
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in the detection of attacks, can then be used by our framework to prioritize and
compress the data locally. In fact, depending on the results of the analytics, eventful
data are being reported with highest priority and the finest resolution, while non-
informative segments have low priority and can be compressed more heavily.
After the BBB completes its analysis of the local data, the information and analysis re-
sults are sent upstream to a RabbitMQ messaging system [RabbitMQ(2017)]. Alternative
messaging systems using a publisher-subscriber model, such as Naspinet [Myrda and Koell-
ner(2010)] for the electrical grid, or the general purpose, distributed ZeroMQ messaging
system [ZeroMQ(2017)] do not support prioritization of the data streams. Furthermore Ze-
roMQ as a peer-to-peer messing system would make the low powered and connected BBB
send their data to the multiple aggregated analytics block as opposed to well connected
severgrade RabbitMQ instances.
Note that the RabbitMQ publisher-subscriber messaging system, does not add any com-
plexity to the deployment of the BBB as each BBB can publish data blindly to the messaging
system, providing only an identifier, but not the destination of the transported data, sim-
plifying deployment (and allowing for automation in deployment). The data transported
to RabbitMQ, consisting of raw data and computations performed on the BBB (analytics,
pre-processing etc., as explained in the following sections). These data and results are sent
upstream and analyzed through dedicated programs that look , now in the joint data of
multiple sensors, for anomalies that show sensor data sources either violating the physical
laws or safety limits.
RabbitMQ, as the central messaging system is providing data to all higher levels, as
seen from Fig. 4.1, and prioritizes more important segments of data. Once again, the
principle of using contextual information for the management and flow-control of the data is
a unique feature that we propose to apply to various layers of the CPS security architecture.
In general, attacks are rare and signatures across the infrastructure are correlated. The
layering allows to aggregate reports that can be tied to the same event and the use of
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priorities that are driven by eventful sensor data allows to reduce the latency from event
capture to (re)action in the control center, by prioritizing eventful data over uneventful.
The analytic results are then transported to a central location and saved, along with a
heavily compressed version of the raw data in Elastic Search, while raw data is available
in Cassandra DB. The reason for this splitting the data into multiple databases will be
explained in the following sections1. The data from both DBs is then presented in a user-
friendly interface with options for display, download and user-defined post analysis directly
in the server environment under the Jupyter framework [Jupyter(2017)].
In comparison, the previously mentioned available commercial frameworks [AmazonKi-
nesis(2017), IBMstreams(2017),Apa(2017)] cannot take advantage of the layered analytics,
in the integration of distributed low power computers like the BBB. Therefore they can-
not prioritize critical events as they pass trough the network and do not offer the kind of
isolation and separation of the sensor and the CPS network as we do.
4.3 Hardware and Software Components
4.3.1 BeagleBoneBlack (BBB)
The BBB is an inexpensive Linux minicomputer, similar to the more known Raspberry
Pi. It contains an ARMv8 1GHz processor sided with 512 MB of memory. It is equipped
with two independent Ethernet connections one is connected to the µPMU, and the other
is connected to our CPS network. The reasons for this configuration are to: a) isolate
the sensor from threats in the CPS network, and b) to avoid interfering with the sensor
network. As an example, we can passively sniff SCADA data from the sensor network
without transmitting data in the same sensor network ourselves, therefore not interfering
with existing operation and without signaling the existence of our BBB to a potential
adversary in the sensor network.
The software running in the BBB is a modular and flexible solution we developed for this
project and is illustrated in Fig. 4.3. First, we discover and fetch the data into the BBB.
Then, we employ a modular c++ architecture with shared pointers to distribute the data
1In our actual deployment we are momentarily saving all the raw data for debugging purposes, but we
plan to use the analytic results to summarize aggressively uneventful data segments.
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Figure 4.3: Dataflow inside the BBB
to a set of analytic algorithms. This technique allows us to send the same data to multiple
analytic processes without replication. In the event that an analytic process cannot keep up
with the amount of data, we implemented the option of rejecting the incoming data buffer,
depending on the status of each analytic process. In case of data rejection, the analytic
process will miss some data, but it will not crash the whole BBB operating system as data
piles up. In order to keep track each data rejection is logged and can be reported to a
central location if intended.
Once the analytics over a given data set are complete, the results are sent to the trans-
portation layer to be shipped via RabbitMQ. A side benefit of the analytic results is to
allow the transportation layer to prioritize and compress the data. We take advantage of
this fact and will discuss in Sec. 4.3.2.1 how the prioritization and compression can be
achieved through the analytics. If the connection from the BBB to the sensor or to the
messaging system breaks for any reason, the BBB will realize and report the issue (as soon
as the network is restored), and will continue from the time, when it was left off. Note that
all the functional blocks shown in Fig. 4.3 are running in parallel and could take advantage
of multi-core systems2.
One of the key features of our CPS architecture is the ability to dynamically add and
remove analytic processes and to reconfigure each individual BBB. For this purpose, we
are using the so-called “shared libraries” that can be developed independently of the rest
of the project. For the configuration of the BBB, we use a central Redis DB to be able
2The BBB, as a cheap system, unfortunately has only a single core.
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to configure each BBB from a central control location. The BBB keeps a local copy of
the configuration data, for fail-safe reason. As the configuration for each BBB is online,
we are free to automate the deployment (from a blank factory new BBB) and update a
process from a central location using a program called Ansible [Ansible(2017)]. Ansible
can, given ssh access to the device3, run commands on the BBB automatically and it can
react dynamically without much need of programmer intervention.
4.3.2 Message Transport / RabbitMQ
We use the RabbitMQ messaging system for data transport between the components.
There are multiple reasons for this deployment, which we will elaborate in the following.
• Data Prioritization: The first and the most important reason is that the RabbitMQ
allows the prioritization of individual queues4. This feature is critical for us and is
not supported by other messaging systems such as ZeroMQ.
• Scalability: The RabbitMQ messaging system itself is designed with a computing
cluster in mind and a single instance can be spanned over multiple hosts.
• Decentralized Computing: we can also deploy RabbitMQ as interconnected decentral-
ized clusters, allowing a layered deployment as seen in Fig. 4.4.
• Load Management: Having the RabbitMQ system, each BBB only needs to publish
its data once into the network, and it is now the RabbitMQ task to handle the
distribution of the data to all the designated destinations. This in fact allows to shift
the communication load from the BBBs access channel (in our deployment they are
partly on cellular connections) to a high speed server system network (RabbitMQ
server).
The above-mentioned characteristics allow us to put analytics not only in the central
location, and on each BBB, but also in groups like each individual deployment site, which
then become intermediate layers. This has the advantage that a subset of the transported
3Factory new BBB has a Debian-Linux with ssh server pre-installed and is therefore suitable.
4Server sided, since version 3.5 (released March 2015)
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Figure 4.4: Different Locations for Analytics
data can be evaluated on site, thus can be processed faster, operating in part independently
from the central system. The latter is particularly useful in the case of failure of the
central system itself or of the communication link that is used to reach it. In that case, the
deployment on site will work autonomously and store all reports for the central system in
a queue that is only limited by the RAM and hard disk space available on the RabbitMQ
server5.
For transportation of the raw data from the BBB, we evaluated multiple container
solutions in terms of their data size and computation time on the BBB. The data size is of
utmost importance to us since we plan to delpoy µPMUs at remote locations that require
the use of a metered cellular connection to forward the data. We also need to ensure that
the packaging (serialization) of the raw data does not take up too much of the available
CPU resources, so that it is able to serve as real-time application. We compared Google
Protocolbuffers (Protobuf’s) [GoogleProtocolbuffers(2017)], MsgPack [MsgPack(2017)] and
JSON in terms of size and computation time on the BBB using both python and C++ with
the results shown in Table. 4.1, averaged over 1000 runs6. From the table, we can see that
the Protobuf is the best in terms of transportation size, which comes largely from the fact
5Because RabbitMQ uses a first-in-first-out queuing system, we avoid using the hard-disk for speed
reasons.
6Deserialization of the data is not done on the BBB but at the other end in the network.
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Table 4.1: Transportation containers for one second worth of µPMU data (6304 Bytes raw
data length) on the BBB.
Protobuf MsgPack JSON
size (Bytes) 7703 13408 15487
serialization Python(ms) 47.0197 0.6806 6.4709
deserialization Python(ms) 48.6306 0.3453 2.0404
serialization C++(ms) 0.79528 0.47313 0.18463
deserialization C++(ms) 0.66304 0.29642 0.29469
that Protobuf is not self-describing and requires the use of a static description file (.proto).
MsgPack and JSON on the other hand are a lot bigger in size, but are self-describing
and only differ from each other in the encoding of the data stream. The speed we found is
largely impacted by the language, in which the individual container solution is written. The
Protobuf solution in C++ is heavily optimized for this purpose, while the Protobuf python
solution uses wrappers that reduce the speed dramatically as seen from Table. 4.1. Msgpack
in python on the other hand is very fast. JSON is by default integrated into python and is
the largest container in terms of size. Since there is no default implementation for JSON in
C++ we use Niles Lohmann’s implementation for C++11 [jso(2016)], which has the fastest
speed among the packaging solutions. In general, all of the solutions are acceptable for our
application in terms of their speed, and we ended up using the Protobuf solution in C++
due to the data size advantage over the other solutions. Thus in real time application a
CPU load of 0.8% is generated on BBB to perform this task. In the future, we plan to add
an additional compression to the Protobuf, depending if the analytics on the BBB found the
data to be “of interest” to higher levels of analytics or the operator. In case of uneventful
static behavior of the physical system, one can even reduce the messaging to an “everything
is ok” message.
4.3.2.1 Prioritization of Messages
The analytics implemented in the BBB can be used to tag the segments of data with
a “priority index”. Determining how this priority index is generated in the BBB depends
on the application. For example, for the case of a distribution grid, the pieces of data that
are indicating the existence of a transient and their corresponding analytic results can be
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Figure 4.5: Messaging System and Employed RabbitMQ Exchanges
labeled with the highest priority to be sent upstream. The prioritization of the sensor data
from the BBB is carried and respected by the RabbitMQ messaging system7. We give each
analytic process its own individual queue, such that all analytic processes can run in parallel
and asynchronous.
Inside RabbitMQ, topic exchanges are used for the multicast routing of messages to the
various processes and associated queues with a ”priority index”’. An example of data flow
inside RabbitMQ can be seen in Fig. 4.5. When raw data is transported from the BBB,
it is packaged in Protobufs as we discussed before. As our analytic programs intend to use
decoded raw data and we desire to decode the data only once we have a single process that
reads the Protobufs data and writes it back to RabbitMQ on a “Raw Data” exchange. As a
full raw data stream from many sensors might be large for a single analytic process, we use
RabbitMQ to filter for data with wildcard semantics that matches the routing keys with the
information of interest, e.g., the central analytics only run if the analytics on the BBB find
something interesting. As a second example, an analytic process can be only interested in
data originating from a specific set of sensors, e.g., only data from selected µPMU locations.
This filtering prevents that these analytic processes chock on unnecessary data.
7Server sided prioritization is supported in RabbitMQ since version 3.5, released in March 2015.
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4.4 DataBases (DBs)
When developing the system in this dissertation, we found that each DB solution we
tried has its individual strengths and weaknesses. We have found that the Cassandra DB is
excellent at storing raw data, but lacks a strong software base for on-server computations.
Elastic Search on the other hand works well to search for data, but might choke on raw
data when the volume grows. Similar observations were made by [ela(2015)]. Also, data
searches on Elastic Search requires server side computations. As an example, suppose a
user requests a month of data to display. If we choose to transmit raw µPMU data, we
have to transmit ≈ 2.4 GB of data per electrical phase and µPMU, which is not practical.
A summary version of the data may suffice (e.g., a down-sampled version with a resolution
that depends on the requested time-frame by the user. In a nutshell, our idea is that the
user will use Elastic Search to get an overview of the data and find which time ranges are
of interest, and only request those time ranges at full resolution.
4.4.1 Cassandra DB
As it was mentioned, the Cassandra DB is used to store full resolution data. We also
found that all users typically are interested in multiple consecutive seconds worth of data.
Therefore, we store raw data in form of a one second Protobufs they are transported in (see
table 4.1), and only unpack the data out of the Protobufs on demand based on the client
side. This has the advantage of storing all the data in a simple byte blob so we can preserve
the compact size of Protobufs for archiving. Thus, we only have a CPU load of ≈ 1.3% per
µPMU on our server, which itself is running on a single core Virtual Machine(VM) with
8GB of RAM.
4.4.2 Elastic Search DB
The Elastic Search DB is the primary location to discover and find eventful and inter-
esting data in the huge data pile from the µPMUs. As mentioned before, Elastic Search
has the ability to perform server side computation and is therefore suited to display large
time-frames of data to the user using simple computation function and it excels in search-
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ing for interesting data in the haystack. The general idea is to store results of the analytic
functions in Elastic Search in form of annotations and display the results along with the
data (at the appropriate resolution) to the user. This often is sufficiently informative: for
example, a voltage sag in a µPMUs stream that lasts for 0.3s can be visible comparing the
range between minimum and maximum value.
Alternatively, the user can also search along these annotations for data to display. Once
the specific time-range for the data of interest is found, the user can take the sensor ID and
time-frame and query the Cassandra DB for the raw data. In our performance experiments
we found that Elastic Search can ingest a constant stream of about 250 messages per second
per server node, using redundant storage. This validates our previous statement that Elastic
Search is a search engine and not a storage DB. In other words, we cannot support an ingest
of µPMU data each sampling at 120Hz with Elastic Search, but it is instead suitable to
only store a summary of the data and the results of our analytic processes.
4.4.3 Redis DB
The Redis DB is a central location for all (BBB) configuration files and meta-data that
is assigned with each sensor. The use of a central database for all configuration files for
each BBB simplifies maintenance of therein, as an operator can manage all devices in a
single location.The meta-data includes all parameters and information of a sensor that are
not changing frequently, such as the location of the sensor, version numbers, vendors, a
mapping to human-readable names etc. We chose Redis DB for this purpose as it is an easy
to manage, computationally inexpensive8 but fast database.
4.4.4 Deployment
All of our central system components, including the Elastic Search engine, Cassandra
DB and Central RabbitMQ are deployed using Docker [Docker(2017)] together with Rancher
[Rancher(2017)] as management console. Therefore, we can spin up additional data nodes
for all systems within a matter of seconds onto additional hardware, in our private cloud
8Redis DB is keeping all data in-memory, which is no problem for us as the amount of data we are storing
is small.
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or the “public cloud”, like Amazon AWS. Docker simplifies deployment of components by
encapsulating dependencies in a container. A container is an instance of an image (eg.
Ubuntu Linux). Updates to a component are made using a new versioned image, which
is pushed out to hosts and used to create a new updated container. The host system and
other components on the other hand are unaffected and isolated from those changes.
Rancher is a container management system with capabilities to define and update ver-
sioned multi-container applications, application scaling, create and manage private overlay
networks for inter-container communications, and provisioning containers to a cluster of
docker host machines.
4.4.5 Outlook to User Front-End
For our user front-end, we wrote a semi-custom website interface that combines a few
useful software pieces together, while keeping the interface clean and organized, without
the need of users to install any software. To accomplish this we used Flask and Plotly.
Flask is a lightweight python web server which we use to serve customized static files (CSS,
HTML, JS) and a RESTful Web API in front of the Elasticsearch and Cassandra databases
to simplify AJAX requests for data. The most important function for us so far has been
the quick comparison of different sensors and their analytic computations. Furthermore,
we also integrated user-defined analytics on the data in over 40 programming languages
using “Jupyter notebooks” and the “JupyterHub” framework. JupyterHub runs notebooks
server-side without the need to transfer large quantities of data to clients9. Lastly, we also
allow the download of all or selected parts of the data.
4.5 Applications for said End-to-End Infrastructure
4.5.1 Securing Key Distribution Protocols
Premise: Encryption keys are a required necessity for modern encrypted message ex-
changes. The encryption serves multiple purposes: First encryption hides the content of a
9The Jupyter framework ensures that the user written-code is only executed in the context of data
analytics. For example, Jupyter does not allow the change of parameters in the underlying operating
system.
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message from eavesdroppers protecting the privacy of a message. Second encryption pro-
tects a message against modification as any changes could lead to the message no longer be
successfully decrypted, ensuring the integrity of a message. Finally, encrypting a message
allows for authentication since only the user in procession of the key in question possibly
can encrypt the message.
In this section we describe how we use the framework presented for monitoring a cryp-
tographic key distribution (CKD) system. The key task is to provide a key distribution
protocol for large scale sensor networks and monitor the correct application of the protocol
by sniffing, key exchange messages from the network. Eventual alarms and status messages
are sent using said end-to-end infrastructure. First let us describe the key distribution part
then we will explain the monitoring.
4.5.1.1 CKD Architecture
The CKD system architecture is designed to accommodate the challenges and unique
characteristics of process control environments such as sensor deployments. These sensor are
often deployed in high quantity, making individual key or certificate assignment burdensome.
Additional complexity is added when domains are crossed and third parties need to be
trusted an added to a system (For a trust metric see Section 4.5.2). Fig. 4.6 depicts the
CKD system high level architecture. The diagram shows the interaction between facilities
within the utilitys process control network as well as with a third party entity that must
interface with the process control equipment (e.g., an integrator or vendor) or aggregation
nodes (sensor data). The CKD architecture leans heavily towards sensor and SCADA-type
infrastructure, i.e. is designed to work well with the stages of the previous chapters. In
fact, the CKD system mimics this characteristic and was designed to centralize the trust
management functionality of remote cryptographic assets, such as sensors. The control
center is the central point of control, where sensors register themselves and get authenticated
and receive a so called Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Sensors can then use this TGT to
receive their set of cryptographic keys for use in their filed site only, from a so called
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cryptotrustcache, housed within remote/field sites10. The distribution of TGT and crypto
trust caches in multiple locations is useful not only enable devices within one field site to
communicate (that limits potential damage in case of compromise) but also in the case of
unreliable connection between remote and central site. This is because sensors/field devices,
can use their TGT to renew any expiring cryptographic keys, even when the connection
to the control center is currently not available. This is needed to ensure that local on
site operations and data processing can occur normally, even the connection to the control
center momentarily not available. In fact the TGT can be transported to a field site by any
means of transporting data, including physical media, thus allowing a variety of (emergency)
backup solutions. This fact is also useful to supply key material to legacy devices not
supporting this protocol, by using an authorized and trusted user as middlemen. The CKD
system also enables cross-realm key association, i.e. field site to field site or third party to
field site encrypted communications, by requesting a special cross realm TGT. This special
TGT is granted by the central control system which in turn means, that all nodes, third
party and cross realm or not, are authenticated and are audible at a central location, such
that the information which nodes are authenticated and allowed, is available at any point
in time, also for forensic usage.
4.5.1.2 CKD Monitoring Architecture
The CKD architecture is equipped with a (self) monitoring system that detects and
reports compromises of the system and reports these using the in this chapter presented
end-to-end infrastructure. Here we are designing the monitoring system according to Dolev-
Yao communication threat model [Dolev and Yao(1983)]: “The adversary in this model can
overhear, intercept, and synthesize any message and is only limited by the constraints of
the cryptographic methods used. In other words: the attacker carries the message.” As a
restriction to this model, we require that any traffic, synthesized or not, be mirrored to our
monitoring Bro instance. Physical access to devices is provided to the adversary, under the
10In practice the crypto key cache will deployed at the same location at the first level of aggregated
analytics.
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Figure 4.6: Proposed key distribution protocol and the monitoring placement to ensure that
the protocol is strictly followed and not manipulated.
condition that the defender is aware of such a compromise. In turn, the defender can put
the device on a blacklist. The key material on the compromised devices, however, stays
with the compromised device.
To monitor the system we use the Bro Network Security Monitor [Bro(2017)] [Pax-
son(1999)], running on a computer with non-intrusive Ethernet tap access to communica-
tions between the key distribution server and the field devices within the remote station. A
list of known compromised, lost, or stolen field devices is made known to the Bro system,
so that Bro can properly identify revoked keys and field devices being misused. Our work is
to monitor the network traffic in between nodes and ensure that only nodes with valid, non
revoked and expired, cryptographic keys from the central authority are communicating, as
the individual policy of this set of nodes allows.
We now briefly describe the function of the Bro instances at the two key locations, and
how they work together: the central Bro monitor and the instances of Bro placed in the
substation next to the crypto key cache as illustrated in Fig. 4.7. Let us describe next what
each of these instances do:
Central Bro Monitor: Collects Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests from cross
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domain key requests as well as requests assigned for legacy devices, that are not seen by the
field-level monitors and forwards those accordingly. The central Bro monitor also maintains
a list of recently revoked keys, that are not yet expired, and shares this list with all other
Bro instances. Furthermore Bro raises an alarm if unexpected traffic to the Central Key
Management service is detected.
Field Bro Monitors: Monitors connections to the Key Cache and extracts and vali-
dates Keys granted and extracts expiration times with its corresponding device ID. It also
raises alarms if mis-behavior has been detected in their respective location. Next we de-
scribe the special cases that can occur, exposed/leaked keys and legacy devices. Bro needs
to maintain a list of all exposed (and revoked) keys that have not expired. If Bro detects
the usage of such revoked key an alarm is raised. Furthermore in order to keep revoca-
tion lists small we only use keys that have a short lifetime, as expired revoked key do not
have to be saved. In order to support legacy devices and cross realm requests Bro needs
to be informed about any issued legacy keys in use. As the Central Bro Monitor is aware
of situation we can transfer this information using an encrypted connection between the
Central Bro Monitor and Filed Realm Bro Monitor. Using a simple state machine each
Figure 4.7: Placement of the Bro monitoring instance
Bro instance examines the expected exchanged messages and inspects the individual keys
used. We designed the system such that Bro is only able to verify the integrity and origin
of TGT’s and Keys, but is not able to decrypt the keys transported. This is because we do
not want to expose all keys to Bro, as this would be a security risk in itself, i.e. an attacker
103
controlling the Bro instance would have ultimate control of the attached network. If any
message exchanged over the network does not follow the state machine described, or data
transfer between nodes should be encrypted but it is not, then an alarm is raised. This
alarm is then propagated to our publisher subscriber messaging system that will forward
this alarm to the respective destinations, such that local as well as central counter-actions
can be taken.
4.5.2 Third-Party Trust Metrics for Control Systems in Energy Delivery Environments
4.5.2.1 Introduction/ The Problem
Premise: The ability to determine the trust of a user in order to manipulate control
system devices controlling critical systems in the energy grid is of vital importance. The
permissions that define the ability of a user to read data from the asset are key, but even
more importantly are the permissions of a user to to create and alter services running on
the specific asset in question. For use in a large deployments, automated metrics ease
the burden on the administrative team. This automation is especially critical for disaster
recovery, as many assets will have to be accessed in a a very short period of time, and during
chaotic, disorganized circumstances, in order to restore functionality. The metrics shown in
this chapter are intended to be general, such that they can be applied to any asset and both
to internal staff as well as third parties to reduce the impact of credential theft/phishing.
In this section we describe how we can include and provide data to third party devices and
users without trusting them blindly. In fact permissions or trust are a key components in
any computer security. This trust grants a user to do certain actions with a device, with
more and higher level permissions the larger the amount of trust on the user is. As more
and more devices outside of computers, such as controllers and actors, used in industrial
control, or “Internet of Things” (IoT) devices are equipped with a data connection, the
same principle applies. Traditionally this trust is assigned manually by administrative staff
to individual users or groups of users. This approach has multiple problems: First the trust
has to be assigned manually and thus requires a lot of labor to set this up. Second, because
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the trust is set up manually, it is not flexible (dynamic) on changing conditions, such as
disaster recovery, which we elaborate on with a few examples.
One example is an emergency occurring on a day with sparely available personnel such
as Christmas Eve. In that case, the available local personnel has to ensure running systems,
even those that local personnel are not typically responsible for. Therefore on that special
day local personnel on call has more permissions on that day.
As a second example we have a emergencies that requires many external contractors
in order to resolve the situation quickly (e.g., a storm causing an electrical outage). Due
to the sudden emergency a large number of new users need access to the assets therefore
in this type of situation we do want to have an option to quickly remove the red tape.
At the same time, we can have fine-grained access control such that the newly hired, and
therefore low trust, contractors do not gain access to the critical core devices and cannot
use the just arising opportunity to inject malicious code into these important core devices.
A third problem with the trust being manual, and not dynamic, is that more people will
have full permissions to devices than are needed for operations, violating the principle of
least privilege [Saltzer and Schroeder(1975)]. Therefore it would be better not to grant
full permissions to reduce the impact of credential theft/phishing. One classic example of
users with traditionally too many permissions are supervisors that have access to assets but
typically do not need access on a day to day basis. For this reason we propose the methods
described in this chapter not only for third parties but also to internal staff.
4.5.2.2 Premise of our Solution
We propose an automated trust metric that is dynamic, and based on the status/state
of the network. The goal is that the trust in each user is assigned in an automated fashion,
reducing the load on, and need of, administrative staff, especially in abnormal situations
and with large number of assets. The trust is computed from various factors, described
in detail in Section 4.5.2.3, and, depending on the level of trust, the user gains certain
permissions on individual assets.
For simplicity in this report, the trust is computed at a central location, although this
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approach could be extended in the future to a decentralized setup. The way we compute
the trust is designed to be general, such that in can be applied in all networked assets,
independent of the individual function of the asset. This trust is then to be applied to both
third party collaborators as well as internal staff.
This approach would work well in conjunction with the principles of the Kerberos net-
work authentication protocol [Miller et al.(1987)]. Kerberos is designed to provide strong
authentication for client/server applications by using secret-key cryptography, but it re-
quires to know which users to authenticate and witch which permissions, which we can
provide in this chapter. In addition this trust information could be used to automatically
reconfigure a software-defined network (SDN) that connects the networks of allowed entities
together while disconnecting disallowed. This principle relies on the fact that an SDN the
SDN-controller can dynamically assign and reassign routes of network connection, includ-
ing the ability to dynamically discard network traffic. The use of an SDN however has a
drawback: because it allows a binary decision of connecting two entities or not, it can only
enforce a two state permission system and not finer permission control.
In addition to assigning a trust/permissions to a user and asset pair we can also use
this system to audit all granted permissions since we store the access history of each as-
set and the corresponding user, similarly to the approach used in the Chinese Wall Se-
curity Policy [Brewer and Nash(1989)] and optimistic access control models [Peisert and
Bishop(2013)], among others, and use it for the computed trust score (see below).
4.5.2.3 Detailed Solution
In this section we illustrate the individual factors that influence the trust scoring.
Ownership of Asset: If the user or the party is the owner of the asset then this reflects
a significant increase in trust. However, there are many cases where the owner is not doing
the day-to-day operations, and therefore requires trust from additional elements.
Responsibility for Day-to-Day Asset Usage: If the user is marked in the system as being
responsible for day-to-day usage of the asset, this also reflects a significant increase in trust.
This is because we are checking for anomalies, and thus access from a frequent user is
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not anomalous. This is in contrast to other role based access control models [Ferraiolo
et al.(1995)] where each user in a group has the same permissions.
History with Asset: If the user is first time accessing this device then this reduces the
trust score. However if the user is among the most frequent users, then this will add to
the score. Furthermore, if the user has history with similar assets, this also increases the
score, weighted by how similar the set of assets are. The rationale behind this is that if an
entity is doing maintenance work for one type of device at one location, it makes sense to
also influence the same type of devices at another location, since they can re-apply their
knowledge to another set of devices.
This item is evaluated separately from the ownership and responsibility for following
reason: the owner of the asset might not be the one operating the device as the operation
is outsourced to a third-party thus the owner typically does not interfere with operations.
Now when the owner is connecting for the first time, this is an anomaly and the chance of
the user’s computer being compromised by an attacker is high and therefore the score is
lower.
Primary, Current Asset Users: If the primary asset user is on duty, then this changes
how other users should connect to the system. In case of an emergency, other users should
have more administrative permissions to restore service, as the primary asset user might be
very busy. Read-only request and data sharing should happen policy based. That is, there is
an upcoming trend among companies working in the same field, even if they are competing
against each other, to share attacks with each other such that together they can join forces
against the attackers [Paypal(2017)]. The idea is that the benefits of (cyber-)protection
outweighs the loss of company privacy. On the other hand read access to the asset where
no attack sharing agreement is in place should be restricted at this point as the attacker
might be among the crowd of people that are reading data and using this information to
plan or execute the attack. A second aspect is that if the primary asset user is on duty or
even supervising the action, then that person can help out in case problems arise and also
monitor the events taken against the asset. For these reasons, maintenance events for an
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asset in a non-emergency situation should happen when the primary user is on duty e.g.,
during daytime on weekdays only, and not, for example, on national holidays, where the
number staff on duty is low.
History with the User / Relationship to the Company: This metric evaluates the users,
and the relationship with the user to the organization in question. Internal staff is ranked
higher than external staff, such as contractors. Furthermore, the relationship history with
external entities plays a role such that long term successful partnerships have a higher trust
than freshly joint entities with no historic background. Also, indirect relationships e.g.,
sub-sub-contractors are evaluated here.
Furthermore we also evaluate the data connection parameters against historic informa-
tion to find anomalies in the connection. E.g., has the user aways connected from the same
IP/location, did he use the same software setup as usual?
Trust of the User’s Computing System: If the user is the using outdated software,
this amplifies the risk of the user being infected with malware. Therefore the trust entity
should evaluate all reported software versions against known vulnerabilities, weighted by
how vulnerable the asset is against these vulnerabilities.
While for an attacker it is easy to report falsified software versions, this mechanism
ensures that honest user keeps their software stack up to date and they do not get infected
by a virus in the first place.
Importance of the Asset: It is important to understand how critical the asset is that the
user is connecting to. If it is one of the very important core assets for business operation
require a very high trust score in order to connect to this device. If on the other the user
is connecting to a relatively unimportant asset then it is easier to get access to. This is
because we recognize the importance of the core assets and want to put an extra layer of
protection on these important devices, while not over-complicating access to less sensitive
devices.
Difficulty in Determining Cause of Damage: In addition to the point above on how
critical the asset is, we also evaluate on how easy it is to detect and trace potential damages
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back to the user/party. This is to ensure that a malicious user has less chance to hide
code without it getting detected and backtracked to it. This may be counterintuitive since
we would allow an attacker to execute code at first. However since most operations, like
the attack on the Ukraine power grid [Lee et al.(2016)], start with reconnaissance, in this
case we would be able to backtrack and identify the user in question and thus disable the
accounts used before they perpetrate the most damaging actions. At the same we gain in
simplicity of the setup, given the modest need for manual permissions, which again is the
main objective of the proposed automated trust assignment technique.
Situation Awareness: The trust metrics should reflect the situation that is happening
and adjust trust values accordingly. This is a key feature of this work as it allows to keep
the amount of users that have access to a device small, while allowing easier access in times
of need. It is important that the classification of the event is fast and easy as the staff in
such a situation has the more important task of resolving the situation as fast as possible.
4.5.2.4 Example Scoring
As an example in the case that a storm that has/is destroying electrical equipment, such
as power lines and is disrupting service. To resolve this power-outage as fast as possible
and previously unknown external contractors are hired. The work to be done requires
shutting off a power switch such that connected power lines that suffered from storm-
damage on power lines can be repaired in a powerless state. In order to turn off the switch
the contractors would contact this trust system to get permission to manipulate the switch
in question. On a regular day with no storm, this request will be denied as we would not
want contractors that we just hired and have no history with to shut off power without
supervision. If, on the other hand, the equipment in question would have been a core asset
for which it is hard to trace potential damage back to the user, then only users with higher
trust score should get access, and newly hired contractors, with low trust score, require
supervision to increase their score.
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4.5.2.5 Implementation Details
In this section, we present a high-level overview on how one might implement the ideas
presented in this chapter. We break the tasks down into the following steps:
The first step and majority of the work is to assign the individual scoring parameters
described in the section above. This also includes defining the target scores that have to be
reached in order to be granted a certain set of permissions. In practice the administrator
of this system should evaluate a small set of example cases manually and set the thresholds
and weightings and resulting target permissions such that the automated trust mechanism
gives similar results. In this work every asset is treated individually, but many assets will
share the same parameters since many devices have similar functionality they they likely the
same set of permission and trust score thresholds to reach this permission can be applied
to multiple devices at once. In practice this can mean thats devices that support the same
functionality and/or are at the same location could be grouped together. Therefore as soon
as example cases are evaluated the system can then evaluate the remaining set of similar of
assets automatically. As a safety mechanism one could also automatically check the results
of the scoring mechanism with simple rules (e.g. by ensure that the score levels requirements
are set such that there is always at least one user that has administrative access).
In the next step, the affiliation of the users and the relationship in between themselves
and with the assets or assets group have to be defined. This can also include historic
information with the asset if it exists. Alternatively one can extract this information from
the log files of an existing trust/authentication system with a data mining system (e.g
[van der Aalst(2011)]).
The last step is to ensure that the result of the trust score calculation and the resulting
permissions are respected in the system. In practice this can mean the linkage of the trust
system of this section with an authentication system like Kerberos, or alternatively it could
also reconfigure a software-defined network (SDN) to allow or deny communication (e.g. in
PulseSDN from Chapter 3.)
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4.5.3 Analytics in Action
In this section, we provide examples of the data analytics that we developed for our
architecture, aiming to spot any abnormal behavior in the sensor data. In particular,
focusing on the µPMU data, we formulated two sets of rules that inspect the phasor data
for anomalies. Although what we discuss next are rules only for the detection of the events,
and there is no inference of their cause, the goal is ultimately to correlate the µPMU data
with the monitored SCADA packets to figure out whether a malicious activity is the most
plausible source of the anomaly.
We will refer to the rules that are checked at BBB next to each µPMU as “local rules”,
and correspondingly those that are checked at our central analytics as “central rules”.
An anomaly is a deviation from what we consider normal from the power grid. Normal
can also be a set of events which are explainable, for example a voltage sag in relation to a
switching event. An anomaly is an event which is inexplicable by traditional measurement
means. The definition of normality is inspired by the well-known power quality and pro-
tection standards in addition to the governing physical equations (Kirchhoff’s and Ohm’s
law) during the quasi steady-state. The detailed information about the rules pertaining to
the governing physical equations, and the employed anomaly detector can be found in our
previous work [Jamei et al.(2016)].
4.5.3.1 Local Rules
The local rules are formulated to inspect for anomalies using a single µPMU data stream.
At time instant k, the µPMU at bus i reports the three phase voltage phasor at that bus
and the three phase current phasors at all the incident lines to that bus denoted by vi[k]
and iij [k], i ∼ j, respectively11. In order for our framework to be scalable, the “local rules”
are set up to be agnostic about the grid interconnection and the geographic location, on
which they are placed. The rules at this stage look for anomalies in the following quantities:
1-Voltage Magnitude Range: The voltage magnitude should lie in a certain range dur-
ing the normal operation of the system that is imposed by the power quality standards
11i ∼ j denotes that bus i and j are connected through the line (i, j).
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[515(2009)]. Any deviation from this normal range is then an anomaly, which has a pre-
defined label depending on the severity and the duration. For example, we report a sustained
interruption at specific phase if the measured voltage phasor magnitude at that phase is
below 0.1 p.u. for a duration greater than 60 seconds.
2-Line Rated Current Limit: The magnitude of the current is bounded by the pre-
defined rated current of the line during the quasi stead-state. Violation of this limit is a
signature of an abnormal behavior in the system.
3-Fast Changes in Data: We track the fast changes in the current magnitude, active
and reactive power at each phase of the data. From our observations, the sample mean
value of these quantities vary very smoothly over time during the normal operation. It then
motivated us to track the fast changes in the sample mean of these quantities using the two-
sided Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm [Page(1954),Basseville et al.(1993),Lai(1995)]
to notify the system operator when the regime of operation has changed.
4-Validity of the Quasi Steady-State Regime: We proved in [Jamei et al.(2016)] that the
correlation matrix R
(ij)
k defined through the following steps using the voltage phasor at bus
i and current flow from bus i to j is approximately of rank-1 during the quasi steady-state.
The proof is achieved by using what is imposed by the Ohm’s law in the quasi steady-state,
and also incorporating the fact that the voltage phasor variation is smooth during the
normal operation. We first define the following correlation matrices using M ≥ 6 samples:
R
(ij)
iv [k] =
1
M − 1
M−1∑
m=0
iij [k −m]vHi [k −m], (4.1)
R(ii)vv [k] =
1
M − 1
M−1∑
m=0
vi[k −m]vHi [k −m], (4.2)
and Rij [k] is defined as:
R
(ij)
k =
(
R
(ij)
iv [k],R
(ii)
vv [k]
)T
(4.3)
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Having rank-1 R
(ij)
k , we can write:
R
(ij)
k (R
(ij)
k )
H ≈ σ21[k]u1[k]uH1 [k] (4.4)
where σ1[k] is the largest singular value of R
(ij)
k , and u1[k] is its corresponding left singular
vector. Overall, deviation from the rank-1 approximation is a signature of exiting from the
quasi steady-state regime so what we propose is to inspect the fast changes in the size of the
null-space of R
(ij)
k (R
(ij)
k )
H given in (4.5) through CUSUM as it is close to zero during the
quasi steady-state and non-zero when the line that the data is representing is experiencing
a transient12.
x[k] = min
u
||(I − uuH)R(ij)k (R(ij)k )H ||F s.t. ||u|| = 1 (4.5)
The local rules can enable the integration of the “data stream prioritization” from BBBs
to upstream that was explained in Sec. 4.3.2.1. In fact, if analytics in a BBB next to a
sensor finds a segment of data eventful, it assigns a high importance to that corresponding
BBB, indicating that its data and analytics results should have high priority when sent
upstream.
Also note that having analytics that provide intelligence at the edges of the infrastructure
adds resilience to man-in-the-middle attacks, since the link between sensor and BBB is
exclusive and hard to compromise, while the BBB can request the publisher upstream to
acknowledge an anomaly report, to further control the integrity of the process.
4.5.3.2 Central Rules
The central anomaly detection rule correlates the µPMU data that are shipped from the
on-site RabbitMQ to the central RabbitMQ, and are accessed by the central analytic node.
The natural way to relate the voltage and current measurements at different locations in the
grid is through the admittance matrix. In fact, the Kirchhoff’s law forms the cornerstone of
our central rule. During the quasi steady-state, the Kirchhoff’s law takes a form of memory-
12I denotes the identity matrix
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less algebraic equations, while differential equations can only capture the manifestation of
the dynamics when the grid is in a transient. Next, we describe briefly our formulation (for
details c.f. [Jamei et al.(2016)]). Denoting the three phase voltage and current injection
vectors over the grid by V[k] and I[k], and defining them as follows 13:
[V[k]]i = vi[k], [I[k]]i =
∑
j:i∼j
iij [k] (4.6)
the following relationship holds:
(I3N ,−Y3(N×N))︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
 I[k]
V[k]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
d[k]
= 0 (4.7)
where Y is the three phase admittance matrix of the grid at nominal frequency and is
assumed to be known for the central analytics, and N is the number of the buses. Equation
(4.7) only holds during the steady-state and can also be used for the quasi steady-state
regime with a good approximation, while it is not valid during the severe transients. We
can decompose (4.7) into two terms based on the available and unavailable measurements
denoted by subscripts a and u respectively, as follows:
Hada[k] + Hudu[k] = 0→ Hudu[k] = −Hada[k] (4.8)
The challenge is usually that the number of available µPMUs is much smaller than the
size of the grid making the matrix Hu a fat matrix. Hence, the unavailable measurements
cannot be reconstructed through the available measurements. However, we can use the fact
that HuH
H
u has a high condition number, and project equation (4.8) on the left singular
13We use the three phase admittance matrix in our formulation rather than the common positive sequence
matrix in the transmission grid to take the specific considerations of a distribution grid into account including:
1) lines are not generally transposed, 2) the grid is normally unbalanced, 3) and finally single phase and
two phase laterals exist in the grid that can be modeled by their 3× 3 equivalent with zero entries for those
phases that do not exist.
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vector of Hu, denoted by uu corresponding to its smallest singular value:
uHu Hudu[k] = −uHu Hada[k] (4.9)
We expect the left term in (4.9) to be small and therefore, when the normal quasi steady-
state condition holds (and accordingly the equality holds), the following function should be
small and vary smoothly:
x[k] =
|uHu Hada[k]|22
||da[k]||22
. (4.10)
What we propose is to track the fast changes of x[k] using the CUSUM change detection
algorithm, to flag when the grid is under a transient mode.
Discussion–Cyber Data Aggregation
The rules that we covered up to this point are purely based on the physical µPMU
measurements and are used to discover the eventful intervals of data. Our goal however is
to also correlate the monitored cyber traffic at higher levels of aggregation (as part of the
central rule in this example) to determine whether a cyber-attack is at cause.
We bring the following example to illustrate the idea in more details, while keeping in
mind that the concept can be applied to any cyber-physical system. Fault Location, Isola-
tion, and Service Restoration (FLISR) is a critical application in an automated distribution
grid and is intended to find the location of a fault on the grid, isolate the faulty section,
and restore the service to the healthy parts of the grid using the SCADA network. When
a fault occurs, our rules explained above will be triggered to indicate the existence of an
anomaly. Therefore, if the attacker falsifies the fault detectors trying to pretend that ev-
erything is normal, our CPS architecture detects the inconsistency between the cyber and
physical data and flag the event as an intrusion. In a more complicated attack, the adver-
sary manipulates data to mislead the system about the location of the fault. We can use
the µPMU measurements to identify the location of the fault independent from the fault
detectors and check if the fault detectors are compromised.
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4.5.3.3 Real-Data Example
In this section, we showcase an example of our data analytics using the real µPMU
data that are collected at our partner utility grid. Through this example, we show how our
infrastructure is providing a level of situational awareness about the distribution grid that
was not attainable using the SCADA sensors.
Fig. 4.8 shows the location of the installed µPMUs in the utility on an abstract one-line
diagram. As it can be observed from this figure, three µPMUs are already installed at two
distribution feeders that are connected only through the subtransmission grid. The µPMUs
at feeder 1 are monitoring the substation bus and the PV site at feeder 1, denoted by µPMU
1 and 2, respectively; while µPMU 3 is monitoring the substation bus at feeder 2.
Subtransmission 
Grid
Feeder 1
Feeder 2
PV Site
µPMU 1 
µPMU 2 
µPMU 3 
Figure 4.8: Location of the Installed µPMUs at the Partner Distribution Feeders.
Fig. 4.9 shows a segment of voltage phasor magnitude captured by our µPMUs. Based
on the defined regions in our voltage magnitude rule, µPMU 1 and 2 are not experiencing
any power quality event, while µPMU 3 is indicating a voltage sag that has affected all the
three phases. This analysis is performed at each BBB separately, and the stored results
are in the format as shown in Table. 4.2. The fast changes detected (using CUSUM) in
Table 4.2: Voltage Magnitude Rule Format of the Result
ID Type Phase Interval
1 No Event – –
2 No Event – –
3 Voltage Sag a-b-c
05-Jan-2016
13:12:14.96-13:12:15.08
the current phasor magnitude for phase-a are also shown in Fig. 4.10, only for µPMU 3.
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Figure 4.9: A Segment of Voltage Phasor Magnitude Data.
The current phasor at the two other µPMUs are not affected by this event, and the plots
are omitted for brevity. Similar to the voltage magnitude rule, the current magnitude fast
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Figure 4.10: Detected Fast Changes in the Current Magnitude of µPMU-3.
change rule creates the following report: As it can be seen, the interval reported, which
was flagged by the current magnitude rule, is almost the same as the voltage magnitude
rule. A comparison of these time intervals can streamline the report, indicating that they
are referring to the same event. We note that, while we only showed the results of these
two rules to showcase the idea, the other rules also capture the existing anomaly on feeder
2 and flag successfully this event.
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Table 4.3: Current Magnitude Fast Change Rule Format of the Result
ID Type Phase Interval
1 No Event – –
2 No Event – –
3 Current Surge a-b-c
05-Jan-2016
13:12:14.95-13:12:15.11
In this example, using “local rules” results, our “data stream prioritization” assigns the
high-priority to the data and results of µPMU-3, while the data and results for the other
two µPMUs are labeled with low-priority tag.
As we mentioned, one of the main advantages of our automated anomaly detector is
providing distribution operators with situational awareness about the grid. For example,
in the case that we just discussed, by looking at the results in Table. 4.2, an operator can
immediately conclude that the cause of the event is most likely on feeder 2. The reason is
that if the root was in the transmission or subtransmission grid, the µPMUs at both feeders
would have captured an anomaly, and also if it was on feeder 1, µPMUs installed on that
feeder would have been affected more, compared to µPMU 3. The data from the current
magnitude fast change can also reveal that the cause of the event is likely a momentary
fault or start of a big motor. In addition, since the interval is provided, operator can look
more closely to the raw data and realize that some loads went out of service after this
event since the current magnitude is lower and the voltage magnitude is higher in the new
quasi steady-state situation as opposed to the state before the event. Ultimately, one could
automate also these kind of considerations to further relieve operators from the task of
interpreting the data.
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5 Data injection attacks in randomized gossiping
Abstract: The subject of this chapter is the detection and mitigation of data injection at-
tacks in randomized average consensus gossip algorithms. It is broadly known that the main
advantages of randomized average consensus gossip are its fault tolerance and distributed
nature. Unfortunately, the flat architecture of the algorithm also increases the attack surface
for a data injection attack. Even though we cast our problem in the context of sensor net-
work security, the attack scenario is identical to existing models for opinion dynamics (the
so-called DeGroot model) with stubborn agents steering the opinions of the group toward a
final state that is not the average of the network initial states. We specifically propose two
novel strategies for detecting and locating attackers and study their detection and localiza-
tion performance numerically and analytically. Our detection and localization methods are
completely decentralized and, therefore, nodes can directly act on their conclusions and stop
receiving information from nodes identified as attackers. As we show by simulation, the
network can often recover in this fashion, leveraging the resilience of randomized gossiping
to reduced network connectivity.
This chapter studies two methods on how to protect a randomized gossiping network from
an inside attacker, who already passed initial protection levels such as encryption keys and
firewall rules.
Gossiping networks are completely distributed algorithms that allow for local computa-
tion and processing of (sensor) data. Gossiping algorithms are an application layer protocol
algorithms that are resilient to node failures and can reorganize themselves automatically,
just like PulseSS from the previous chapter can for the MAC/Physical layer. The flat
architecture of gossiping algorithms however can be a burden as even a single attack, con-
trolling only one node, can take control of the complete gossiping network. In this chapter
we describe two defense mechanisms that honest nodes can execute locally, without any
connectivity overhead to detect, localize and isolate an attacker from the network.
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This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we describe the pairwise random-
ized consensus algorithm and introduce the data injection attack model. In Section 5.2, we
propose the detection and localizing strategies for eliminating the attackers. The perfor-
mance analysis for the proposed strategies are analyzed in Section 5.3. We conclude with
simulation results in Section 5.4.
Notations: We use boldfaced letter to denote vector/matrix. For a vector x, [x]i denotes
its ith element; similarly, for a matrix A, [A]ij denotes its (i, j)th element.
5.1 Consensus Network Model
Let us consider a sensor network, which is described by a connected, undirected graph
G = (V,E), where V = {1, ..., n} denotes a set of nodes and E ⊆ V ×V denotes the connec-
tions between the nodes. Assume that the sensor nodes continuously perform a randomized
consensus algorithm. We assume that at each iteration of the detection algorithm, a total
of K instances of the consensus algorithm have taken place, either running in parallel or
sequentially, and each node has overheard many, if not all, transmissions in its neighbor-
hood and accrued historical data of K runs of the consensus algorithm from its vantage
point, which we enumerate in with the superscript k, with k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. In our notation
k ∈ N is used as a superscript in reference to the instance of the consensus algorithm and
the time index t ∈ N denotes the specific iteration. Correspondingly, the random vector
xk(t) = (xk1(t), ..., x
k
n(t))
> ∈ Rn represent the states at the tth consensus iteration1.
Let the initial state of node i ∈ V be xki (0) = γki , with γki being a stationary discrete
random process. The goal of the consensus algorithm is to compute the network initial
states’ average
xkav :=
1
n
1>xk(0) =
1
n
1>γk, (5.1)
where 1 is an all-one vector. The consensus algorithm we consider in this work is the random
pairwise exchange algorithm [Boyd et al.(2006)], shown in Algorithm 3. We remark that the
non-negative parameter Pij , which is probability that node i selects node j to update with,
1One can assume a random waiting time between updates, for instance draw from i.i.d. exponential
distributions [Boyd et al.(2006)]
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Algorithm 3: Randomized consensus protocol
Input: no. of iterations T , initial states: xki (0) ∀ i ∈ V .
for t = 1 : T do
• Uniformly wake up a random node i ∈ V .
• Node i selects node j from its neighborhood with
the probability
Pij , where j ∈ Ni and Ni := {j : (i, j) ∈ E}. (5.2)
• Node i and j update their states as follows
xki (t+ 1) = x
k
j (t+ 1) =
xki (t) + x
k
j (t)
2
; (5.3)
Other nodes keep their original states, i.e., xkv(t+ 1) = x
k
v(t) for all v 6= i, j.
in Algorithm 3, satisfies
∑n
j=1 Pij = 1 and Algorithm 3 can be implemented asynchronously.
Each sensor node does not need to know the iteration index t of the protocol. The updates
in Algorithm 3 can be conveniently expressed as:
xk(t) = W (t− 1)xk(t− 1), (5.4)
where W (t) is the transition matrix at instance k and time t. Define [P ]ij = Pij and Σ
as a diagonal matrix with [Σ]ii =
∑n
j=1(Pij + Pji), the expected transition matrix can be
written as
W = E [W (t)] = I − 1
2n
Σ +
P + P>
2n
. (5.5)
It can be verified that W is non-negative, symmetric and doubly stochastic. We have
the expected states
E[xk(t)|xk(0)] = WE
[
xk(t− 1)|xk(0)
]
= W
t
xk(0),
Under some mild assumptions (one of them being the graph to be strongly connected), the
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protocol above finds the true average xkav. Denote λ2(W ) as the second largest eigenvalue
of W , we have
Fact 1: For each k, the state at every sensor i ∈ V converges to a ∆-neighborhood of xkav
with a high probability, i.e.
P
(
|xki (t)− xkav| < ∆ max
j∈V
|xkj (0)|
)
≥ 1−∆, (5.6)
for all ∆ ≥ 0 and t ≥ 3 log ∆−1/ log λ2(W )−1.
The detailed proof and conditions of Fact 1 can be found in [Boyd et al.(2006), Theorem
3]. Notice that the lower bound on t is finite only if λ2(W ) < 1, which depends on the
design of P and thus can be satisfied when G is a connected graph; see [Dimakis et al.(2010)]
for further discussions.
5.1.1 Data Injection Attack Model
The data injection attack model we consider in this chapter is analogous to the stub-
born agent model studied under the framework of DeGroot opinion dynamics in social
learning [DeGroot(1974)], whose average convergence properties were studied in [Yildiz and
Scaglione(2010)]. We assume that the sensor network is compromised by a set of attackers,
denoted by Vs ⊆ V . For simplicity, we set Vs = {1, ..., ns} and ns ≤ n. The remaining
normal nodes form the set Vr = V \Vs. The goal of the attackers (or malicious nodes) is to
steer the consensus result of the network to a certain target value of their choice αk 6= xkav,
so that the states converge to
lim
t→∞x
k(t) = αk1. (5.7)
As we shall see in Section 5.2, αk is a stationary discrete random process.
To stage the attack, the malicious nodes follow a modified update rule. That is, under
the consensus protocol of Algorithm 1, if a malicious node j ∈ Vs is selected at iteration t,
in lieu of (5.3), the node’s state will be generated as
xkj (t) = α
k +mkj (t), (5.8)
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where mkj (t) is a zero-mean artificial noise generated by the attackers to hide their malicious
intent from the normal nodes. Notice that a normal node could easily detect a malicious
agent with no artificial noise as the node’s state over time would be constant, xks(t) = x
k
s(0),
and thus easily detectable.
We claim that under the modified update rule (5.8) and the assumptions that (i) the
attackers are not isolated from the network and (ii) the induced sub-graph G[Vr] is strongly
connected, the attackers can successfully steer the consensus result of the network:
limt→∞ E[xk(t)|αk] = αk1. (5.9)
To show (5.9), let us first define
xk(t) =
(
sk(t)>, rk(t)>
)>
, (5.10)
where sk(t) ∈ Rns , rk(t) ∈ Rn−ns correspond to the states of the malicious nodes and
normal nodes, respectively. As a consequence of the update rules in (5.3) and (5.8), we
have
E[sk(t)|αk] = αk1, ∀ t ≥ 1. (5.11)
Moreover, the expected transition matrix W becomes
W = E[W (t)] =
 I 0
B D
 , (5.12)
where the malicious nodes correspond to the identity matrix inW as they are never affected
by the other nodes. It is well known that [Minc(1974), Theorem 1.1, Chapter 2]:
Fact 2: If D is sub-stochastic and irreducible, then it holds that ‖D‖2 < 1.
Notice that B 6= 0 as the attackers are not isolated, thus D is sub-stochastic. Moreover,
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D is irreducible as G[Vr] is connected. It can be verified that
E[rk(t)|γk, αk] = αk∑ts=0Dt−sB1 +Dtγk. (5.13)
As ‖D‖2 < 1 and using the identities
∑n−1
t=1 D
t = (I −Dn)(I −D)−1 and B1 +D1 = 1,
∑t
s=0D
t−sB1 = 1−Dt+11,
As Dt decays to zero, we have limt→∞ E[rk(t)|γk, αk] = αk1. Combining this with (5.11)
yields (5.9).
Remark 1: From the normal nodes’ point of view, the attackers appear to make progress
towards the final value xk(∞). If there is no attacker, xk(∞) would be the true average of
all nodes; in the presence of coordinated attackers, it will tend to αk. At the same time, the
attackers states converge with the expected convergence speed to αk.
Remark 2: When there are multiple attackers in the network, we assume that they are coor-
dinated such that all the malicious agents bias their state with the same value αk. Otherwise,
the network almost surely will not reach consensus [Yildiz and Scaglione(2010),Ben-Ameur
et al.(2012)], and thus attacks can be detected by spotting different final states. Interest-
ingly, a recent submission [Sundaram and Gharesifard(2016)] proposed an alternative de-
fense mechanism against attackers for synchronous gossiping, which is based on discarding
extreme values in the consensus iteration. It is useful to notice that their method does not
generally work with random gossiping and against the noisy coordinated attack technique
we consider. Our methods, in contrast, can be applied very successfully against the attack
model in [Sundaram and Gharesifard(2016)] in which the malicious nodes simply do not
average with their neighbors, as well as the more insidious one we consider, as we show by
simulation in Section V.
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Figure 5.1: Different tasks involved in the attack detection scheme.
5.2 Detecting Data Injection Attacks
We consider three detection tasks, to be performed in a decentralized fashion by the
normal nodes i ∈ Vr in order.
(I) Attacker Detection Task — The first test checks if the presence of attacker(s) in the
network:
H0 : No attacker in the network, i.e., Vs = ∅,
H1 : At least one attacker in the network, i.e., Vs 6= ∅.
(II) Neighborhood Detection Task — The second test checks if an attacker is present in
the neighborhood of node i:
Hi0 : No attacker in the neighborhood, i.e., Vs ∩Ni = ∅,
Hi1 : Attacker in the neighborhood, i.e., Vs ∩Ni 6= ∅.
(III) Localization Task — The third test attempts to locate the malicious node in the
neighborhood of node i. For all j ∈ Ni, we check:
Hij0 : node j is not an attacker, i.e., j /∈ Vs.
Hij1 : node j is an attacker, i.e., j ∈ Vs.
Note that the localization task is performed only if the neighborhood detection task decides
that Hi1 is true. We depict the detection/localization targets of the three tasks in figure 5.1.
In the case when a central authority (CA) exists, node i can report the tests’ results to
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Figure 5.2: Each normal node H will perform detection and localization independently,
therefore isolating attacker A from the network.
the CA. The CA will take appropriate actions, possibly fusing the information of multiple
nodes. We also propose the following decentralized protection scheme which does not require
the existence of a CA. Specifically, upon the completion of task II and task III, node i shall
cut all future communication to the located malicious nodes, i.e., E icut = {ij ∈ E : Hˆij =
Hij1 } where Hˆij is the outcome from the localization task. If completed successfully by all
nodes, we can effectively isolate the attackers and prevent any future harm to the network.
An illustration of the detection and localization steps is depicted in figure 5.2. We mention
that this protection scheme is successful if all edges to an attacker are disconnected and
the attacker cannot do any harm, i.e. ‖B‖2 = 0. False detections, as long as they do not
disconnect the graph, only slow down convergence.
Our detection schemes rely on finding the statistical anomalies through statistics com-
puted at the normal nodes. In particular, we make the following assumptions:
(A1) : γ¯ := E[γki ], ∀ i ∈ Vr. (A2) : γ¯ 6= α¯ := E[αk],
where we emphasize that the expectation above is taken w.r.t. k. The first assumption
(A1) states that the initial values for the normal nodes have the same mean γ¯ for all normal
nodes; and the second assumption (A2) states that γ¯ is different from α¯, i.e., the initial
value for the attacker.
5.2.1 Detection through Temporal Difference
We introduce a strategy which detects the anomalies caused by the malicious agent by
evaluating the (average) temporal difference of the values held by normal nodes. To explain
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the intuition, observe that the expected initial value of a malicious agent s ∈ Vs is different
from that a normal agent j ∈ Vr, i.e.,
E[xks(0)] = α¯ 6= γ¯ = E[xkj (0)]. (5.14)
While when t→∞, the network will be misled by the malicious nodes, i.e.,
E[xks(∞)] = α¯ = E[xkj (∞)]. (5.15)
This implies that the quantity |xki (∞) − xki (0)| will be close to zero if i ∈ Vs or be large
otherwise, indicating an anomaly.
The temporal difference method is developed from the observation above. Consider a
normal node i ∈ Vr, let xkj (Tij), xkj (0) be respectively the last and the first observed state
value for a node j in the neighborhood of node i. The following metric can be evaluated:
ξij :=
1
K
K∑
k=0
(xkj (Tij)− xkj (0)), (5.16)
for all j ∈ Ni. Notice that if Tij is sufficiently large and node j is not malicious, then ξij
tends to be large.
We propose the following detection criterion for the neighborhood detection task (which
implies attacker detection): ∑
m∈Ni
|ξim − ξ¯i|
Hi0
≶
Hi1
δI , (5.17)
where ξ¯i := (1/|Ni|)
∑
m∈Ni ξim and δI > 0 is some pre-designed threshold. The detection
criterion in (5.17) finds if there is an outlier in Ni for the set of statistics {ξim}m∈Ni . This,
however, implies that a node that has no attacker in its neighborhood cannot detect that
an attack is present in the network. This can also be seen mathematically as E[ξim− ξ¯i] = 0
for both Hi0 ∩H0 and Hi0 ∩H1 (5.17), where the ∩ operator returns true if both events are
true. Note that we require that there is at least one normal neighbor to detect an attack.
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For the localization task, we propose the following criterion:
|ξij |
Hij1
≶
Hij0
I (5.18)
for all j ∈ Ni. The intuition behind this criterion was given at the beginning of this
subsection. We remark that the localization task is performed only if the neighborhood
detection task returns Hi1.
5.2.2 Detection through Spatial Difference
This subsection describes what we refer to as the spatial difference strategy for data
injection attack detection. Herein, our main idea is to exploit the fact that a malicious
node, if it exists, always tries to influence and steers the nodes away from their true average;
if there is no malicious node in the network, the average state of all nodes are identical.
Mathematically, if 0 < t <∞,
E[xkm(t)− xkj (t)|H0] = 0, E[xkm(t)− xkj (t)|H1] 6= 0, (5.19)
i.e., anomalies can be found in the spatial difference of states.
Define Tk ⊆ N as the set of sampling times observed by a normal node i at the kth
instance of the consensus algorithm. We consider the following metric for all m ∈ Ni ∪ {i}:
Xkim :=
∑
t∈Tk
(
xkm(t)−
1
|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
xkj (t)
)
. (5.20)
Notice that |Xkim| is the difference between the value held by a neighboring node m and
the sum of all the nodes in the same neighborhood (excluding node i itself), and then sum
up this difference from all the observed consensus iterations. Compared to the temporal
method, the spatial difference method registers an anomaly even if attacks are not staged
directly in the neighborhood of node i. This is a double-edged-sword because while it
indicates that one can attain situation awareness throughout the network, not just in the
immediate proximity of attackers, it complicates the localization task.
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Based on Xkim, we have the following criterion for both attacker detection and neighbor-
hood detection tasks:
Si1 :=
1
|Ni|
∑
m∈Ni
( 1
K
K∑
k=1
Xkim
)2 H0
≶
H1
δII , (5.21)
where we shall use a different threshold δ′II > δII for the neighborhood detection task.
Furthermore, we require that node i which performs (5.21) to have at least 2 neighbors,
from which at least one is normal.
For the localization task, we define the following metric:
X˜kij :=
∑
t∈Tk
(
xkj (t)− xki (t)
)−Xkii, (5.22)
which has a similar interpretation as Xkim. This metric compares a neighboring node j to the
node i itself and the neighborhood average with respect to the node itself. The localization
task is performed by the following test:
Sij2 :=
( 1
K
K∑
k=1
X˜kij
)2 Hij0
≶
Hij1
II (5.23)
The next section analyzes the performances of both temporal difference and spatial differ-
ence methods.
5.3 Performance Analysis
We first define the following performance metric — for the attacker detection task (per-
formed by the ith agent):
P iad := P (Hˆ = H1|H1), P iaf := P (Hˆ = H1|H0),
for the neighborhood detection task :
P ind := P (Hˆi = Hi1|Hi1), P inf := P (Hˆi = Hi1|Hi0),
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for the localization task :
P ijld := P (Hˆij = Hij1 |Hij1 ), P ijlf := P (Hˆij = Hij1 |Hij0 ),
Our analysis holds under the following assumptions on the statistics of the attacker and
normal nodes:
• The initial state for normal nodes, xki (0) = γki , is identically independently distributed
(i.i.d.) with mean γ¯ with sub-Gaussian parameter σ2γ .
• The initial state for malicious nodes, αk, is i.i.d. with mean α¯ with sub-Gaussian
parameter σ2α.
• The artificial noise for malicious nodes, mki (t), is i.i.d. with zero mean and sub-
Gaussian parameter σ2m.
Notice that a random variable (r.v.) z with mean z¯ is said to have sub-Gaussian parameter
σ2z if
E
[
eλ(z−z¯)
] ≤ eσ2zλ2/2, ∀ λ ∈ R.
If z is also Gaussian, then σ2z is the variance of z.
Remark 3: Even when these assumptions are violated, the metrics can be applied and loose
bounds (e.g., using generalized Markov inequality) are obtainable as long as the distribution
of the attackers states has finite moments. In the case of infinite moments the metrics
however will fail. In addition, our simulation results test the same metrics in scenarios that
violate the assumptions above to show their effectiveness.
5.3.1 Analysis for the Temporal Difference Strategy
Observe that the metric ξij is evaluated as a finite sum of independent sub-Gaussian
r.v.s. Define the following constants:
µi =
|Ni,r|
|Ni| (α¯− γ¯), Ni,r = Vr ∩Ni, Ni,s = Vs ∩Ni, (5.24)
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σ2i =
( |Ni|2 − 2|Ni|+ |Ni,s|
|Ni|2
)
σ2m +
|Ni,r|2
|Ni|2 σ
2
α +
|Ni,r|
|Ni|2 σ
2
γ ,
We have the following performance guarantees:
Theorem 1: Let Tij →∞. We have
P inf ≤ 2|Ni| · exp
(
−Kδ2I/(2σ2γ |Ni|(|Ni| − 1))
)
, (5.25)
P ind ≥ 1− exp
(
−K(max{0,−δI + |µi|})2/(2σ2i )
)
, (5.26)
When the initial states and artificial noise are Gaussian, we have
P inf ≤ 2|Ni| ·Q
(√
KδI/(σγ
√
(|Ni| − 1)|Ni|)
)
, (5.27)
P ind ≥ Q
(√
K(δI + µi)/σi
)
+Q
(√
K(δI − µi)/σi
)
. (5.28)
The result in theorem 1 is proven in Appendix 5.A for the sub-Gaussian case. The
analysis above shows the impact of the variance on the detection (5.17) performance. We
see that the false alarm rate (5.25) depends solely on σ2γ , while the miss detection rate (5.26)
depends on the other parameters as well.
From Theorem 1, we observe that δI should be chosen to be smaller than |µi| to yield a
non-trivial bound. In this case, let P ind be the minimum required detection rate, the false
alarm rate can be bounded as:
P inf ≤ 2|Ni| · exp
(
− K|Ni|
(
|µi| −
√
2σ2i
K log
1
1−P ind
)2
2σ2γ(|Ni| − 1)
)
.
This implies that for a given requirement on the detection rate probability, the false alarm
probability will only be influenced by the choice of K.
Following the same line of reasoning we can prove the following performance bounds for
the localization task:
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Lemma 1: Let Tij →∞. We have
P ijlf ≤ exp
(
−K(max{0,−I + |α¯− γ¯|})2/(2(σ2α + σ2γ))
)
, (5.29)
P ijld ≥ 1− 2 · exp
(
−K2I/(2σ2m)
)
. (5.30)
For the case of Gaussian random initial states and attackers noise we have:
P ijlf = Q
 −I + |α¯− γ¯|√
(σ2α + σ
2
γ)/K
−Q
 I + |α¯− γ¯|√
(σ2α + σ
2
γ)/K
 (5.31)
P ijld = 1− 2Q
(√
KI/σm
)
. (5.32)
Lemma 1 is proven in Appendix 5.B for the sub-Gaussian case. Notice that the formulas
in (5.31) and (5.32) are exact. Once again, if K is sufficiently large, (5.31) and (5.32) are
good approximations for the sub-Gaussian case as well as we verified by simulation.
Remark 4: The requirement that Tij → ∞ is imposed for the sake of obtaining constants
that can be evaluated in closed form. Without such assumption, we can still obtain bounds
similar to Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 and the exponential scaling with K will remain valid.
5.3.2 Analysis for the Spatial Difference Strategy
We perform the following analysis under the assumption that the initial states γk, αk
and attackers’ noise mk(t) are Gaussian distributed. Our first result is the following char-
acterization of the random variable Xkim. Let ei be the unit vector with 1 being in the ith
entry. We define
ηim = (em − 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
ej)
>
 0
(γ¯ − α¯)∑t∈TkDt1
 . (5.33)
Also, τim and βim are constants that are bounded as
τ2im = Cτim ·
(
σ2γ
λ2(W )
(1− λ2(W ))2
)
, (5.34)
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β2im = Cβim ·
(
(σ2γ + σ
2
α)
3λ˜− 1
(1− λ˜)2 + σ
2
m
3λ˜− λ˜2
(1− λ˜)3
)
, (5.35)
for some Cτim , Cβim <∞ that are independent of the network topology nor the statistics of
the r.v.s, where λ˜ = max{λˆ2, λ1(D)}. It can be proven that:
Theorem 2: Assume that γk, αk and mk(t) are Gaussian, the random variable Xkim is also
Gaussian with statistics
H0 : Xkim ∼ N (0, τ2im) and H1 : Xkim ∼ N
(
ηim, β
2
im
)
.
The results hold for all m ∈ Ni ∪ {i} and i ∈ Vr.
We remark that the hypothesis H1 refers to the scenario when an attacker exists some-
where in the network (not necessarily in Ni). In other words, the statistics of Xkim changes
whenever at least one attacker exists therefore, this metric is a suitable candidate for per-
forming the attacker detection task.
In fact, the difficulty in establishing Theorem 2 lies on the fact that Xkim is an infinite
sum of correlated random variables. It is not obvious whether its variance is bounded. In
our proof, we exploit the sub-stochasticity of D and that the infinite sum may be treated as
a converging geometric series. The proof to the proposition can be found in Appendix 5.C:
Our main result is summarized as follows.
Theorem 3: Assume that γk, αk,mk(t) are Gaussian. The attacker detection performance
of the spatial difference strategy is given as:
P iaf ≤ exp
(−K max{0, |Ni|δII − c0}/c1). (5.36)
for some c0, c1 that scale with τim. Also,
1− P iad ≤ exp (−K max{0,−|Ni|δII + c2}) ,
for some c2 > 0 that scales with βim, ηim.
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The proof is relegated to Appendix 5.D.
Next we characterize the localization performance. In the following, we shall assume
that at least one attacker is present in the network, i.e., H1 holds. Our first step is to
study the statistics of X˜kij . Observe that
η˜ij = E[X˜kij ] = (ej − ei)>
 0
(γ¯ − α¯)∑t∈TkDt1
− ηii.
Moreover, the variance can be bounded as
β˜2ij := var(X˜
k
ij) ≤ 4 max{var
(∑
t∈Tk(x
k
j (t)− xki (t))
)
, β2ii}
In the same spirit as the proof of Proposition 2, it can be verified that var
(∑
t∈Tk(x
k
j (t)−
xki (t))
)
<∞ and thus β˜2ij is bounded from above. We remark that the values of η˜ij , β˜2ij are
dependent on the cases (Hij0 , Hij1 ) we are in. For instance, it can be seen that |η˜ij | is larger
in Hij1 than in Hij0 .
Knowing the statistics above, the localization performance can be evaluated straight-
forwardly as:
Lemma 2: Assume that γk, αk,mk(t) are Gaussian, the localization performance of the
spatial difference strategy is given as:
P ijlf ≤ Q
(√
K(
√
II − η˜ij)/β˜ij
)
+Q
(√
K(
√
II + η˜ij)/β˜ij
)
1− P ijld ≤
Q
(√
K(η˜ij −√II)/β˜ij
)
−Q
(√
K(
√
II + η˜ij)/β˜ij
)
.
The proof can be found in Appendix 5.E.
Compared to the analysis of the temporal strategy, we observe a similar improvement
in the performance that decays exponentially in K. Moreover, the bounds obtained for the
attack detection task using the spatial difference method depend explicitly on the network
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topology, while the respective bound for neighborhood detection task with the temporal
difference method only depends on the neighborhood size.
Remark 5: We remark that the analysis above can be extended to sub-Gaussian initial states,
e.g., by applying the general results from [Rudelson and Vershynin(2013),Hsu et al.(2012)].
We omit such extensions in the interest of space limitation.
5.3.3 Optimal Attacker’s Strategy
We consider a scenario when the attacker optimizes his/her strategy to maximize the
damages caused to the consensus network. Specifically, we focus on the defense strategy
employing the temporal difference detection (cf. Section 5.2.1) and assume that the attacker
is aware of the strategy employed by the network, including the parameter δI .
The attacker’s goal is to introduce the maximum perturbation |α¯− γ¯| to the network’s
final state, while avoiding being detected. For simplicity, we assume that σ2α = 0 and the
attacker optimizes its attack statistics by:
max
α¯
|α¯− γ¯| s.t. P ind(α¯) ≤ Π, ∀ i ∈ Vr, (5.37)
where Π ∈ (0, 1) is the detection probability threshold for the attacker.
Due to the intractability of the constraint on P ind(α¯) in Problem (5.37), we bound the
detection probability and derive a conservative approximation to (5.37). The following can
be derived as an extension to Theorem 1:
Lemma 3: Let Tij →∞. We have
P ind(θatt) ≤ 2|Ni| · exp
(
−K (max{0, |Ni|
−1δI − |µi|})2
2σ2i
)
, (5.38)
When the initial states and artificial noise are Gaussian,
P ind(θatt) ≤ 2|Ni| ·Q
(√
K
(|Ni|−1δI − |µi|)/σi), (5.39)
see the definitions of the constants in (5.24).
135
The proof can be found in Appendix 5.F. Notice that the bounds above are non-trivial
only when |Ni|−1δI ≥ |µi|, since otherwise the bounds become equal to 1. Since |µi| ∝ |α¯−γ¯|,
this limits the maximum deviation that the attacker can introduce to the network. Based
on the bound from Theorem 1, we observe that −δI + |µi| ≤ 0, then P ind ≥ 1 and any attack
will be detected. Applying the results above, an approximate optimal attack strategy can
be found by replacing P ind(θatt) in (5.37) with the right hand side of (5.38) or (5.39).
To obtain an optimal solution to the approximated (5.37), we observe that the bounds
in (5.38) (or (5.39)) are monotonically increasing with |µi|. Now, to maximize |α¯− γ¯|, the
right hand side of (5.38) (or (5.39)) must equal to Π. Taking the sub-Gaussian case as an
example, suppose the consensus network designs a threshold δI such that the false alarm
probability is no bigger than P¯ inf, it can be verified that the maximum perturbation subject
to a detection probability Π is:
|α¯? − γ¯| = max
{
0,
√
2σ2γ |Ni|(|N i| − 1)
K|Ni,r|2 log
(2|Ni|
P¯ inf
)
−
√
2σ2i |Ni|2
K|Ni,r|2 log
(2|Ni|
Π
)}
.
(5.40)
Note that as K →∞, the maximum perturbation goes to zero.
Remark 2: The presented detection and localization strategies have limits on how many
attackers they can successfully defend against. In fact in order for our tests to work, we
have the following two requirements: First, as we can see from (5.38) (5.39) (5.40) an honest
node requires at least one honest neighbor for a non-trivial bound. Secondly, as of Sec. 5.1
we require the network to be connected in order for the nodes to converge the true average.
For this reason the best way for an attacker to attack the network is by splitting the network
in multiple parts, by placing themselves in nodes that keep the network connected, i.e. with
the minimum number of attackers required is the minimum network cut [Hu(1969)]. In fact
even if the attackers are detected correctly and removed, the gossiping algorithm will fail to
produce the correct result on all nodes2.
2We can define several criterion on what we classify as a failed network as follows. Which criterion to use
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The minimum number of such compromised nodes needed to perform an attack with
the minimum amount of attackers (i.e. minimum cut) can be found in [Stoer and Wag-
ner(1997), Addis et al.(2011)] and thus can give a lower bound on the amount of attacking
nodes needed to compromise the network for a given network graph, independent on the
performance of detection and localization algorithms. In case an attacker has equal chance
of compromising a node and cannot optimally choose target nodes then the line network
is the easiest to attack because, if any node (but the last&first node) is compromised, that
would mean that the network will be disconnected if the attacker is detected and removed.
Moreover in the line network one cannot have the majority of nodes that are honest, making
the detection and localization task more difficult as we will find in Sec. 5.4.2.
If, on the other hand, an attacker can choose the target nodes, then start networks require
the minimum number of attackers (just one) to fragment the network completely. In addition
this configuration would not allow the detection and localization. This suggest that attacks
that can be strategic in placing the malicious nodes, clustered networks (interconnection
of star networks) would be the most fragile. From this consideration it is clear that our
methodology performs well in meshed networks.
5.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of the proposed methods. For
the simulation results that follow, we consider a Manhattan topology with n = 9 nodes, as
shown in Figure 5.3. The randomized gossip-based consensus protocol (cf. Algorithm 3) is
run with Pij = 1/|Ni| (cf. (5.2)), and is terminated with T = 500. We have αk ∼ N (0, 1),
γki ∼ U [−0.5, 1.5], mki (t) ∼ U [−λˆt, λˆt]. The Monte Carlo simulation is run with 103 trials.
Before we present the performance evaluations, let us describe a few observations that
motivated us to develop our methods. In Figure 5.4, we show the evolution of the states
of all nodes in an instance of the average consensus algorithm when an attacker is present.
Recalling that ξij ≈ xkj (Tij) − xkj (0), i.e., the difference between the terminal and initial
will largely depend on the context of application: A certain percentage of nodes disconnected; A number of
nodes having degree one; Or a number of nodes. surrounded by attacker.
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Figure 5.3: The Manhattan network topology considered. First we select only node 1 as
an attacker, while all other nodes are normal. Then, in the second set of experiments, we
consider and increasing number of nodes to be an attacker i.e node [1], [1, 2], [1, 2, 3] . . ..
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Figure 5.4: State evolution in a single random consensus run. The dashed lines are the
state trajectories for the normal nodes. The malicious node (black) is forcing all normal
nodes (dashed) to its target value α = 0, while the true xav = 0.5 (green). Furthermore the
noise of the malicious agent is given by the true λ2 of the network without attackers (blue).
state values, we see that ξij tends to be larger if node j is normal, i.e., j ∈ Vr. On the
other hand, Figure 5.5 presents a scatter plot for the value of (xki (t), x
k
j (t)) for two pairs of
adjacent nodes, one with a malicious node and one without. We observe that in the former
case, the scatter plot is tilted towards horizontal, indicating a larger spatial difference, i.e.,
Vij (or V˜ij).
5.4.1 Detection & Localization with one Attacker
We first simulate the performance of the proposed schemes when the network is under
attack from |Vs| = 1 malicious node. As the network topology is symmetrical, without loss
of generality we set node 1 to be the attacker. Notice that there are 4 nodes located directly
next to the attacker.
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Figure 5.6: Temporal method detector performance: (Left) ROCs for attacker detection.
For the considered Ks, the theoretical bounds (5.25) & (5.26) are trivial and therefore
omitted. (Right) ROCs for localization of attacker. Dotted lines show the theoretical bounds
in (5.31) & (5.32). Markers show the bounds obtained by applying Gaussian approximation.
5.4.1.1 Temporal Difference Method
We present the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the temporal difference
method in Figure 5.6. First, we consider the performance of the neighborhood detection
task in Figure 5.6 (Left). As we only focus on the case when the evaluating node i is
located next to the attacker, the ROC curves also correspond to the attacker detection
task. The false alarm and detection probabilities are evaluated by taking an average of
the probabilities of all the four neighbors of the attacker. From the figure, we notice that
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Figure 5.7: Temporal method: Probability of correct localization of all nodes for K = 25
the detection performance improve as K increases, as predicted in Theorem 1. Accruing
statistics from K ≈ 100 instances seems to provide a reliable detection.
For the localization task in Figure 5.6 (Right), we assume that the neighborhood detec-
tion test was completed without errors (by an ‘Oracle’). Similar to the attacker detection,
the performance of the localization task improves with K. Moreover, with the same K,
the performance of the detection task is worse than that of the localization task. This
corroborates our observations in Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
We also compare the theoretical bounds with the actual performance for the two tasks.
Here, the performance bounds predicted for the Gaussian case are plotted. We observe that
the bounds (5.27) & (5.28) are generally loose in the case of attacker detection, yet (5.31)
& (5.32) nearly match the actual performance.
We then investigate the optimal thresholds I , δI for the temporal difference method.
Fixing at K = 25, Figure 5.7 shows the probability when all neighbors are classified cor-
rectly. Since all neighboring nodes have to be classified correctly, the nodes next to the
attacker have to both detect and localize the attackers, as well as classifying the normal
nodes. Nodes that are not next to an attacker, i.e. with only normal neighbors, must not
detect a neighborhood attack. We find that for the thresholds (δI , I) chosen as (0.6,0.25),
we classify all neighbors correctly with a probability of 63%.
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5.4.1.2 Spatial Difference Method
For the spatial difference method, the ROC curves of the attacker detection are shown
in Figure 5.8. Contrary to the temporal difference case, the spatial difference method can
also detect an attack if a node is more than one hop away from the attacker. Therefore, in
addition to performing attacker detection on nodes that are directly next to the attacker,
we also compare the detection performance on nodes that, for our example, are two hops
away from the attacker seen in Figure 5.8 (Right). From the figure, the nodes that are
directly next to an attacker are clearly more sensitive then the nodes far from an attacker.
In Figure 5.9, we show the ROC curves for the localization and neighborhood detection
tasks. Specifically, in the neighborhood detection task we evaluate the false alarm/detection
probabilities conditioned on H1, i.e., when the attacker is actually present in the network.
Observe that we can get the neighborhood detection to work, however it is the worst per-
forming test for the spatial difference method. For the localization task in Figure 5.9
(Right), similar to the temporal case, we assume that the neighborhood detection test was
completed without errors. Also in this case, the tests improve with K in a way that is
more pronounced than with the temporal difference method, and under the same K, the
performance of the neighborhood detection task is worse than that of the localization task.
Nevertheless, the spatial method has a drastic advantage over the temporal method in spot-
ting attacks, as it leverages information of the entire dynamic, while the temporal method
only uses the initial and terminal states.
We now investigate the optimal thresholds II , δII for the spatial difference method by
studying the case with K = 25. In Figure 5.10 we plot the probability when all nodes are
classified correctly, using similar settings as Figure 5.8. We find that for the thresholds
(δII , II) chosen as (50,1100) we classify all nodes correctly with a probability of 87%.
Comparing the performance of the temporal and spatial difference methods, we see that
the spatial difference method is outperforming the former. However, we notice that the
computational complexity requirement of applying the spatial difference method is higher.
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Figure 5.10: Spatial method: Probability of correct localization of all nodes for K = 25
5.4.1.3 Non Sub-Gaussian Distribution
Next, we evaluate the performance of the data injection attack methods when the states’
distributions are not sub-Gaussian. In particular, we repeat the simulations above with the
attackers and normal nodes’ states generated with a Laplacian distribution, with unit vari-
ance and mean γ¯ = 0.5 for normal nodes, and mean α¯ = 0 for the attacker. The simulation
results are shown in Figure 5.11. As seen, the detection/localization performances are al-
most identical to the cases considered with Gaussian initialization. This shows that the
proposed methods are robust to the distribution of the nodes’ states.
5.4.1.4 Correlated Attackers
Finally, we consider a scenario when the attacker’s target values are correlated across
instances. We assume that the attacker’s states follow an autoregressive model, i.e., αk+1 =
0.9γk+1 + 0.1αk with α0 = γ0; while the other settings remain the same. Under this attack,
the detector performance is shown in Figure 5.12. As seen in the figure, the two proposed
method achieve similar performance as in the case with i.i.d. attacker’s statistics.
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Figure 5.11: ROCs with the Laplacian distribution via the (Top) temporal method and
(Bottom) spatial method.
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Figure 5.12: ROCs with an autoregressive attacker’s target value via the (Top) temporal
method and (Bottom) spatial method.
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5.4.2 Detection & Localization of Multiple Attackers
We now consider the case when the network is under the coordinated attack from mul-
tiple nodes. We consider the same topology and parameters as before and fix K = 25 for
all experiments. The attackers share the same αk, but each of them adds a random and
independent series of noise samples. In the experiments, we assign the first d nodes as the
attackers, i.e., we set nodes {1, ..., d} as the attackers when considering a scenario with d
attackers (cf. Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.13 plots the ROC curves for the attacker detection task with up to 7 attackers.
We notice that the performance for both methods depends on the number of attacking
neighbors. At this point we recall that in the chosen topology each node has 4 neighbors.
For the temporal method, we observe that the detection rate is best with 2 attackers and
2 normal neighboring nodes. For the spatial method, we notice that the attack detection
performance degrades with the amount of attackers increasing in the network, but the
attacker localization performance is the best with 2 neighboring attackers and 2 normal
nodes. This result makes sense as in this case, (5.20) will be maximized, thus giving rise to
a higher detection rate. The performance also seems to be identical for nodes with either 1
or 3 attacking neighbors, given the same total number of attackers in the network. This is
due to the fact that each node is comparing with all its neighbors (5.21). As there are more
attackers, the value of 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni x
k
j (t) becomes more biased by the attackers themselves,
which therefore become harder to detect.
In Figure 5.14, we show the ROC curves for the localization task with up to 7 attackers.
For the temporal method, the localization performance is independent of the number of
attackers and neighboring attackers. Meanwhile, the spatial method’s localization perfor-
mance, degrades with both the number of attackers and the number of neighboring attackers.
We speculate that this is due to the fact that in (5.23), when there are more neighboring
attackers, the influence of an individual attacker becomes less pronounced. Furthermore
with more attackers in the network, more normal nodes will be affected directly, thus the
localization task becomes more difficult with the spatial difference method. Nevertheless,
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Figure 5.13: Detection performance, depending on how many attackers are present, averaged
over all nodes with the same amount of malicious neighbors: (Left) ROCs for the temporal
method (Right) ROCs for the spatial method.
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Figure 5.14: Localization performance, depending on how many attackers are present, av-
eraged over all nodes with the same amount of malicious neighbors: (Left) ROCs for the
temporal method (Right) ROCs for the spatial method.
the spatial method performs the best from Figure 5.14. With an increasing amount of
attackers, however, the temporal difference method provides better performance.
Lastly, we consider a scenario when the attacker nodes, i.e., node 1 & 2, do not share
the same target value. In Figure 5.15, we show the trajectories of the nodes’ states of the
consensus algorithm when we set [αk]1 = 1 and [α
k]2 = 0. We observe that the two attackers
settles at their individual target value (in black and blue), while the states of normal nodes
146
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time t
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Cu
rre
nt
 V
al
ue
 x
k i[t
]
Figure 5.15: Trajectories of nodes’ states with two non-agreeing attackers in the network.
The attackers’ states are in black and blue
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Figure 5.16: ROCs with non agreeing attackers via the (Top) temporal method; (Bottom)
spatial method.
fluctuate between 0 and 1. The detection and localization performances of the proposed
methods are shown in Figure 5.16. From the top figure, we observe the temporal metric is
able to the attack with worsened performance than in the previous sections. On the other
hand, from the bottom figure, the spatial metric achieves an almost perfect performance.
The reason for that is that the network is never converging, thus the spatial metric diverges,
i.e., Xkim → ∞, whenever the attackers are present (cf. compare Figure 5.15 with Figure
5.4).
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Figure 5.17: (Left) Expected number of residual attackers, (Middle) probability of discon-
nected nodes and (Right) average algebraic connectivity versus iteration number.
5.4.3 Decentralized Disconnection
In Figure 5.17, we show the performance of decentralized disconnection method discussed
in Section 5.2 using the spatial metric, for the same network topology as in the previous
experiments with one attacker and setting K = 25.
We show the expected number of residual attackers in the network in Figure 5.17 (Left),
from which we observe that after 4 iterations of the detection and disconnection algorithm
we remove the attacker 100% of the times.
In Figure 5.17 (Middle) we show the probability that normal nodes get disconnected.
Because we set a low probability of false alarm we rarely have disconnections and rarely they
are in excess of the attacker. This explains the fact that the average algebraic connectivity,
shown in Figure 5.17 (Right), hardly changes over the iterations.
5.4.4 Sequential Change Detection
We consider extending the attacker detection method to a sequential change detection.
The idea is compute the log-likelihood of each sample (of temporal or spatial difference
metrics) assuming a change in mean and variance of a Gaussian distribution (approximating
the true distribution) and decide if a significant change in distribution has occurred due to
attacks.
Let µ¯k, (σ¯k)2 be estimated mean and variance respectively in the absence of an attack,
adaptively updated at every k as follows
µ¯k+1 = 0.98µ¯k + 0.02zki , (5.41)
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Figure 5.18: Trajectories of the log likelihood using (Left) temporal difference metric and
(Right) spatial difference metric.
(
σ¯k+1
)2
= 0.98
(
σ¯k
)2
+ 0.02 · (zki − µ¯k)2. (5.42)
where zki is the temporal or spatial’s metrics output. Moreover, at instance k, we compute
the sample mean µˆk and variance (σˆk)2 from a window of 25 samples of zki into the future.
If the network is under attack, we expect to see a significant difference between the
two pairs of sample mean/variance. Assuming a Gaussian prior, we can compute the log-
likelihood:
Lk = log(σˆk/σ¯k)− ((zki − µˆk)2 − (zki − µ¯k)2)/2 (5.43)
We further smooth out the log-likelihood using an AR model with a forgetting factor of
0.1. Figure 5.18 shows an example trajectory of Lk with the temporal and spatial difference
metric, where the attack began at sample 0 and the first 200 samples are used to initialize
the estimators. Both detectors show a peak after the attack started, and fall under the
threshold after the change, as the attack continue persist and the mean/variance estimated
is now tracking the high value corresponding to the persisting attack. The classification of
the state of the network can be done by comparing the sample mean/variance prior and
after the change since the metric has an increased mean/variance when the network is under
attack. Note that the spatial metric’s peak is higher than the temporal one, indicating once
again that the spatial method has better detection performance. In Figure 5.19 we show the
probability that an attack/change is detected before sample k, with an attack happening at
sample k = 0, averaged over 600 Monte-Carlo trials. We can see that the temporal method
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Figure 5.19: Performance of sequential change attack detection.
does not detect all the time the starting time of the attack but provides a reasonable low
amount of false alarm. The spatial method on the other hand is very accurate.
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Appendix
5.A Proof of Theorem 1
Observe the following chain for the false alarm rate:
P
(
Hˆ = Hi1 | Hi0
)
= P
∑
m∈Ni
|ξim − ξ¯i| ≥ δ | Hi0

≤ |Ni|P
(
|ξim − ξ¯i| ≥ δ|Ni| | H
i
0
)
, for some m ∈ Ni,
(5.44)
where we have applied the union bound in the last inequality. We have
ξim − ξ¯i = 1
K
K∑
k=1
(−1 + 1|Ni|
)
γkm +
∑
j∈Ni\{m}
1
|Ni|γ
k
j
 .
The quantity above is a zero mean r.v. with sub-Gaussian parameter σ2γ(|Ni| − 1)/(K|Ni|).
Applying the Hoeffding’s inequality [Massart(2003)] to the last term of (5.44) yields the
desired result.
For the miss detection rate, we have
P
(
Hˆ = Hi0 | Hi1
)
= P
∑
m∈Ni
|ξim − ξ¯i| ≤ δ | Hi1

≤ P (|ξim − ξ¯i| ≤ δ | Hi1) ∀ m ∈ Ni.
(5.45)
Observe that
ξij =

(1/K)
∑K
k=1(m
k
j (0)), j ∈ Vs,
(1/K)
∑K
k=1(α
k − γkj ), j /∈ Vs.
and
ξ¯i =
1
K|Ni|
K∑
k=1
 ∑
j∈Vs∩Ni
mkj (0) +
∑
j∈Vr∩Ni
(αk − γkj )

We observe that ξim − ξ¯i is a r.v. with mean µi and sub-Gaussian parameter σ2i /K for
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m ∈ Vs. Let us write ξim − ξ¯i = ξ˜im + µi. We can upper bound the last term in (5.45) as:
P
(|ξim − ξ¯i| ≤ δ | Hi1) ≤ P (ξ˜im ≥ −δ + |µi| | Hi1) (5.46)
Consequently, the desired inequality can be obtained by applying Hoefding’s inequality.
5.B Proof of Lemma 1
Under Hij1 , we have ξij = (1/K)
∑K
k=1m
k
j (0), where m
k
j (0) are zero mean, independent
r.v.s with sub-Gaussian parameter σ2M . Under Hij0 , we have
ξij =
1
K
K∑
k=1
(
αk − γkj
)
, (5.47)
note that the terms inside the summation have mean α¯− γ¯ and are independent with sub-
Gaussian parameter σ2α+σ
2
γ . Similar to Theorem 1, the desired inequalities can be obtained
by applying Hoeffding’s inequality.
5.C Proof of Theorem 2
For the ease of presentation, we ignore the index i throughout this proof. Through-
out this section, we use · to denotes the inner product between matrices, i.e., A·B :=
Tr(A>B).
5.C.1 First-Order Statistics
Under H0, it is obvious that:
E[Xkm] = E
∑
t∈Tk
xkm(t)− 1|Ni| ∑
j∈Ni
xkj (t)
 = 0. (5.48)
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Under H1, we observe the following chain:
ηim = E[Xkm] = E
∑
t∈Tk
xkm(t)− 1|Ni| ∑
j∈Ni
xkj (t)

= (em − 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
ej)
>∑
t∈Tk
W
t
α¯1
γ¯1

= (em − 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
ej)
>∑
t∈Tk
W
t
(
α¯1 + (γ¯ − α¯)
 0
1
)
= (em − 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
ej)
>
 0
(γ¯ − α¯)∑t∈TkDt1
 .
where the last equality is due to the stochasticity ofW and the fact that (em− 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni ej)
>1 =
0.
5.C.2 Second-Order Statistics
Define the following quantities
Akt1,t2 :=
(
xk(t1)− E[xk(t1)]
)(
xk(t2)− E[xk(t2)]
)>
. (5.49)
Fn,m := (en − 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
ej)(em − 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
ej)
>. (5.50)
Note that the variance ofXkm can be written as E[(Xkm−E[Xkm])2] = Fm,m ·(∑t1,t2 E[Akt1,t2 ]).
1) Under hypothesis H0 — In this case, we observe that E[xk(t)] = γ¯1. Using W (t)1 = 1
for all t, we have:
xk(t)− E[xk(t)] = W (t) · · ·W (1)(γk − γ¯1),
153
where (γk − γ¯1) ∼ N (0, σ2γI) is independent of W (t), ...,W (1). We can evaluate:
E[Akt1,t2 ] = σ
2
γE[W (t1) · · ·W (1)W (1)> · · ·W (t2)>]
= σ2γW
max{t1,t2},
(5.51)
where the first equality is due to E
[
W (t)W>(t)
]
= E
[
W 2(t)
]
= E [W (t)] = W , since
W (t) is a projection matrix under the current hypothesis. The variance of Xkm under H0
can be evaluated as:
E[(Xkm − E[Xkm])2|H0] = Fm,m· (∑
t1,t2
E[Akt1,t2 ]
)
= Fm,m·(∑
t
E[Akt,t] + 2
∑
t2,t1>t2
E[Akt1,t2 ]
)
= σ2γFm,m·(∑
t
W
t
+ 2
∑
t2,t1>t2
W
t1
)
= σ2γFm,m·(∑
t
(2t− 1)(11> + n∑
i=2
λti(W )viv
>
i
))
,
(5.52)
where λi(W ) is the ith largest eigenvalue of W and vi is the associated eigenvector. To
show that the variance is bounded, we observe the following fact: (i) Fm,m ·11> = 0 for
all m; (ii) λi(W ) < 1 for all i ≥ 2 and thus the associated sum is bounded by
∞∑
t=1
(2t− 1)λti(W ) =
3λi(W )− 1
(1− λi(W ))2
<∞. (5.53)
We conclude that under H0, E[(Xkm − E[Xkm])2] < ∞ for all m and it can be analytically
calculated by (5.52) & (5.53). Furthermore, the variance grows as
τ2im = Cτim ·
(
σ2γ
λ2(W )
(1− λ2(W ))2
)
. (5.54)
2) Under hypothesis H1 — Define xˆk(t) = xk(t) − E[xk(t)] and its partition as xˆk(t) =
(sˆk(t)>, rˆk(t)>)> such that sˆk(t), rˆk(t) correspond to the malicious nodes and normal
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nodes, respectively. Our goal is to evaluate:
E[Akt1,t2 ] =
E[sˆk(t1)sˆk(t2)>] E[sˆk(t1)rˆk(t2)>]
E[rˆk(t1)sˆk(t2)>] E[rˆk(t1)rˆk(t2)>]
 . (5.55)
In Appendix 5.G, we show:
Lemma 4: Under H1 and the same settings as in Proposition 2. The expectation of Akt1,t2
is:
E[Akt1,t2 ] = σ
2
α11
> + Θ(σ2m min{t1, t2} · λ˜max{t1,t2})
+ Θ((σ2γ + σ
2
α)λ˜
max{t1,t2})−Ξt1,t2 ,
(5.56)
where λ˜ = max{λˆ2, λ1(D)} < 1 and
Ξt1,t2 = σ
2
α
 0 11>(Dt2)>
Dt111> Dt111> + 11>(Dt2)>
 . (5.57)
Using the fact that Fm,m ·11> = 0 and Fm,m ·Ξt1,t2 = 0, the variance of Xkm depends
on the latter two terms in (5.56). The second last term with Θ(min{t1, t2}λ˜max{t1,t2}) is
bounded as
∑
t1,t2
min{t1, t2}λ˜max{t1,t2}
=
∑
t
tλ˜t + 2
∑
t1>t2
t2λ˜
t1 =
λ˜
(1− λ˜)2 + 2
∑
t
∑
τ
tλ˜t+τ
=
λ˜
(1− λ˜)2 + 2
∑
t
tλ˜t
1− λ˜ =
λ˜(3− λ˜)
(1− λ˜)3 <∞.
In particular, the variance of Xkm has the following order
β2im = Cβim ·
(
(σ2γ + σ
2
α)
3λ˜− 1
(1− λ˜)2 + σ
2
m
3λ˜− λ˜2
(1− λ˜)3
)
. (5.58)
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This concludes the proof. It is worth mentioning that Sij2 can be similarly expressed as a
Chi-square r.v. with bounded variance.
5.D Proof of Theorem 3
To facilitate our analysis, we define X¯im := K
−1∑K
k=1X
k
im as the averaged statistics
over the K observed instances of consensus. Moreover, let X¯i := (X¯im)m∈Ni be an |Ni|-
dimensional random vector. Note that Si1 = |Ni|−1‖X¯i‖22, whose concentration inequalities
are derived below.
1) Under H0 — In this case, we observe that:
X¯i ∼ N (0,Σi0), where diag(Σi0) = (τ2im/K)m∈Ni . (5.59)
The K−1 scaling in the diagonal of Σi0 is due to the fact that Xkim are independent across k.
In fact, as Σi0 must be positive semidefinite, there is also a K
−1 scaling for every element
in the matrix Σi0. Let Σi0 = QDiag(τ¯
2
i /K)Q
> with3 τ¯ 2i := (τ¯
2
im)m∈Ni , we can express S
i
1
as:
Si1 = |Ni|−1
∑
m∈Ni
τ¯2im
K
(X˜im)
2, (5.60)
where X˜im ∼ N (0, 1) are independent across m ∈ Ni. We have
P (Si1 ≥ δII |H0) = P
(∑
m∈Ni τ¯
2
imX˜
2
im ≥ K|Ni|δII
)
= P
(∑
m∈Ni
τ¯2imX˜
2
im ≥ ‖τ¯ 2i ‖1 − 2‖τ¯ 2i ‖2
√
t? + 2‖τ¯ 2i ‖∞t?
)
The last term can be bounded by exp(−t?) using Proposition 1.1 in [Hsu et al.(2012)], which
is due to Laurent and Massart [Laurent and Massart(2000)]. Hence, we have:
√
t? =
‖τ¯ 2i ‖2
2‖τ¯ 2i ‖∞
(
1 +
√
2‖τ¯ 2i ‖∞
‖τ¯ 2i ‖22
(K|Ni|δII − ‖τ¯ 2i ‖1) + 1
)
(5.61)
We consider the case when K|Ni|δII ≥ ‖τ¯ 2i ‖1. If K → ∞, then t? ≈ K|Ni|δII/(2‖τ¯ 2i ‖∞).
3We remark that τ¯2im are at the same order of τ
2
im.
156
Finally:
P (Si1 ≥ δII |H0) ≤ exp(−K|Ni|δII/(2‖τ¯ 2i ‖∞)). (5.62)
2) Under H1 — In this case, we observe that:
X¯i ∼ N (ηi,Σi1), where diag(Σi1) =
(
β2im
K
)
,m ∈ Ni, (5.63)
where we obtained a scaling of K−1 using the independence of Xkim across k. Let Σi1 =
QDiag(β¯2i /K)Q
> with β¯2i := (β¯
2
im)
|Ni|
m=1, X˜i ∼ N (0, I) be an isotropic Gaussian vector with
elements X˜i := (X˜im)
|Ni|
m=1 and η¯i = Q
>ηi, we observe the following chain:
Si1 = |Ni|−1‖Diag
(
β¯i/
√
K
)
X˜i + η¯i‖22
= |Ni|−1
|Ni|∑
m=1
(
β¯im√
K
X˜im + η¯im
)2 (5.64)
Let Ni1 be the rank of Σi1 such that β¯im = 0 for all m ≥ Ni1 + 1. Observe that Si1 can now
be regarded as a sum of Ni1 independent random variables. Recalling the generic Chernoff’s
bound which states that for independent random variables X1, ..., Xn, it follows:
P (X1 + . . .+Xn ≤ a) ≤ eat
n∏
i=1
E
[
e−tXi
]
. (5.65)
Moreover, we observe that for β¯2im > 0 and all t < 1/2:
E
[
e
t(X˜im+
√
K
β¯im
η¯im)
]
= (1− 2t)−12 exp
(
Kη¯2imt
(1− 2t)β¯2im
)
.
Plugging the above into (5.65), we can upper bound P (Si1 ≤ δII |H1) by:
exp
(
δt˜−
Ni1∑
m=1
η¯2imt˜
1 + 2β¯2imt˜/K
)
Ni1∏
m=1
(1 + 2β¯2imt˜/K)
− 1
2 , (5.66)
for any t˜ > 0 and we have set δ = |Ni|δII−
∑|Ni|
m=Ni1
η¯2im. In particular, setting t = K/2β¯
2
imin
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yields:
P (Si1 ≤ δII |H1) ≤
exp
(
−K max
{
0,−δ +
Ni1∑
m=1
η¯2im
1 + β¯2im/β¯
2
imin
})
.
(5.67)
5.E Proof of Lemma 2
The test statistics Sij2 can be written as
Sij2 = (η˜ij + X˜ij)
2,
where X˜ij is a zero-mean Gaussian r.v. with variance bounded by β˜
2
ij/K. The false alarm
and miss detection probability can be bounded by evaluating:
P ijlf = P (S
ij
2 ≥ II |Hij0 ), 1− P ijld = P (Sij2 ≤ II |Hij1 ).
The desirable bounds can be obtained straightforwardly using the definition of the Q-
function.
5.F Proof of Lemma 3
Our goal is to bound the following probability:
P
(
Hˆ = Hi1 | Hi1
)
= P
( ∑
m∈Ni
|ξim − ξ¯i| ≥ δI | Hi1
)
(5.68)
Under Hi1, each of ξim − ξ¯i is an r.v. with mean µi and sub-Gaussian parameter of σ2i /K.
Similar to Appendix 5.A, we can write ξim − ξ¯i = ξ˜im + µi. Moreover, using the inequality
158
∑
m∈Ni |ξim − ξ¯i| ≤
∑
m∈Ni |ξim|+ |Ni||µi|, we obtain the upper bound:
P
(
Hˆ = Hi1 | Hi1
)
≤ P
( ∑
m∈Ni
|ξim| ≥ δI − |Ni||µi|
)
≤ |Ni| · P
(|ξim| ≥ |Ni|−1δI − |µi|)
≤ 2|Ni| · exp
(
−K (max{0, |Ni|
−1δI − |µi|})2
2σ2i
)
,
(5.69)
where the last inequality is due to Chernoff’s inequality. This concludes our proof.
5.G Proof of Lemma 4
Recall that
sˆk(t) = zkα1 +m
k(t),
where zkα := α
k − α¯ ∼ N (0, σ2α). Denote Φ(t, s) = D(t)D(t− 1)...D(s) and zkγ := γk − γ¯1,
we can write
rˆk(t) =
t−1∑
s=0
Φ(t− 1, s+ 1)B(s)(zkα1 +mk(s)) + Φ(t− 1, 0)zkγ .
The top-left block in (5.55) can be evaluated as:
E[sˆk(t1)sˆk(t2)>] = σ2α11> + δ(t1 − t2)(λˆt1σm)2I, (5.70)
Then, the top-right and bottom-left blocks are decomposed as:
E[rˆk(t1)sˆk(t2)>] = E[zkαrˆk(t1)1>] + E[rˆk(t1)mk(t2)>].
Using the fact B(s)1 = (I −D(s))1, we note that
∑t1−1
s=0 Φ(t1 − 1, s+ 1)B(s)1
=
∑t1−1
s=0 (Φ(t1 − 1, s+ 1)−Φ(t1 − 1, s))1
= 1−Φ(t1 − 1, 0)1.
(5.71)
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++
Figure 5.G.1: Linear System for rˆ(t).
As zkα, z
k
γ ,m
k(t) are mutually independent, taking the expectation gives
E[zkαrˆk(t1)1>] = σ2α(I −Dt1)11>, (5.72)
Moreover, if t1 ≥ t2,
E[rˆk(t1)mk(t2)>]
= (λˆt2σm)
2u(t1 − t2 − 1)E[Φ(t1 − 1, t2 + 1)B(t2)]
= (λˆt2σm)
2u(t1 − t2 − 1)Dt1−t2−1B,
(5.73)
where u(t) is the unit step function such that u(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0 and is zero otherwise.
In general, the term above can be bounded by O(σ2mλ1(D)max{t1,t2}). As such,
E[rˆk(t1)sˆk(t2)>] = σ2α11> − σ2αDt111>
+O(σ2mλ1(D)max{t1,t2})
(5.74)
Finally, we compute the bottom-right block E[rˆk(t1)rˆk(t2)>], i.e., the covariance of rˆ(t).
Observe that rˆ(t) can be viewed as the output of a linear system as shown in Figure 5.G.1,
with the input:
δ(t)zkγ + z
k
αB(t)1 +B(t)m
k(t) (5.75)
Importantly, rˆk(t) can be expressed as the superposition of the responses to the three input
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signals above. For t ≥ 1:
rˆk(t) = Φ(t− 1, 0)zkγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
rˆk1 (t)
+ zkα
t−1∑
s=0
Φ(t− 1, s+ 1)B(s)1︸ ︷︷ ︸
rˆk2 (t)
+
t−1∑
s=0
Φ(t− 1, s+ 1)B(s)mk(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
rˆk3 (t)
,
(5.76)
and rˆk(0) = 0. The output signals rˆk1(t), rˆ
k
2(t), rˆ
k
3(t) correspond to the input signal δ(t)z
k
γ ,
zkαB(t)1 and B(t)m
k(t), respectively. It is obvious that rˆk1(t), rˆ
k
2(t), rˆ
k
3(t) are mutually
independent. As such, the covariance can be decomposed as
E[rˆk(t1)rˆk(t2)>] (5.77)
=E[rˆk1(t1)rˆk1(t2)>] + E[rˆk2(t1)rˆk2(t2)>] + E[rˆk3(t1)rˆk3(t2)>].
Consider the following chain for E[rˆk1(t1)(rˆk1(t2))>]:
vec
(
E[rˆk1(t1)(rˆk1(t2))>]
)
(5.78)
= σ2γ (I ⊗D)t1−t2 (E [D(t)⊗D(t)])t2 vec (I)
= Θ(σ2γλ1(D)
max{t1,t2}).
where we have used the identity vec(AXB) = (B> ⊗A)vec(X) recursively and the fact
that λ1 (E [D(t)⊗D(t)]) ≤ λ1(I ⊗D) = λ1(D) < 1.
Next, using (5.71), we have
rˆk2(t) = z
k
α(1−Φ(t− 1, 0)1). (5.79)
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Therefore,
E[rˆk2(t1)rˆk2(t2)>]
= σ2αE[(1−Φ(t1 − 1, 0)1)(1−Φ(t2 − 1, 0)1)>]
= σ2α
(
11> −Dt111> − 1(Dt21)>
+ E[Φ(t1 − 1, 0)11>Φ(t2 − 1, 0)>]
)
(5.80)
Similar to (5.78), the last term above can be bounded as
vec
(
E[Φ(t1 − 1, 0)11>Φ(t2 − 1, 0)>]
)
= (I ⊗D)t1−t2 (E [D(t)⊗D(t)])t2 vec
(
11>
)
= Θ(λ1(D)
max{t1,t2}).
(5.81)
We finally consider the covariance of output due to mk(t):
E[rˆk3(t1 + 1)(rˆk3(t2 + 1))>] =
E
[
t2∑
s=0
(λˆsσm)
2Φ(t1, s+ 1)B(s)B
>(s)Φ>(t2, s+ 1)
]
,
where we have used the fact that mk(s) is independent of mk(s′) for s 6= s′. Again,
vectorizing the term above yields
t2−1∑
s=0
(λˆsσm)
2 (I ⊗D)t1−t2 (E [D(t)⊗D(t)])t2−s−1 b˜
= Θ(σ2m min{t1, t2} ·max{λˆ2, λ1(D)}max{t1,t2}) (5.82)
where b˜ = vec(E[B(s)⊗B(s)]). Combining (5.78), (5.80) and (5.82) give:
E[rˆk(t1)rˆk(t2)>] = σ2α(11> −Dt111> − 1(Dt21)>)
+ Θ((σ2α + σ
2
γ)λ1(D)
max{t1,t2})
+ Θ(σ2m min{t1, t2} ·max{λˆ2, λ1(D)}max{t1,t2}).
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6 Conclusions
As (wireless) sensor networks are becoming larger and larger (and more important in
everyday life) we have proposed and studied in this dissertation several scalable solutions to
have a complete architecture for data acquisition, wired and wireless transport, processing
and aggregation; with higher level of data availability, security and integrity compared to
the state of the art. We also demonstrated that most of our ideas work in practice through
testbeds.
Specifically, we proposed PulseSS, a protocol that provides network synchronization
and proportionally fair scheduling in wireless mesh-networks with a clustered structure.
The protocol was loosely inspired by the PCO model from mathematical biology. PulseSS’
main appeal is that of providing scheduling and synchronization functionalities by exploiting
simple physical layer signaling and local network updates. The complexity of the updates
remains unchanged as the size of the network scales up, offering a competitive alternative
for wireless sensor networks to main-stream protocols, like WirelessHart, especially in ap-
plications that are delay sensitive and need a resilient clock distribution mechanism, e.g.
Intelligent Infrastructures, Internet of Things, Control Area Networks and Cyber-Physical
Systems.
PulseSDN is the extension of PulseSS to wired networks supporting multi hop networks
without the need for buffering data at any hop; while preserving all properties of PulseSS
like synchronization and proportional fair scheduling and self healing networks. This is
especially powerful in low latency applications as data is never buffered in transport, thus
archiving the best possible end-to-end latency, while providing a proportional fair share of
bandwidth to every user.
As our second focus we have developed a system for prioritized, secure and trusted
hierarchical aggregation. In fact sensor data is aggregated and analyzed with multiple
stages, from local processing to field processing to central processing. The idea is that we
process as much data locally as possible in order to classify and prioritize the data already
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at the source, such that critical information such as attacks or outages are transported with
priority. In addition each stage can react autonomously on its locally available analytics,
especially useful for latency minimization and in case of line outages. Last but not least, we
have shown an infrastructure for the collection, and analysis of sensor data for cyber-physical
security (CPS) applications. Our approach is scalable and can integrate any source of data
using inexpensive BeagleBoneBlack (BBB) minicomputers. The data from the sensors is
analyzed at multiple stages and the results of the analytics are used to detect anomalies and
prioritize and direct the flow of data, avoiding congestion in the individual components. We
have applied this framework in the electric distribution grid, and have shown an exemplary
analytics process that can take advantage of the proposed framework. Furthermore we
show that now only electrical data can be transported with this system but also security
monitoring data as follows. In order to stop outside attackers we have shown an automated
cryptographic key distribution system with self monitoring. The automation in this process
is important as there are potentially thousands of sensors in the network that each need
unique and trusted keys, again making the system scalable. The self monitoring of the
automated key distribution system ensures that the key distribution protocol is strictly
followed and any exceptions raise an alarm. This alarm is then propagated upstream using
the same aggregation path as above, thus integrating and allowing for joint analysis with
other types of data. This includes trusted third party data for which we have developed
a method to classify the trustworthiness of external inputs with an automated scoring
metric. This means that only data that passes this trustworthiness test, it is used. Because
it is an automated scoring, large quantities of data inputs can receive their individual
trustworthiness score without human intervention. We can apply the same metric not only
do data producers but also to data consumers, automating witch user or system is allowed
to read and process the data.
Last but not least we have shown how to protect a decentralized Gossip based network,
that is prune for attacks due to its flat architecture, against inside attackers. To protect
from said inside attackers, i.e. attackers that have all necessary keys, we have proposed
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two independent novel strategies to detect and localize attackers in a randomized consensus
algorithm. Each strategy can be performed at each individual node in a completely decen-
tralized manner and without any communication overhead. The performance bounds of the
algorithm are analyzed, and the simulation results confirmed our findings.
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